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SUMMARY 
 
 
 
This dissertation is about the poetry and prose, published and unpublished, of the British poet 
Douglas Dunlop Oliver (1937-2000), written between 1973-1991. It traces the development of 
Oliver’s poetics from his early prose through his later poetry of the 1970s and 1980s. The 
dissertation makes extensive use of archive material stored in the Douglas Oliver Archive at the 
Albert Sloman Library, University of Essex, the vast majority of which has thus far received 
little or no critical commentary or appraisal.  
 
Contained in the archive are a set of unpublished essays Oliver wrote as a mature undergraduate 
at the University of Essex between 1974-1975. In my first chapter, I discuss these essays and 
examine their philosophical and aesthetic standpoints in order to understand and expand upon 
Oliver’s published claims about the experience of reading poetry in his theoretical monograph 
Poetry and Narrative in Performance (1989). Oliver’s thinking about prosody and poetic 
language are then discussed in relation to his books of poetry on explicitly political subjects, 
The Diagram--Poems (1979) and The Infant and the Pearl (1985).  
 
My second and third chapters present close readings of Oliver’s poetry with a view to 
understanding and critiquing the political arguments conducted therein. My second chapter, on 
The Diagram--Poems, adds to the discussion of prosody the historical significance of Oliver’s 
thinking about “stupidity,” and reads the poetry’s political intervention in the light of such 
thinking. My third chapter, on The Infant and the Pearl, reads the poem’s critique of the 
contemporary political landscape with the help of the extensive scholarship on its prototype, the 
medieval Pearl, in order to explain and critique Oliver’s poem’s emphasis on national and inter-
personal “unity.”  
 
The dissertation argues throughout that the inseparability of poetic form and political feeling is 
at the heart of Oliver’s practice as a poet. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
This dissertation is about the poetry and prose, published and unpublished, of the British poet Douglas 
Dunlop Oliver (1937-2000), written between the years 1973 and 1991. Oliver’s work is not now widely 
read or discussed by many people beyond certain communities of poets, critics and students of the UK 
and North American experimental and avant-garde poetry scenes. Yet during his later life, at least, Oliver 
was the recipient of a wide range of plaudits and enjoyed some impressive public claims for his poetry. 
The reception of his work by the mainstream of the English press and literary organs was often as 
enthusiastic as its celebration in the pages of smaller, avant-garde journals. Writing in The Times, Peter 
Ackroyd named Oliver’s 1987 collected poems Kind “the finest poetry of the year.”1 Patrick Wright and 
Howard Brenton both heaped praise on Oliver’s The Infant and the Pearl (1985) and Penniless Politics 
(1991) in the London Review of Books and The Guardian respectively, with Brenton in 1992 claiming the 
latter poem had set “the literary agenda for the next two decades,” invoking both Eliot and Milton as 
comparable precursors.2 Bloodaxe Books reprinted Penniless Politics in 1994 with Brenton’s ecstatic 
recommendation as a foreword. Oliver was declared by Ian Sansom in 1997, again in The Guardian, to be 
“one of the very best political poets writing in English.”3 By the time of his death in 2000, Oliver had 
become one of the most publicly and internationally visible of all the poets whose writing careers began 
in earnest in the college rooms, grounds, domestic environs and pubs of Cambridge, UK in the 1960s. 
Partly this has to do with Oliver’s shifting geographical locales. His work as a provincial journalist in 
Cambridge in the 1960s, his frequent travels between various English cities and Paris as a journalist in the 
following two decades, to New York in the late 1980s upon his marriage to the American poet Alice 
Notley, and back to Paris in the 1990s where he lived and wrote until his death, allowed him the 
opportunity to establish connections with communities of writers in Britain, France and North America 
with relative ease. Partly, too, it was the result of a deliberate courting and attempted cultivation by Oliver 
of a wider audience for his poetry than the one he had established, originally amongst the Cambridge 
                                                            
1 Peter Ackroyd et al, ‘Bringing the year to book...,’ The Times, Saturday, November 28th 1987, p.13. 
2 Patrick Wright, ‘A Journey through Ruins,’ London Review of Books, Vol. 8, No. 16 (September 18th 1986), p.10; 
Howard Brenton, ‘Poetic passport to a new era,’ The Guardian, Tuesday, April 7th 1992, p.38. See also Patrick 
Wright, ‘Poet of the lower depths,’ The Guardian, October 24th 1991, p.23, on The Infant and the Pearl, 
Penniless Politics and Oliver’s authorship in general. 
3 Ian Sansom, ‘Toffee of the universe,’ review of Ian Sinclair, Douglas Oliver and Denise Riley, Penguin Modern 
Poets 10, The Guardian, Thursday, January 23rd 1997, p.A11. 
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milieu in the late 1960s, many (but by no means all) of whom have since been grouped for critical 
expediency under the shorthand “Cambridge School,” and latterly in the 1970s amongst the poets 
gathered at the new University of Essex. Oliver remained a loyal friend to these communities and a 
committed supporter of their work his entire life.4 
 The poet and publisher Andrew Crozier noted the recognition afforded to Oliver by the 
mainstream press in his obituary of 6th May, 2000. Crozier described Oliver’s desire to move away from 
the small press poetry scene with which he had most often published in the following terms: 
 
Even before [the playwright] Howard Brenton’s outburst in the Guardian in 
1992, acclaiming Penniless Politics (1991) as setting the literary agenda for 
the next two decades, and invoking both Paradise Lost and The Waste Land, 
Oliver had taken the step, necessary in order to reach a broader public, of 
publishing with a trade paperback house.5 
 
Such visibility as I have noted above did not, in fact, translate into the larger readership to which Crozier 
appeals, and which Brenton, in his enthusiastic hyperbole, made a deliberate attempt to encourage into 
existence. Since this readership did not, in the end, materialise, Brenton’s claims today sound almost 
awkwardly impassioned. They were a genuine attempt to promote Oliver’s work out of the obscurity in 
which it nevertheless remains. It is perhaps unsurprising that Crozier, a close friend of Oliver’s, greeted 
Brenton’s discovery, in the last decade of Oliver’s life as he then was, with some eyebrow-raising. 
Brenton’s 1992 review is an “outburst,” late to recognize the vital work of an important poet that had 
been slowly and painstakingly cultivated through the small press scene (to which Crozier was himself a 
significant contributor) for decades. The word finds in Brenton’s rhapsody a tone of flustered tardiness; 
                                                            
4 Oliver’s authorship presents a problem for any clean-cut definition of “Cambridge School” poetry. Published by 
Ferry Press and Allardyce, Barnett for most of his life, Oliver’s mature poetry resembles nothing like the poetry, 
often derided (and sometimes praised) as hermetic and wilfully obscure, that many have transferred by lazy 
association from J.H. Prynne’s late work to an amorphous group picked out usually for their very association 
with, or relationship to, Prynne himself. One of the problems with the moniker, as Andrea Brady has pointed out 
in correspondence with Robert Archambeau, is that it is difficult to tell who is “in” the “Cambridge School” and 
who is not. As Brady writes, “If the Cambridge School did exist, then it existed between the years of the 
publications of the English Intelligencer [1966-1968] and A Various Art [1987]. But these days there’s a great 
deal of obscurity around, in Manchester, London, Newcastle, Glasgow, and Totnes; is all this poetry not 
“Cambridge School” unless it is branded with the mark of Prynne? If Barque [Press] is the modern home of the 
CS, then that field stretches also to Paris, Berlin, China, New York and Winnetka. If it’s all about geography, 
would we say that Dell Olsen is now Cambridge School, because she lives in the episcopacy? Do the most recent 
Yankee immigrants Justin Katko and Ryan Dobran know what they’re in for?” See Cambridge Literary Review, 
Vol. 1, No. 2 (Lent, 2010), pp.244-249 (247). 
5 Andrew Crozier, ‘Douglas Oliver: A poet articulating ethical values in a world of injustice and joy,’ The 
Guardian, Saturday, May 6th 2000, http://www.theguardian.com/news/2000/may/06/guardianobituaries.books 
[accessed 05.12.2014]. The trade paperback house to which Crozier refers is Grafton Books (then a division of 
the Collins Publishing Group), which published Oliver’s Three Variations on a Theme of Harm under its Paladin 
Poetry imprint in 1990. The entire Paladin Poetry series was pulped less than three years later. 
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some of us, intimates Crozier, have known about this stuff for a long time. Crozier’s Ferry Press 
published more of Oliver’s work than any other press during his lifetime, that is, three collections of 
poetry and a novel between 1969 and 1985. Crozier’s wording in his obituary is interesting. It speaks to 
the anxiety of recognition, of the question of the public, and of publicity, that has since become 
something of a critical instrument with which to accuse the “Cambridge School” poets of hypocrisy. One 
recent formulation of this position can be found in Robert Archambeau’s article ‘Public Faces in Private 
Places: Messianic Privacy in Cambridge Poetry,’ first published in 2009 by the Cambridge Literary 
Review.6 Archambeau argues that “poets of the Cambridge School,” with which he associates most 
prominently J.H. Prynne, but also Peter Riley, Tom Raworth, Simon Jarvis and John Wilkinson, as well 
as Keston Sutherland and Andrea Brady, “create a hermetic poetry, circulated outside the regular system 
of publication among a small group of cognoscenti.”7 The charge of hypocrisy is made when Archambeau 
suggests that “Cambridge” poetry “is often justified and explained as a poetry with a specific and far-
reaching political goal and effect,” an impossible effect in contradiction with the limited public afforded 
by small press and private distribution.8 Such circulation “defies the idea of a poetry of public, political 
significance.”9 Archambeau is at times careful to reckon only with those who champion J.H. Prynne’s 
poetry with “far-reaching political [...] effect[s],” but his argument slips into more direct criticism of all 
“Cambridge” poets’ alleged agendas when he concludes by asserting “both the apparent futility of 
Cambridge School poetry’s political ambitions and a sense of the comforting private confinement in 
which it has so often circulated.”10 
 In my second chapter, I detail some of the ways in which Douglas Oliver was (or would have 
been) sympathetic to a critique of this kind, and was so some thirty years before it was first levelled at the 
“Cambridge School” as an entity. Oliver privately but vociferously pressed charges of elitism and 
obscurantism at the modernist canon to which he was himself indebted, and his career as a poet is 
intricately bound up with his search for what he called, in retrospect and near the end of his life, a 
                                                            
6 Robert Archambeau, ‘Public Faces in Private Places: Messianic Privacy in Cambridge Poetry,’ Cambridge 
Literary Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Michaelmas, 2009), pp.199-215, reprinted in Emily Taylor Merriman and Adrian 
Grafe, ed., Intimate Exposure: Essays on the Public-Private Divide in British Poetry Since 1950 (Jefferson, NC 
and London: McFarland & Company, Inc. Publishers, 2010), pp.31-42. 
7 Archambeau, ‘Public Faces...,’ p.31 (Merriman and Grafe ed.). 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., p.32. 
10 Ibid., p.41. 
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“democratic tone.”11 Between the 1970s and the 1980s Oliver made a conscious effort to alter the way he 
wrote poetry, if not exactly in order to appeal to more people than he previously had done (he was not, 
during these decades, publishing with trade paperback houses), then certainly so as to produce in verse 
the “democratic tone” that did justice to the social questions tackled in his poetry. In 1980, Oliver wrote 
to his friend, the poet Peter Riley, that he was “shedding my avant-garde manners but not, I hope, my 
poetic attitudes in other respects.”12 One of these attitudes was a keen sense of loyalty to the people who 
had first supported him, and Oliver continued to publish with presses like Ferry, Street Editions, 
Allardyce, Barnett and Reality Street right up to his death. The difference in tone, style and form between 
Oliver’s first collection Oppo Hectic (1969) and the later works discussed in this dissertation, The 
Diagram--Poems (1979) and The Infant and the Pearl (1985), is certainly substantial. Yet in many 
respects the themes, types of social address and kinds of political desire in Oliver’s early work remain 
rooted to the spot for the duration of his writing life. It is true that Oliver harboured great “political 
ambitions” in, rather than for, his poetry, and one of the aims of this dissertation is to begin to make sense 
of these ambitions through close readings of Oliver’s poetry and prose. By the distinction in Oliver’s 
poems as opposed to for them, I mean to convey something of the sense of my first chapter, in which I 
describe the background to, and the influences upon, Oliver’s theory of prosody. Between 1973 and 1989 
Oliver developed a phenomenological theory of poetical language that asserted the possibility of an 
intersubjective encounter between poet-author and reader, activated by the stresses in verse lines. The 
sheer, perhaps baffling, enormity of such a claim is something I work through in all three of my chapters, 
firstly with reference to a set of unpublished essays Oliver wrote as a mature undergraduate at the 
University of Essex in the first half of the 1970s, and secondly with regards to The Diagram--Poems and 
The Infant and the Pearl. It is a commonplace amongst the existing literature on Oliver, academic or 
journalistic, to note the “ambition” inherent in Oliver’s poetical project. But it is precisely the breadth and 
intelligence of this ambition that requires an explanation if the true measure of Oliver’s contribution to 
English-language poetry in the twentieth century is to be taken. 
 Here is Oliver describing, in his 1989 monograph Poetry and Narrative in Performance, the 
experience of reading verse: 
 
                                                            
11 CAAS, p.249. 
12 Oliver to Riley, 1980, DOA, Box 9. The letter is, infuriatingly, undated except for the year.  
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Author and reader create, through their own implied personification in the 
text, a special intersubjectivity – a perfecting of the emotional and semantic 
fields through a shared experience of space and time, owing to the mystery of 
artistic form. The process reveals what our everyday experience and speech 
could be like if, when our emotions were real and not imaginary, our hearts 
and heads were in temporal consonance.13 
 
This is a truly mysterious vision of aesthetic and social identity. Its scope conceptually exceeds the 
formulation of the problem of pretensions to radical literary efficacy in terms of chapbook sales or 
readership. It exceeds such a formulation not only because the transformation asserted to take place 
during the act of reading a poem is essentially incalculable, “owing to the mystery of artistic form,” but 
also because the desired end of such an act, at the furthest possible boundary of quantifiable social 
consequence, is the bringing into consciousness of something like a utopian state of what Oliver refers to 
as emotional, imaginative and temporal “consonance.” The reason this “consonance” is a “political 
ambition,” and not simply or only an aesthetic one, is that Oliver firmly believed that poetic form and 
social life were intimately intertwined; that “unity,” a theme to which he returned again and again in 
practically everything he wrote, was the object of artistic, ethical, and social endeavour alike; that, as he 
put it in 1990, 
 
Unity of form disappears into ambiguous dark whenever we examine it 
analytically, but its heart is like the always beating heart of a poem: it is the 
precious origin of our lives’ form, or of a true politics.14 
 
The ramifications of this complicated claim, and its practical political resonance in Oliver’s major works 
of the late 1970s and 1980s, are the subjects of the close readings of Oliver’s poems of that period over 
the course of my second and third chapters. My readings of The Diagram--Poems and The Infant and the 
Pearl, themselves a fraction of Oliver’s complete works, are by no means exhaustive. But some important 
questions raised by Oliver’s substantial body of work are, I hope, broached here in some detail. Most 
prominent among these are: what bearing do the philosophical influences on Oliver’s unpublished 1970s 
essays have on his prosodic theory? How do Oliver’s theory of prosody and the politics in, and of, his 
mature poetry relate to one another? What kind of challenge to literature’s relationship to politics does 
Oliver’s work provide? To what extent does Oliver’s poetry refuse practical political suggestion in favour 
                                                            
13 PNP, p.172. 
14 VTH, p.107. 
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of the poetical ideal of social identity which all his major works strive to exemplify and provoke? These 
concerns could be summarised under the single query: what is politics doing in these poems? 
 Both The Diagram--Poems and The Infant and the Pearl are poems in which every syllable and 
stress of every line is positively rigged with politics. Politics, as I hope to show, both begins and begins to 
end in these poems. The political agenda indissoluble from the grain of prosody by which these poems 
exert their powers of argument, persuasion and imperative is one that finds confirmation of its aspirations 
to social justice in the aesthetic result of poetic composition itself. In other words, the poems’ “political 
ambitions” are not expressed as a by-product or neatly extractable result of their polemic, but are in fact 
made possible in the first place by the formal properties of poetic language. They are poems in which 
political desire is made from the very stuff of poetry. Perhaps an attempt to understand how and why this 
is the case might aid us in loosening the stranglehold of the contemporary prevailing narratives of 
mandatorily uneasy aesthetic and political cohabitation – as if the meaning of the two categories were 
somehow mutually constituted, when it comes to political poetry, by their inability to reconcile each other 
to their own particular kind of purchase on social life – and allow us instead to start thinking about the 
kinds of politics that only poems have the capacity to present, promise or predict. Such an attempt as is 
made in the present work may plausibly go some way towards thinking about how, in a very specific 
sense, politics gets made in poems, and by extension, how poems – whole poetries, in fact – are liquidated 
into lifeless component particles when criticism promotes their political thinking to the status of an 
advertising tagline (whether for ‘world change’ or for ‘subjective transformation’) rather than attending to 
the full-blown complexity of their formal virtue, their fantastic gift. I mean by this interjection to 
distinguish such thinking (but by no means to divorce it entirely) from the ways in which, for example, a 
Coleridgean or Byronic Orientalism feeds into, to quote Said, “the making of an imperialist tradition,” or 
the ways in which Wordsworth’s poetry either formalises a European revolutionary imperative, or curdles 
into a nationalist Tory humanism, or both.15 The specific ways that “politics gets made in poems” that I 
have in mind here would be more local and ancillary to such large-scale, historically and culturally 
discursive readings, and would involve, as they do in Oliver’s work, the conscious effort in verse to 
conduct the experience of social relations into something that identifies itself as, or in contradistinction to, 
political organisation. I want to suggest that speculations of this sort might aid us in determining what, 
                                                            
15 See Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003), p.15. 
7 
exactly, “a poetry of public, political significance” at the cynical dénouement of the twentieth century 
actually meant, as well as to reflect upon what this “significance” comes to mean in the hyper-virtualised 
barbarity of the early twenty-first. The work of Douglas Oliver presents one vital opportunity to practise 
these questions at the highest pitch of their social and literary significance. 
8 
Chapter 1 
 
1.1 – Introduction 
 
During the third year of his bachelor’s degree in Comparative Literature at the University of Essex, 1972-
1975, under the supervision of the Shakespearian and scholar of French Renaissance literature, Dr. (now 
Prof. and OBE) Michael Edwards, Oliver wrote a series of five essays dedicated to theorising and 
explaining what he called “the dynamics of artistic creativity.”1 The essays offer readings of Chaucer, 
Husserl, Heidegger and Bataille.2 A sixth essay, which contains scraps and fragments as well as large 
paragraphs of concerted argument, and which is most likely an unfinished draft of the second essay, 
discusses Husserl and Heidegger.3 The essays are composed in a somewhat more personal style than is 
common for academic work of their genre. They are densely written and contain a number of interwoven 
strands of argument. In this chapter I focus on those arguments most prominently related to the 
development of Oliver’s theory of prosody, and which pertain especially to prosody’s “function” – the 
instrumental nature of which will become apparent as we proceed – as well as its effect in the experience 
of composing and reading verse.4 Central to this development is Oliver’s relationship to philosophy, 
expressed in the essays through his selective appropriation, and idiosyncratic account, of elements of 
Husserl’s mature phenomenology. These early essays are exceptionally revealing. They contain the 
                                                            
1 Oliver, ‘Introductory Essay to a series of five concerning the dynamics of artistic creativity. On transcendence 
and relativity in The Canterbury Tales,’ DOA, Box 1, p.1. Hereafter ‘Introductory Essay.’ This box in the 
Douglas Oliver Archive at the University of Essex contains a substantial amount of unpublished prose, largely 
written during the period 1973-1975. It also contains one autobiographical essay, published by the Contemporary 
Authors Autobiography Series in Detroit, MI, in 1997. Excepting the essays described and examined in the 
present chapter, the box’s contemporaneous content comprises: three third-year French Renaissance course 
papers on Racine, Descartes and du Bellay; an essay for a course in Applied Linguistics on wh-movement; notes 
for another Linguistics essay, the completed version of which does not seem to be present, and a series of typed 
or hand-written notes on various monographs. These are C.W. Cassinelli, Free Activities and Interpersonal 
Relations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966); José Ortega y Gasset, On Love: aspects of a single theme (New 
York: Meridian Books, 1957); Étienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: 
Sheed and Ward, 1955); Charles Rycroft, Imagination and Reality (London: The Hogarth Press, 1968), and 
Victor W. Turner, The Ritual Process (London: Penguin, 1974). 
2 All of which are contained within DOA, Box 1. 
3 This essay, ‘Who does the poet think he is in presuming to share his consciousness with the reader? A theme 
from Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations seen in the light of Heidegger’s Existence and Being,’ (hereafter ‘Who 
does the poet’) contained in the same box in the DOA as the other essays referred to here, appears to be in draft 
stage, with many sections of the essay duplicated, revised, or otherwise broken-off. Some of its passages are 
repeated verbatim, some altered, in the second essay in the series on Husserl and Heidegger. It is therefore most 
likely to be an unfinished early draft of this second essay, although it may potentially also represent an attempt at 
a revision or expansion of the same. Unfinished or not, this essay contains some important speculation that 
resonates with the other five essays, and I will refer to it when necessary. 
4 Oliver, ‘An examination of “prosody” in the light of theories already expressed,’ DOA, Box 1, p.8. Hereafter ‘An 
examination.’ “[P]rosody” here refers to a wide-ranging set of formal poetical devices, not limited to metrics 
alone, but including rhythm, stress, enjambment, diction and tone, as well as overall form and general shape. 
9 
origins of an argument that found full public expression only by the time of Oliver’s 1989 theoretical 
monograph Poetry and Narrative in Performance. Written at a formative stage in Oliver’s career as a 
poet, their aim is to “establish an argument about the dynamics of poetic consciousness at the moment 
when it acts,” by means of “an exploration of the dynamics of ‘self’ as it acts poetically.”5 
 After leaving school at 16, Oliver took a number of different jobs before settling on journalism 
and moving to Cambridge with his wife, Janet Hughes, in the early 1960s. Employed by the Cambridge 
News until the couple’s move to Paris in 1970, Oliver’s time in Cambridge was indelibly marked by his 
friendship with, and tutelage by, the poets J.H. Prynne, John James, Wendy Mulford, Andrew Crozier, 
Anthony Barnett, Denise Riley, Peter Riley, John Riley, Tom Raworth and Lee Harwood.6 This cadre of 
poets, with Raworth, Harwood, Denise Riley, Peter Riley and John Riley described as being part of “a far 
wider circle” than the rest, appears in Oliver’s posthumous memoir Whisper ‘Louise’.7 Oliver’s first book, 
Oppo Hectic, was published by Andrew Crozier’s Ferry Press in 1969. In 1973 Oliver’s novel The 
Harmless Building, a book which he later described as “the mother plant” from which all subsequent 
collections grew, was jointly published by Ferry along with John Riley and Tim Longville’s Grosseteste 
Review Books.8 Upon their return from Paris in 1972, Oliver and his family moved to Brightlingsea and 
Oliver enrolled as a mature student at the new University of Essex, a decision taken, he later reflected, in 
order “to fill in holes in my education.”9 The faculty at the university, founded in 1963, would have been 
attractive to Oliver. Donald Davie, surely known to Oliver through Davie’s former student and colleague 
J.H. Prynne, established the Literature department at Essex during the early 1960s. In 1965 Davie invited 
the American poet Ed Dorn, a poet whom Oliver read and admired (and had also most likely been 
introduced to by Prynne), to teach at Essex. Oliver’s mature undergraduate period (1972-5) saw the 
composition and publication of In The Cave of Suicession (1974), the creation of the campus “poetry 
service” Aiken Jacks (an endeavour to print “anyone’s poems at all”), and the publication of five issues of 
the journal The Human Handkerchief (an editorial collaboration between Oliver and the poets Ralph 
Hawkins, Simon Pettet and Charles Ingham), as well as a spate of letters, of which particular mention 
should be made of those between Oliver and the poets Peter Riley and J.H. Prynne.10 Oliver maintained a 
steady, if sometimes patchy, correspondence with both of these poets from the time of their first meetings 
                                                            
5 Ibid., p.1. 
6 In October 1969 the Cambridge News became the Cambridge Evening News. 
7 WL, p.54. 
8 CAAS, p.251. 
9 Ibid., p.252. 
10 Ibid. 
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in Cambridge in the 1960s until his death in 2000. 
 The extant record of this correspondence in the Douglas Oliver Archive in the Albert Sloman 
Library at the University of Essex represents a significant contribution to the documentation of mid-late 
twentieth-century literary culture. Prynne especially seems to have exercised a deep and abiding influence 
during the Essex period, an influence which continued throughout Oliver’s life. The trajectory of Oliver’s 
development as a poet (and editor) at the time of writing his ‘undergraduate’ essays is thus well 
established; so too is his indebtedness to the atmosphere of comradeship and correspondence created by 
his friends in Cambridge and his colleagues at Essex. Prynne is thanked effusively in a note appended to 
the first essay of the series of five. This note reads: “Throughout all these essays I owe a considerable 
debt to Mr. J.H. Prynne, of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, whose letters and conversation have 
suggested many turning points for me.”11 The American poet Ted Berrigan, who in 1973-1974 taught at 
Essex as Poet in Residence following the departure of Ed Dorn, is credited in a late autobiographical 
essay with having performed a service of a similar magnitude to Prynne’s: “No-one in my adult life,” 
Oliver recalled, “has taught me more about how to use emotion wisely.”12 It is testament to the breadth of 
what Oliver would later reflect upon and celebrate as “Poetry’s Subject” that he felt equally influenced 
by, or at least in later life felt the need to assert the broadly equivalent influence of, both J.H. Prynne and 
Ted Berrigan, poets for whom, it might be claimed, the only conceivable commonality was a mutual 
friendship with Douglas Oliver.13 The essays are therefore neither juvenilia nor merely assignments; they 
represent some of Oliver’s most concerted efforts to apply himself, in an institutionally rigorous manner 
and in a period coeval with poetic composition and passionate correspondence and debate, to the 
questions of poetic language and authorship to which he would return time and time again over the course 
of his life. 
 
1.2 – Prynne, Oliver and philosophy 
 
In the aforementioned note in the references to the first of the series of five essays, Oliver thanks his 
friend, the poet J.H. Prynne, “whose letters and conversation have suggested many turning points for 
                                                            
11 ‘Introductory Essay,’ p.9.  
12 CAAS, p.252.  
13 See Oliver, ‘Poetry’s Subject,’ PN Review 105 (Vol. 22, No. 1; Sep.-Oct., 1995), pp.52-58, later revised and 
extended in Philip Davis, ed., Real Voices on Reading (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, and New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, Inc., 1997), pp.83-102. 
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me.”14 Given that the essays contain a substantial amount of discussion centred around the late work of 
the philosopher Edmund Husserl (and in the second and sixth essays, around those of Martin Heidegger), 
it seems extremely likely that one such “turning point” involved thinking comparatively about poetry and 
philosophy, especially phenomenology. The essays are comparable with the early prose of J.H. Prynne in 
terms of the questions they ask and the answers they give to those questions. As with the Prynne of the 
1961 essay ‘Resistance and Difficulty,’ the Oliver of the early essays expresses a keen interest in 
phenomenology. Oliver’s use of phenomenology resembles Prynne’s in that it is introduced in order to 
elucidate a problem which philosophy alone cannot fully solve or overcome. Like Prynne’s essay, 
Oliver’s essays deal with phenomenology in a way that is preparatory, conceptually if not 
chronologically, to a description of the powers specific to poetic language. Both poets use philosophy as 
evidence to support an argument that poetry can do things that philosophy alone cannot, since poetry is 
able to produce proofs unavailable to philosophic description, proofs discoverable only in poetry. For 
Prynne, poetry, which he conceives as a product of the imagination, solves the problem of the existence 
or non-existence of the outside world by proving the “ontological priority” of that world through 
encountering the “resistance” it offers the creative imagination: this is the imagination’s “peculiar 
function,” its privileged domain.15 For Oliver, poetry solves the problem of whether or not it is possible to 
experience exactly what another individual experiences. It solves this problem positively, since poetry 
allows us to experience a situation in which self and other are not hard and fast categories into which 
human experience is forever split, but rather one in which this distinction, that between self and other, 
collapses. It collapses in “fleeting glimpse[s] of transcendence” that indicate the potential for a perfect 
“fusion of self and other.”16 
 In ‘Resistance and Difficulty,’ which discusses Husserl and mentions Heidegger, among many 
others, Prynne argues that the imagination is the human faculty most fully capable of acknowledging the 
existence of the world outside subjective experience. It is capable of this task thanks to its capacity to 
augment reality and not merely to reflect it, and it augments reality by producing poems:17 
 
It is the imagination’s peculiar function to admit, draw sustenance from, and 
                                                            
14 ‘Introductory Essay,’ p.9.  
15 J.H. Prynne, ‘Resistance and Difficulty,’ Prospect 5 (Winter, 1961), pp.26-30 (30). 
16 Oliver, ‘Some groundwork towards investigating the poet’s creative dynamic,’ DOA, Box 1 (hereafter ‘Some 
groundwork’), pp.3-4.  
17 Insightful commentary on ‘Resistance and Difficulty,’ to which I am indebted for this reading, can be found in 
Keston Sutherland, ‘J.H. Prynne and Philology,’ unpublished PhD thesis (University of Cambridge, 2004) 
pp.106-110. 
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celebrate the ontological priority of this outside world, by creating entities 
which subsequently become a part of the world, an addition to it. Hence the 
tensions between metre and rhythm, between credibility and dramatic 
cogency, in fact the stringencies of artifice and discipline generally which 
constitute the dimensions within which the imagination is realised and 
becomes intelligible, embody both the process and its difficulties, and the 
resistance proper to its substance.18 
 
In this passage the prosodic detail of a poem, its “tensions between metre and rhythm,” for example, are a 
direct result of the difficulty involved in the realisation of “imagination’s peculiar function.”19 They are, 
for Prynne, the hallmarks of a specific kind of difficulty which provides evidence that the world exists 
and that we are in it. This description of rhythm and metre, and the experience of the “tension” between 
the two, as evidence of an ontological condition, bears a significant relation to Oliver’s thinking about 
prosody.  
 For Oliver, prosody contains the answer to the question whether or not we can ever directly 
experience what someone else experiences. His thesis on the matter, in the form of a “CREDO,” is set out 
in the fifth essay of the Essex series: 
 
CREDO: the function of all details of prosody, especially the finest details, is 
to ensure that the reader, by assenting all along to the music of the language 
as emotionally apt for himself as well as for the poet, tunes the process of his 
thought to that of the poet more exactly than ordinary language makes 
possible.20 
 
As a matter of belief, a “CREDO,” it is the “function of all details of prosody” to effect the attunement of 
the “thought” of the reader to that of the poet-author. It will be the task of the present chapter to offer a 
theoretical framework with which to understand and critique this complicated claim. This explanation, in 
summary, will proceed as follows: philosophy, specifically the late transcendental phenomenology of 
Edmund Husserl, presents the problem of the experience of the other, of an alter ego, otherwise organised 
under the rubrics of empathy and intersubjectivity. For Husserl, ego and alter ego are “two primordial 
spheres [...] separated by an abyss I cannot actually cross.”21 Oliver maintains that poets, for whom the 
acknowledgement of this “abyss” is at the core of composition as he describes it, have always practiced, 
and continue to practice, methods which allow for the experience of “ambiguity” between “self” and 
“other.” This is the result, says Oliver, of “the poet’s creative dynamic.” Such ambiguity is desirable, 
                                                            
18 Prynne, ‘Resistance and Difficulty,’ p.30. 
19 Ibid. 
20 ‘An examination,’ pp.8-9. 
21 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: an introduction to phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1960), p.121. Emphasis in original. 
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since it proves “the fusion of self and other really to be perfect in some instant of the encounter.”22 
 Oliver finds useful elucidation of the problem of the alter ego and intersubjectivity in Husserl’s 
Cartesian Meditations, but corroboration of his desire for “fusion” distinctly lacking. He therefore 
requires that poetry provide an object of experience that can bridge the gap between self and other, 
between ego and alter ego, in a manner that transcendental phenomenology cannot. Poetry comes closest 
to achieving this aim during “moments” when a “sharing of consciousness” between poet-author and 
reader is possible; such “moments” are first described in the essays in terms of narrative structure, then in 
more detail as the minutest iterations, the “finest details” of prosodic sound and shape, and finally, by 
1989, as contained within the “notional instant[s]” of poetic stress.23 These moments, in the experience of 
reading poetry, engender the “special intersubjectivity” which would abolish the “abyss” between 
subjectivities that Husserl, amongst other philosophers and theorists, describes as fundamental.24 Belief in 
this process is required since the kind of moment Oliver wants to describe cannot, finally, be rationally or 
empirically identified and must therefore remain “notional.” In this aspect of his argument Oliver displays 
the influence of Romantic accounts of poetical composition, specifically Coleridge’s methodological 
tenet in the Biographia Literaria that his practice involved the attempt 
 
to transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth 
sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination that willing suspension 
of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith.25 
 
For Oliver, the suspension of disbelief also involves the suspension of the abyssal distance between self 
and other, and it is suspended through an act of “poetic faith,” as announced by the “CREDO” about the 
function of prosody. In poetry, Oliver says, 
 
It is as though the ego were in some dynamic becoming properly relative to 
the Other which always to a greater or lesser extent (depending on the 
perfection of the dynamic) came near to presenting itself originally to the ego 
but never quite managed such perfect relativism which would, indeed, be that 
of perfect identity between self and Other.26 
 
The language of this passage, and in particular the vocabulary of “presenting [...] originally to the ego,” 
                                                            
22 ‘Some groundwork,’ p.4. 
23 ‘Introductory Essay,’ p.2; ‘An examination,’ pp.8-9; PNP, p.161. 
24 The phrase “special intersubjectivity” appears at the apotheosis of Oliver’s development of his theory of the 
poetic “moment,” PNP, p.172. 
25 James Engell and W. Jackson Bate, ed., The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Vol. 7, Part 2 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, and Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), p.6. 
26 ‘Who does the poet,’ p.7. Emphasis in original. Note that Oliver’s capitalisation of “Other” is not consistent. 
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as we shall see, is drawn from Husserl. But the argument here goes beyond Husserl’s definition of either 
empathy or intersubjectivity.  
 Husserlian empathy [Einfühlung], as A.D. Smith points out, is the term employed to register 
“experiential awareness of another subject.”27 Intersubjectivity [Intersubjectivität] in Husserl goes no 
further than establishing how the “transcendentally meditating philosopher” may make sense of the 
appearance of other transcendental subjectivities.28 The desire for a kind of fusion in which the alter ego 
presents “itself originally to the ego” is therefore, despite being couched in the language of the 
Meditations, something that the Meditations rule out as a condition of their enquiry, and which is 
furthermore quite alien from their entire project – is, in fact, alien to phenomenology as Husserl practises 
it. In what follows, this line of argument will be developed with more detailed reference to both Husserl’s 
and Oliver’s texts. For now it will suffice to point out that Oliver’s argument about “perfect identity 
between self and Other,” when it comes to phenomenology, is couched in terms whose original context is 
at some remove from, and often at odds with, their deployment in the essays. The question of, let alone 
the desire for, “perfect identity,” could not be farther from Husserl’s philosophy, and the argumentative 
tools Husserl uses therein are not designed to establish, support or corroborate it. The result of this 
disconnect between Oliver’s vocabulary and his sources is that the poet’s use of philosophy is creative 
and speculative, designed to achieve a certain aim without worrying too much about the historical 
semantic freight of the terms used to get there.  
 Where we get to is also a matter for speculation. In the passage quoted above, “[i]t is as though 
the ego” and the alter ego were becoming perfectly identified – it is not literally the case; “perfect 
identity” is “never quite managed.” Oliver’s position on whether or not “perfect identity” is achievable at 
all differs depending on the context; in this passage, it is “never quite managed,” but elsewhere, 
especially in the later monograph Poetry and Narrative in Performance, perfection is certainly glimpsed, 
if not momentarily achieved. Achievable or not, “[t]he complete ambiguity [between self and other] is 
thus [...] an ideal to aim at,” Oliver asserts in the second essay of the early five, and qua ideal it remains 
unverifiable by any standard determined by the rigour of philosophic proof, and especially by Husserlian 
apodicticity. The notion of apodicticity itself is rejected wholesale, along with many other elements of 
Husserl’s system, as we shall see. This distinction allows Oliver to raid Husserl enthusiastically for a set 
of concepts that are useful to his project, but ultimately to reject transcendental phenomenology as a 
                                                            
27 A.D. Smith, Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2003), p.213. 
28 Ibid., p.249. 
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framework in favour of the qualities and ramifications of the “creative dynamic” that are unavailable to 
philosophers, even as they are defined on the basis that they will solve problems that properly belong to 
philosophy. 
 There is another important sense in which Oliver rejects Husserl. Throughout the essays, Oliver 
consistently asserts the poet’s crudity in comparison to the philosopher. This is something Prynne, by 
comparison, never does. The poet, Oliver says in the second essay, entertains “philosophically crude 
presuppositions about self and other,” and as such operates from within what Husserl would call the 
“natural attitude,” that is, the vulgar sense of self that is inauthentic compared to the transcendentally 
meditating subject of the Cartesian Meditations.29 The poet does not exist, says Oliver, as a 
transcendentally meditating subject, but as an everyday subject who “cannot explicitly match the subtlety 
of a philosopher like Husserl”: 
 
Lacking a reduction, poets do not construct a systematics of self–other 
relations; they don’t need to, since by expert practice of the dynamic they 
enter the process of that relation which is a more vital and poetic experience 
of the dynamic (though less systematic) than a philosophical explification 
[sic] of its structures.30 
 
It is important to Oliver that poets are not philosophers; important too that poets engage in a “more vital” 
“relation” between self and other than philosophers. He repeats this distinction, in various guises, time 
and again in the essays, emphasising that he does not 
 
attempt to refer, like Husserl, with his transcendental ego, to an underlying 
level of meaning which is apodictically true. I am referring to the actual way 
in which our consciousness works, moment by moment, in an 
unphilosophical attitude as it thinks, despite all radical doubt, of itself as a 
self which both endures and suffers changes.31 
 
The obvious questions that all this must raise are: if Oliver’s usage of Husserl is finally anti-Husserlian, 
and fundamentally at odds with the sense and methodology of the philosopher’s late transcendental 
meditations, then why adopt any elements of his philosophy? Why import philosophical jargon to deploy 
it against the structures it was conceived to support, and why elucidate the poet’s “creative dynamic” with 
a philosophical system whose central requirements are jettisoned in the course of the elucidation?  
 One answer, as will become clear in the rest of the present chapter, is to be found in the fact that 
                                                            
29 ‘Some groundwork,’ p.3; Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p.37. 
30 ‘Who does the poet,’ p.7. 
31 Ibid., p.13. 
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Oliver certainly does retain certain elements of Husserlian phenomenological thinking in his schema, 
most importantly Husserl’s description of the transcendental subject’s constitution [Konstitution] of the 
alter ego in the fifth meditation. I detail this important retention of Husserl below.32 Yet philosophy 
remains inadequate to the problems it suggests to Oliver, and it is in the “moments” engendered by the 
workings of the “poet’s creative dynamic,” themselves inflected by, but by no means beholden to, 
Husserlian method, that Oliver finds the answer to the question of explaining (and engendering) 
intersubjective perfection. Oliver would insist on the role of the “moment” or “instant” in various 
permutations throughout his career; in almost every major work, whether long poem or explanatory prose, 
they assume the cardinal function of the work’s efficacy. The essays discussed in this chapter represent 
Oliver’s earliest attempt to theorise such moments and their function in and for poetry – specifically, the 
promotion of what he would later call a “special intersubjectivity.”33 
 The rest of this chapter will proceed by explicating the sense of the “dynamic of poetic 
creativity” which is informed by Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations but whose strictures cannot finally 
account for what happens in a line of poetry. This will incorporate discussion of the “moment” theorised 
by Oliver as the site of the “glimpse of transcendence” which can provide an answer to the problem of the 
self–other divide, albeit one which confirms only the ideal perfect fusion’s closest possible 
approximation, rather than established confirmation of the experience of such fusion over time. The 
answer, as I will show, lies entirely within the remit of the “fleeting” instances contained within lines of 
verse, and the chapter ends with a description of the moment’s theoretical culmination in Oliver’s 1989 
book Poetry and Narrative in Performance. The theory of the moment discussed herein contains the 
foundational principles of Oliver’s literary output between the early 1970s and his death in 2000. Every 
major work of poetry and prose is organised around the central principles which the unpublished early 
essays begin to formulate, as it will be one of the tasks of the rest of this dissertation to show. But before 
embarking on a more detailed discussion of the dynamic and the moment, we must elucidate the so 
fervently desired “perfect identity” itself. 
 
1.3 – Perfect identity and utopian politics 
 
What Oliver wants to establish in these essays is the possibility of “perfect identity between self and 
                                                            
32 See below, section 1.4. 
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Other.” The closest the essays come to conclusively detailing what this means is in the “CREDO” quoted 
above. Here, “perfect identity” seems to pertain exclusively to communicative authenticity engendered 
between subjects, that is to say, communication between two people for whom the semantic and 
emotional content of that communication has reached a maximum of reciprocal understanding. Elsewhere 
in Oliver’s oeuvre, as in the culmination of the project which the early essays begin, the 1989 monograph 
Poetry and Narrative in Performance, “perfect identity between self and Other” when most nearly 
realised means that: 
 
Author and reader create, through their own implied personification in the 
text, a special intersubjectivity – a perfecting of the emotional and semantic 
fields through a shared experience of space and time [...] The process reveals 
what our everyday experience and speech could be like, if, when our 
emotions were real and not imaginary, our hearts and heads were in temporal 
consonance.34 
 
This explication of “special intersubjectivity” resembles the “CREDO” in its insistence on “a perfecting 
of the emotional and semantic fields,” but hints obscurely at a further kind of attunement potentially 
achievable if “our emotions were real and not imaginary.”  
 This is an extraordinary throwaway statement that is left undeveloped towards the end of Poetry 
and Narrative in Performance. Emotions are only “imaginary” in the “process” under discussion because 
they are the result of the perceived emotional cartography of literary experience. What Oliver therefore 
seems to be suggesting is that the kind of intersubjectivity only available in poems is in effect a model for 
an unrealised but essentially desirable “everyday experience,” one in which human beings attain a greater 
perfection of emotional and semantic communication than is usually the case. The “ordinary language” 
referred to in the “CREDO” becomes in the passage from Poetry and Narrative in Performance the 
ordinary lives of human beings, which “could,” poetry shows us, achieve a clarity of intellect and 
expression impossible, for whatever reasons, under current conditions. In the type of experience that 
poetry affords, and “in the repeatability of a shared mental experience[,] lies the hope that we can enrich 
our perception and human sympathy.”35 Since our lives outside of prosody cannot be in “temporal 
consonance,” Oliver assumes, we must look to poetry to provide the model for the type of experience that 
would allow us to ascertain what this enriched, perfected sympathy, would feel like. It turns out to feel 
like the experience of poetic stress. 
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 Because stress is a particular incident in the organisation of any given poem’s total set of formal 
properties, its experience gives us a glimpse of unity not only in terms of an intersubjective encounter, but 
also in terms of the unity of artistic form itself. Stress is a microcosm, a “tiny experience of artistic 
form[,]” and literary form 
 
fills the apparent ‘instant’ of time with mental content, an operation which 
ought to be impossible and, in fact, is only achieved in a paradoxical way. 
But because the paradox is infinitely repeatable, literary form allows the 
reader to think he is sharing this ‘instant’ with the imagined author of the 
text.36 
 
The coincidence of the experience of literary (poetic or narrative) form and of a perceptually and 
sympathetically enriched life is a theme Oliver emphasises in the autobiographical prose/poetry sequence 
‘An Island That Is All The World’ (1990). Here, “a true politics” is analogously linked to a similar 
experience to that described in Poetry and Narrative in Performance: 
 
Just as a poem creates form by starting with the smallest occasions of [stress] 
[...] building through syllable, through musical verse unit and silence, up 
through cadence and stanza to the whole poem, so do our lives build a 
coherence from the smallest incorporations of outer world into inner self [...] 
Unity of form disappears into ambiguous dark whenever we examine it 
analytically, but its heart is like the always beating heart of a poem: it is the 
precious origin of our lives’ form, or of a true politics.37 
 
The various iterations of “perfect identity between self and Other” to be found in the work thus 
encompass a range of possible interpretations, suggesting perfected communicative, perceptive, 
sympathetic, political and even psycho-somatic (as in the “beating heart” of the poetic encounter) 
consensus. 
 The correlation between “[u]nity of form,” “our lives’ form” and “a true politics” in the above 
passage from ‘An Island That Is All The World’ is highly instructive, since it brings together the essential 
strands of Oliver’s poetic in one succinct, if somewhat obtuse, statement. Unity of form and unity of 
persons, of poet-author and reader, are, as we have seen, a key feature of the desired “perfect identity 
between self and Other” that Oliver is striving for both in the early essays and in later works. Poetic stress 
is the locus of formal unity which serves as the place where the perfected unity of persons is fleetingly, 
infinitesimally established. That this double unity is furthermore “the precious origin [...] of a true 
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politics” is a mysterious statement. What kind of politics is hereby announced? Why is it especially 
“true”? Oliver says that “Unity of form [...] is the precious origin [...] of a true politics.”38 What, then, 
would this “true politics” become after its original establishment through unity? What I suggest is that the 
kind of politics that Oliver founds on such unity is essentially utopian: it is founded on the principle of 
harmonious reconciliation of humankind through perfected identification of the universal nature of our 
common humanity. This is the meaning of “perfect identity between self and Other” which attains its 
fullest expression in the poetic, rather than the theoretical oeuvre, and it is most apparent in Oliver’s 1985 
poem The Infant and the Pearl. Jameson’s statement that “utopia emerges at the moment of the 
suspension of the political” is useful here, since, as it will take the course of this dissertation to show, it is 
the case in every major political poem that Oliver wrote that politics is at some crucial moment suspended 
in favour, as The Infant and the Pearl puts it, of the kind of “union between / people” that I have been 
describing, and which I intend to establish in this chapter as a theoretical touchstone for the poetry.39 But 
Jameson’s definition also needs complicating, because for Oliver such “union” is always the “origin” of 
politics, or of a “true politics,” never its culmination or exception. It remains to show, in the present 
chapter, the development of Oliver’s argumentative framework in the early essays which would so deeply 
inform his later work. 
 
1.4 – The creative dynamic and Husserl 
 
The phrase “dynamics of artistic creativity” was likely suggested to Oliver by Norman N. Holland’s 1968 
book of psychoanalytic literary theory, The Dynamics of Literary Response. The book is cited as having 
aided Oliver’s discussion of Chaucer’s “Wife of Bath’s Tale” in the notes to ‘On transcendence and 
relativity in The Canterbury Tales.’40 The “dynamics” in Holland’s book concern the processes by which 
literature engages the reader through the manipulation of fantasy. In a chapter titled ‘The Willing 
Suspension of Disbelief,’ Holland proposes that literature is the formal management of fantasy to which 
the reader responds by introjecting those fantasies as if they were their own. The literary process 
“embodies a mental process of transformation” from “a normally unconscious fantasy” to “conscious 
intellectual meaning.”41 In Holland’s account, this explains literature’s potential for enormous emotional 
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40 ‘Introductory Essay,’ p.9.  
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affectivity. Holland’s thesis involves some heavy-handed appropriation of certain psychoanalytical 
concepts, pressed into the service of explaining emotional reactions to literature. “Introjection,” for 
example, has a long, complicated and often contradictory history of usage in analytic literature, but is 
deployed by Holland simply to refer to the act of psychological consumption of the means of 
gratification; his glossary entry for the term reads: “Introjection. Mentally taking an object [...] into one’s 
mind, often with the fantasy that it has been physically incorporated through eyes, ears, nose, mouth, or 
skin.”42 Laplanche and Pontalis define the term with greater care when they refer in their definition of 
“Introjection” not to “mind” but to the “inside” and “outside” of the subject’s “ego” or “ego-ideal”: “in 
phantasy, the subject transposes objects and their inherent qualities from the ‘outside’ to the ‘inside’ of 
himself [...] it does not necessarily imply any reference to the body’s real boundaries (introjection into the 
ego, into the ego-ideal, etc.).”43 
 The attraction of Holland’s book for Oliver likely lay in the insistence on the transformation of 
interiority that Holland describes as a necessary process of the experience of literature: 
 
We experience the work [...] by introjecting it, taking it into ourselves, 
feeling the nucleus of fantasy and the formal management of that fantasy as 
though they were our own [...] the central fantasy and its formal organization 
are not only supplied by the text but also shared by the reader.44 
 
This “central fantasy,” which Holland maintains is the central principle of all works of literature, 
resonates with “our own highly individual fantasies” to produce the engrossment typical of literary 
experience.45 Such an experience involves the satisfaction of primitive emotional states that point to the 
pre-individuated self, and produces “an encapsulated regression to our earliest oral experience of a pre-
self in which we are merged with the source of our gratification.”46 Oliver does not cite Holland’s book 
except to refer to its analysis of Chaucer’s ‘The Wife of Bath’s Tale,’ and does not incorporate any of the 
psychoanalytical terminology used therein into his essays. But the description of an experience of 
literature involving a transformation, whether conscious or unconscious, involving one’s sense of “self” 
would have been appealing to Oliver. It was certainly influential enough for him to refer to “self” 
throughout the essays, as opposed to the more philosophical jargon of “subject” or “subjectivity,” more 
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familiar from the realm of transcendental phenomenology, but used sparingly by Oliver in comparison to 
“self.” There is another sense, connected with this last, in which The Dynamics of Literary Response is 
important for the essay series and the arguments developed therein. As an example of 1960s literary ego-
psychology which developed in Holland’s later work into more canonical instantiations of reader 
response theory, Literary Response’s focus is the literary object as phenomenon to be encountered; its 
arguments are concerned entirely to explicate exactly what is understood to take place between the work 
of literature and its reader. This is precisely the hermeneutic territory of Oliver’s essays. 
 The first essay of the five introduces a version of the “moment” to be elucidated by philosophy 
(but not solved by it) in the second. It is entitled ‘Introductory Essay to a series of five concerning the 
dynamics of artistic creativity. On transcendence and relativity in The Canterbury Tales,’ and begins as 
follows: 
 
This begins a set of essays which aims to establish an argument about the 
dynamics of poetic consciousness at the moment when it acts. In an everyday 
sense of the word, that involves exploration of the dynamics of “self” as it 
acts poetically; and it would of course have been convenient first to have 
defined “self” so as to ground my whole inquiry. However, at least since 
Descartes the notion of “self” has become ambiguous; and since Husserl and 
his successors developed a post-Cartesian phenomenology into sophisticated 
doctrines any discussion of “self” becomes perilous. This opening essay will 
show that it has perhaps always been perilous, since we cannot search for the 
poetic “I” in some great narrative work like Chaucer’s The Canterbury Tales 
without seeing an ambiguity that can strike us as extremely modern infecting 
the presumptions of the narrative.47 
 
The “moment[s]” when “poetic consciousness [...] acts,” the fleeting instances of poetical intensity and 
emotional particularity from which lines of verse derive their propensity to act upon our consciousness, 
would remain central to Oliver’s thinking about poetry and poetics for the rest of his life. Their peculiar 
function within the speculative theoretical framework developed by Oliver across the early essays is 
complex; this complexity occasionally lapses into the radically oblique thanks to the tendency of the 
essays to veer from a specific poetic example, such as a line or motif in Chaucer, to the comparison of 
Oliver’s general theory with such reference-points as the tenets of contemporary astrophysics. Describing 
the effect of “ambiguity” in Chaucer, for example, Oliver writes: 
 
Thus real elements of the poem enter an ambiguity which makes our brains 
work at creating out of opposite signs a singularity – a figure of giant-like 
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significance whom we so nearly glimpse. To judge by modern astrophysical 
mathematics, singularity or somesuch [sic] can be seen as the condition of 
universal “creativity.”48 
 
In a sense this kind of complexity is entirely appropriate to Oliver’s subject matter, since the experience 
his “moments” attempt to articulate operates at the level of “maximum ambiguity”: that of the relation 
between authorial “self” and its implicit or explicit “others,” both internal to poetic composition and 
external to the same, the latter in terms of a readerly other’s “assent” to the music of verse as it plays out 
in all its prosodic minutiae.49 
 Oliver’s argument develops chronologically across the set of five essays. In order to retain a 
balance between clarity of explication and critical evaluation, I follow here broadly the same trajectory, 
citing recapitulations or alternative phrasings from the whole body of early material where necessary. 
Oliver read his source material for these essays in a selective fashion. Chaucer, Husserl, Heidegger and 
Bataille are fairly well raided for a set of conceptual coordinates that are useful to Oliver’s project; he 
makes no claims to the contrary, and is in fact at pains to acknowledge what he calls the “predatory” 
nature of his scholarship when some aspect of a writer’s work does not suit his needs.50 Oliver’s 
intellectual habits in general had always been various, wide-ranging and to a certain extent scattershot. He 
recounts in his memoirs that “in Cambridge in the late sixties I used to look on the shelves where the 
books ordered by the dons for their personal reading were stacked: and I’d buy those books.”51 His 
personal project, begun when he was an out-of-school teenager at 16, to “study under” Coleridge by 
following up the poet’s reading as traced by John Livingstone Lowes’ The Road to Xanadu (1927), marks 
Oliver out as a voracious autodidact.52 It is unsurprising then, when we come to examine these early 
essays, to see Oliver digest his chosen materials through his own hermeneutic idiosyncrasy, rather than 
offering detailed, academic readings of all the relevant texts. The American poet Alice Notley, married to 
Oliver between 1988 and his death in 2000, recalls that when she first met Oliver at Essex in 1973, “he 
was impressively well-read and had a totally coherent philosophy of his own.”53 This recollection is 
instructive, since it suggests that the essays Oliver produced for Michael Edwards were primarily an 
exercise in recapitulating, organizing and consolidating an already well-planned theoretical outline. It 
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would be this outline that, revised, expanded and furnished with a great many more examples, Oliver 
would publish in 1989 as Poetry and Narrative in Performance. 
 The “ambiguity” Oliver identifies in Chaucer is found in the Prologue to Sir Thopas, as we 
“Bihoold the murye wordes of the Hoost to Chaucer” [“Behold the merry words of the Host to Chaucer”] 
directly following the Prioress’s Tale: 
 
Whan seyd was al this miracle, every man 
As sobre was that wonder was to se, 
Til that oure Hooste japen tho bigan, 
And thanne at erst he looked upon me, 
And seyde thus: “What man artow?” quod he;  
“Thou lookest as thou woldest fynde an hare,  
Fore evere upon the ground I se thee stare.54 
 
[Now when they heard this miracle every man  
Was sobered; it was marvellous to see. 
But in the end our Host again began 
His jokes, and then he turned and looked at me,  
And thus he spoke: ‘What man are you?’ said he,  
‘You look as if you were trying to find a hare,  
Scanning the ground with such a steady stare!]55 
 
Oliver concedes that one common reading of this passage is to acknowledge its “witty narrative value” 
and move on. “But we can also,” he suggests, 
 
regard so closely these words, “For ever upon the ground I se thee stare,” that 
they half-awaken a mysterious and profound life lying behind the poem, as 
though some greater, well-nigh superhuman intellect is on the verge of 
raising his gaze to level with ours.56 
 
This moment “speedily passes,” since we are reading the poem and must continue reading it. It is 
precisely the nature of these moments to be fleeting, suggests Oliver, before reflecting that “one of 
poetry’s greatest gifts is that we may return at such times to those moments where we seem on the verge 
of some greater thought than language seems normally to have any capacity to express.”57 The vocabulary 
used to describe this moment of recognition is that of relative scale: the profound life of the poem is 
“greater,” personified as a “superhuman intellect,” enabling us an experience of “some greater thought.”  
 Later in the same essay, Oliver describes the same moment as engendering the recognition of “a 
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figure of giant-like significance[.]”58 For Oliver, this “greater thought” is contained with the figure of 
“Chaucer,” whom he puts into inverted commas to make his point: 
 
For there’s a question here which I take to be cardinal to the understanding of 
poetry’s extraordinary effect upon us: “who” is the anonymous presence so 
near to our understandings, so contingently affecting our emotions, at this 
moment?59 
 
In order to answer this question, Oliver situates Chaucer’s authorship in a tripartite schema of 
subjectivity. From Geoffrey Chaucer, as historical figure and author of The Canterbury Tales, emerges 
“whatever elements of that entity [which] form the Tales’ transcendent author, from which emerges the 
transcendent narrator.”60 It is important to Oliver that he use the jargon of phenomenological epoché in 
his schema: “transcendent” here is appropriated from Husserl’s “transcendental subjectivity.”61 The 
“transcendent narrator” is himself split, “into self-as-subject and as member of that ‘other’ world bound 
together by [the] Host.” 
 Oliver then catalogues these selves accordingly: 
 
In the domain of self appear: all instances of the use of “I”; all personal and 
subjective colouring of the story including observation upon other characters; 
all actions of self described from this subjective pole; the two tales of Sir 
Thopas and Melibeus seen as emitting from this pole; and so on. In the 
domain of “other” appear: Chaucer seen as pilgrim by the others; all the 
others supposedly faithfully reported in their speech or actions; all the other 
tales, but also including those elements of Chaucer’s own tales which can be 
similarly distinguished as “other” from their subjective elements through yet 
another analysis of the narrator as transcendent to his own story and 
supposedly reporting faithfully the actions of others seen as objective.62 
 
What this amounts to is a description of the “ambiguity” inherent, for Oliver, in reading the passage of the 
‘Prologue to Sir Thopas’ quoted above. The entity accosted by the Host whose eyes are fixed “For evere 
upon the ground” is not Geoffrey Chaucer, nor is it some purely fictional “I” embedded in the narrative of 
the Tales. It is Chaucer-as-pilgrim recognised in the narrative world created by Geoffrey Chaucer, the 
artificer of The Canterbury Tales, whose real historical self is further glimpsed as the ultimate ground of 
the very narrative, reflexive, lyrical palimpsest we are describing. It is “a moment of maximum 
ambiguity,” notes Oliver, because all these selves are simultaneously fused and sundered in the act of 
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reading the Host’s recognition.63 As readers, we experience this process qua process, as the depth of 
Chaucer’s reflexive narrative stretching to its fictional limits. The explication of this experience in terms 
of depth is pertinent: the horizon of these same fictional limits is the poet-author Geoffrey Chaucer, 
because he is what the poem “reaches back” towards, “to the poet as maker and thus eventually to 
Chaucer as a historical figure.”64 
 The fact that we cannot resolve moments such as the Host’s recognition of Chaucer into a stable 
figure of either narrative or “transcendent” authorial subjectivity is the source of their power to engender 
the multiplicity, the complexity, and the creative alterity of literature. “Who is this figure with downcast 
eyes?” 
 
Call the “self” the “+” side: is he the historical Chaucer, the transcendent 
author, or the narrator narrating? On the “–” side of “other,” is he the pilgrim 
seen in the Host’s subjectivity? But, then, that subjectivity is utterly 
ambiguous, for it is created by the narrator, transcendent author, and 
historical Chaucer. All quasi-entities of self or other that we question must 
for this instant be granted a “±” sign in which the instant is not one of 
emptiness but of plenitude; these entities “really do” embody both states of 
the sign and the instant is full of that ambiguous potential, the very mark of 
creativity. Thus real elements of the poem enter an ambiguity which makes 
our brains work at creating out of opposite signs a singularity – a figure of 
giant-like significance whom we so nearly glimpse. To judge by modern 
astrophysical mathematics, singularity or somesuch [sic] can be seen as the 
condition of universal “creativity.” I don’t want to be that grandiose: I’m 
only saying that Chaucer makes our brains work at that relativistic task 
because of literary dynamics that are not so very complicated that they could 
not appear when he trusted the relativistic force of his own creative 
imagination.65 
 
There are at least two identifiable strands to this argument. The first is that creativity, and hence the 
literary dynamic which the essays attempt to grasp, is exceptionally well represented by “ambiguous 
potential.” Ambiguous potential is characteristic of creativity because it remains open to an infinite 
variety of possibility. This argument is strongly influenced, I will argue, by the concept of the eidos ego, 
derived from Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations. Oliver discusses Husserl’s transcendental and eidos egos 
in the second essay of the series of five, and I will look in more detail at Husserl’s phenomenological 
method and its bearing on Oliver’s poetics in what follows. The second identifiable strand to Oliver’s 
argument in the passage quoted above is that “literary dynamics” entail cognitive labour on the part of the 
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reader. Chaucer “makes our brains work at [a] relativistic task” that mirrors the relativistic “self–other 
ambiguity” that takes place within the fecund complexity of the poet’s (in this case, Chaucer’s) creative 
dynamic. Literary dynamics make possible a dual process of authorial and readerly work that, together, 
realise the productive ambiguity of self and other as fundamental to poetic experience. 
 In the unfinished draft essay, ‘Who does the poet think he is in presuming to share his 
consciousness with the reader? A theme from Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations seen in the light of 
Heidegger’s Existence and Being,’ Oliver explains this same process in the following manner: 
 
The poet writes from a centre that we may as well identify in an everyday 
sense as his notion of self, yet because of the originality of his process he in 
some way feels that his consciousness is engaged – at least partly – in a new 
kind of language which, despite its originality, other people will consider not 
just apt but also capable of making reborn in them something approaching the 
original writing process [...] Put crudely, the poet begins with elements of 
consciousness which are in [a] state influenced by the distinction between 
self–other. And, by a grand act of creativity, he reforms them into a state 
where the process of reformation may be shared with another person, the 
reader.66 
 
This explanation, like that of Chaucer’s narrative ambiguity, resonates with phenomenological overtones. 
It is a description of poetic creativity strongly evocative of the Husserlian notion of monadological 
appresentation – the manner in which other people are “appresented” to me by analogy, as mirror images 
of my own subjective consciousness. For Husserl, “we must discover in what intentionalities, syntheses, 
motivations, the sense ‘other ego’ becomes fashioned in me” first and foremost, before it “becomes 
verified as existing and even as itself there in its own manner.”67 This phenomenological priority informs 
the sense of the “original writing process” that Oliver uses here. It renders passages in the essays like the 
one above decidedly at odds with contemporary developments in theory, and in particular post-
structuralist considerations of the distinctly de-centred self, of which Lacan is perhaps the most influential 
exponent.  
 Oliver was aware of these developments. He read Lacan, Derrida and Foucault in the late 1960s 
and 1970s.68 In his 1970s correspondence with the British poet Peter Riley, Oliver remarks disparagingly 
on what he perceives to be the uncritical deferral to post-structuralist positions in the literary criticism of 
the day. In a letter to Riley of 21st February 1978, he writes: 
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It’s apparent the kind of damage an arrogant essay like Blaser’s in the 
collected works can do: it places theory above poetry and sends everyone 
scampering to the latest French magi to borrow insights. I’ve read some 
Derrida + Lacan with interest; but I hope I know how to keep that interest in 
its place.69 
 
The essay referred to, unkindly, is Robin Blaser’s ‘The Practice of Outside,’ printed in his 1975 edition of 
The Collected Books of Jack Spicer; the writers to whom Blaser refers most prominently in the essay are 
not Derrida or Lacan, but Merleau-Ponty and Foucault.70 Derrida and Lacan, however, feature heavily in 
the article which Oliver excoriates in much of the rest of the letter. This article is ‘The Orientation of the 
Parasols: Saussure, Derrida, and Spicer,’ by Colin Christopher Stuart and John Scoggan, from the 1977 
special issue of boundary 2 magazine.71 
 The article, which employs a Derridean vocabulary to theorise the major divergences of Jack 
Spicer’s work from that of his Black Mountain contemporaries, is dismissed by Oliver as 
 
just very bad and that’s all there is to it: the usual university thing of thinking 
that understanding someone else’s ideas is the same as having ideas of your 
own [...] There can be no insight from [...] such a hurry to catch on to the 
post-structuralist scene in France as though one would be then (a) up-to-date 
and (b) therefore truer in one’s literary analysis.72 
 
Oliver had previously described The Harmless Building, in another letter to Riley, in terms that refer to 
French post-structuralism with similar disinterest, writing that anyone “who should take my novel as a 
new juggle with reality-imaginary neo-French etcetera misses the point” and is a “dunderhead.”73 
Nowhere in his letters to Riley does Oliver mount a critique of post-structuralism that goes beyond such 
dismissals, which more often than not, as in the letter quoted above, discuss secondary literature which 
quotes from Derrida or Lacan, rather than Derrida or Lacan’s own authorship; nowhere are specific texts 
by either Derrida or Lacan mentioned. Oliver’s generalised antipathy towards the use of contemporary 
French theory in “literary analysis” was not, then, rooted in sustained argument with these thinkers’ texts, 
but in a combination of distrust in academic trends per se, and a belief in the relative merits of the arts 
compared to hermeneutic models of explication, of poetry compared to theory. Derrida and Lacan should 
be attended to, Oliver intimates, but only to the extent that interest in their thought be kept “in its place”; 
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theory must not be allowed “above poetry,” and insights must not be “borrowed.” Oliver’s “original 
writing process” comes from “a centre” that is not only inaccessible to the writer or critic steeped in (or 
even influenced by) theory; it is fundamentally anathema to theory’s explicatory designs upon it, since it 
obscures the “insight” of “your own ideas.” Oliver’s position on “originality” here is thereby inflected by 
an anti-theoretical contrarianism which further serves the privilege of poetic communication over all other 
discourse. The “original writing process” is, then, doubly “original,” since it both comes first – the poet 
must write something before it can be read – and communicates directly with “another person, the reader” 
without the need for the secondary apparatuses supplied by theory. 
 To draw together the strands of argument in the two passages from the first essay quoted above: 
ambiguity is channeled into a moment (in this instance, of the Host’s recognition of “Chaucer”) such that 
a plenitude of ambiguous potential is resolved in the “figure of giant-like significance whom we so nearly 
glimpse.” The resolution is transient and momentary. As readers of poetry, we assume the role of re-
creating the process by which the “self–other ambiguity” involved in the moment under examination was 
originally composed – we re-enact the blurring of distinction between “self” and “other” to the point of 
indiscrimination. The poet’s creative dynamic entails the meeting of minds in this fashion: originally in 
the creative act of poetic composition through the inevitable involvement of a productive ambiguity 
between self and other as it exists in the mind of the poet-author, and secondarily in the mind of the 
reader as the re-combination and re-articulation of this original ambiguity by the conscious effort of 
readerly work. All of the essays, it should be remembered, aim to “establish an argument about the 
dynamics of poetic consciousness at the moment when it acts.” Contained in the moment from the 
Prologue to Sir Thopas, then, is a diagram of poetic consciousness at one particular moment of its acting. 
 Are the lines in the Prologue the only such moment in this particular tale, or the Tales in general, 
or is The Canterbury Tales full of them? Patently not, since we know this moment to be unique to the few 
lines identified; we seem to have encountered a contradiction. How can the dynamics of poetic 
consciousness act at certain moments and not others? Are these moments promoted, as it were, by the 
particular function of a lyric self, an “I,” or an otherwise manifest and explicit narrative or personal 
agent? This confusion stems from the manner of Oliver’s explication. Chaucer, he says, in this moment of 
Sir Thopas, 
 
makes dramatic, in personifications of the poetic self and its relationship with 
all that is seen as “other,” a creative dynamics which acts at the smallest 
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details of all good poetry – at the level of syllable and consonant and in some 
quite-tremulous way even within the minute durées of syllable and 
consonant.74 
 
The moment we have been reading in great detail is not the moment, in ‘The Tale of Sir Thopas,’ of 
poetic consciousness in action. Rather, it is emblematic of a process that takes place at the smallest level 
of poetic composition, ingrained into the minutiae of all “good” poetic language. “[T]he syllable,” 
 
as it moves within the poetic dynamic and yet appears almost to stay a unit, 
[...] bears witness to the same creative process as that dramatised by Chaucer 
and so puts us in touch with a notion of truth-as-general.75 
 
This “truth-as-general” can be summarised as follows: poetic consciousness, acting at all levels from 
dramatic narrative content to micro-tonal syllabic and consonantal durations, engenders communicative 
authenticity between subjects, and blurs the distinction between self and other. 
 The second essay of the series of five is entitled ‘Some groundwork towards investigating the 
poet’s creative dynamic: Husserl on the Ego and Heidegger on temporality.’ It is related to what I am 
referring to as the “sixth” unfinished essay, ‘Who does the poet think he is in presuming to share his 
consciousness with the reader? [...],’ through a shared subject matter, namely, a description of certain 
features of Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian temporality with a view to elucidating “the 
poet’s creative dynamic.”76 Oliver does not, in either of these essays, advocate a whole-hearted adoption, 
or even adaptation of, Husserlian terms to explain his creative dynamic. He is extremely sceptical that 
such an adaptation is even possible, let alone desirable. “And yet,” 
 
in Husserl’s explication of the transcendental ego reside certain clues to the 
condition of that flux point as it is generated within a poet’s perhaps 
philosophically crude presuppositions about self and other. For one thing, in 
considering the way in which ego as ownness is experienced, Husserl notes 
that the ego is the original sphere of these two primordial spheres whereas 
the sphere of the “other” is only appresented [...] I must say that this in some 
sense or other rings true for me even when translated into this crude world of 
the everyday which the poet wrestles with – where “selves” are “selves” and 
“others” “others,” so to speak.77 
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Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, based on the philosopher’s introductory lectures to phenomenology 
delivered at the Sorbonne in February 1929, were first published in a French translation by Gabrielle 
Peiffer and Emmanuel Levinas in 1931. A German text of the Cartesianische Meditationen comprises the 
posthumous first volume of Husserl’s Gesammelte Werke, the Husserliana, and was published in 1950 
under the auspices of Stephen Strasser. Oliver read the Meditations in the 1973 edition of Dorion Cairns’ 
English translation, first published in 1960.78 Oliver’s reading of Husserl in translation is by no means 
thorough. He makes no indication of having read any other works by the philosopher, although he 
certainly did read a select secondary literature whose focus extends beyond the Meditations.79 What he 
does read is largely digested in the manner of the above quotation. His focus here and elsewhere is on the 
manner in which the alter ego is appresented to “myself” as having been constituted in its alterity by 
“my” transcendental subjectivity.80  
 It will quickly become clear that what Oliver refers to in his first essay as the “transcendent 
narrator” of Chaucer’s Tales, split “into self-as-subject and as member of that ‘other’ world bound 
together by [the] Host,” is hardly, to say the least, a rigorous application of Husserlian philosophical 
categories into literary theory. Oliver had read the Cartesian Meditations and was inspired by its 
methodology and terminology; what he proposes as categorical distinctions between various aspects of 
the Chaucerian narrative or lyric self resembles a fairly liberal cross-pollination of relative terms rather 
than a concertedly phenomenological approach to literature. Oliver’s attraction to Husserl as it emerges in 
the second essay is as follows: the general model of intersubjectivity in which the Meditations famously 
culminate, in which the priority of “my” self-constituting transcendental ego is a condition of the 
constitution of any and all alter egos, suits the model of authorial “transcendence” that Oliver identifies in 
Chaucer because the poet-author as self is the creative origin of a self-other distinction or ambiguity 
activated by and in particular moments of verse, re-produced secondarily for the reader through their own 
attentive “work.”81 
 The Meditations present an introduction to transcendental phenomenology as a radical beginning 
                                                            
78 See the notes to ‘Some groundwork,’ p.9. 
79 The secondary material mentioned in the notes to the second essay comprises: Suzanne Bachelard, A Study of 
Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. Lester E. Embree (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1968); Richard Schmitt’s entry for Husserl in Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 4 
(New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, and London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1967), 
pp.96-99 (98); Marjorie Grene, Sartre (New York, NY: New Viewpoints, 1973), and Werner Brock’s 
introduction to Martin Heidegger, Existence and Being, trans. Douglas Scott, R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick 
(London: Vision Press, 1956). 
80 “My” and “myself” are consistently used by Cairns in his translation to render Husserl’s discussion of the solus 
ipse to which “I” must reduce itself in order to effect the transcendental meditation.  
81 See Oliver, ‘Introductory Essay,’ p.2. 
31 
philosophy, that is, a philosophy of first principles aligned with the prima philosophia of Descartes’ 
Meditationes in the following sense: that it aims “to renew with greater intensity the radicalness of their 
[Descartes’ Meditationes] spirit, the radicalness of self-responsibility” and to “uncover thereby for the 
first time the genuine sense of the necessary regress to the ego[.]”82 The regress is a necessity since it is 
only by this method that we may ascertain with absolute certainty the universal experiential foundation 
for knowledge.83 Such a foundation is the only guarantee of apodicticity [Apodiktizität] or, the “absolute 
indubitability [eine absolute Zweifellosigkeit]” of critical philosophical reflection.84 Phenomenological 
method as Husserl conceived it entails, like Cartesian doubt, the stripping away of all pre-supposed 
knowledge of the outside world beyond subjective consciousness in order to reflect upon the contents of 
that consciousness. It is impossible to elucidate the nature of reality from a standpoint secured from 
within that reality, and operating wholly within its premises, since the available evidence for such a 
reality will always be pre-supposed by our acceptance of its existence.  
 Thus transcendental phenomenology is the process of reflection by means of the transcendental 
epoché – the suspension of the so-called “natural attitude,” which includes epistemological and 
metaphysical assumptions concerning (and therefore pre-emptively deciding upon) the reality of the 
world.85 This attitude, the pre-philosophical comportment towards the existence of things that we 
unthinkingly adopt in everyday practice, must be set aside if we are truly to grasp the nature of things as I, 
the subject, apprehend them. The epoché, the decision to suspend belief in the outside world in order to 
examine its objects as they appear to our consciousness (or in the phenomenological jargon, are given to 
us), enables a universal reflective attitude to prevail over the natural one, not by eliminating its relevance 
for human experience, but by the parenthesising or bracketing [Einklammerung] of its validity. The new 
attitude thereby brought into play is itself what is called “transcendental”: it is the reflection, by means of 
reduction, upon the contents of consciousness qua phenomena, as they are given to me in my 
transcendental subjectivity. In this sense the phenomenological method espoused and followed in the 
Meditations is not so much an investigation of the contents of experience, as an investigation into the 
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possibility both of experience, and the meaning of experience, in the first place.  
 Husserl’s method, notes one commentator, 
 
[...] has the significant effect of bringing our consciousness to bear on 
consciousness itself, leading to a kind of ‘doubling’ of the ego, with one side 
of it acting as a non-participating spectator towards the ongoing activity of 
natural, conscious life.86 
 
This “spectator” is a transcendental and universal reflective subjectivity: it is the capacity to experience 
everything and is not restricted to any individual human subject’s field of perceptual activity. The ego 
thus “doubled” in Dermot Moran’s gloss is not split into two separate subjects. Since the entire epoché is 
an act of concerted mental activity performed by a single reflecting subject, the relation between these 
two types of subjectivity, empirical or natural and transcendental or universal, is one of degree: “The 
empirical subject is the same subject, but now apprehended and interpreted as an object in the world[.]”87 
Husserl and his commentators are quick to point out that nothing is lost in this formulation; the 
transcendental process of reduction entails “an enrichment of one’s subjective life – it opens infinitely 
before one,” since what unfolds for reflection is antecedent to, and provides the grounds for the 
possibility of apprehending, natural or empirical subjectivity.88 As Husserl himself suggests, 
 
Natural being is a realm whose existential status [Seinsgeltung] is secondary; 
it continually presupposes the realm of transcendental being. The 
fundamental phenomenological method of transcendental epoché, because it 
leads back to this realm, is called transcendental-phenomenological reduction 
[transzendental-phänomenologische Reduktion].89 
 
The obviousness, or pre-givenness [Selbstverständlichkeit] of the world as we normally, pre-
philosophically perceive it, obscures the fact, fundamental to Husserl’s mature thought of which the 
Meditations are exemplary, that consciousness bestows meaning on the world and its objects: that 
subjectivity is the condition for the appearance and meaning of the world. It is in this sense constitutive, 
or sense-giving; the German noun that names this process is Sinngebung. 
 Paul Ricœur summarises the epoché with respect to constitutive subjectivity as follows: 
 
The epoché is a break en bloc with the world-belief [Weltglaube]. The world 
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is implicated as an unenumerated totality by this act which brings it together, 
strips it of absolute existence, and refers it globally to the cogito. Hence, it is 
the unity of an act of rupturing which permits anticipating the unity of an act 
of constituting.90 
 
Constitution [Konstitution] is a term Husserl inherited from Kantian and Neo-Kantian philosophy. In 
Husserl’s mature writings on transcendental subjectivity, it refers to the manner in which consciousness 
bestows objectivity on entities, and “includes a kind of passive construction of all the meanings found in 
consciousness.”91 The epoché reveals the constitutive nature of consciousness: “Constitution is a 
universal feature of conscious life; all meanings are constituted in and by consciousness.”92 The source of 
all meaning then, for me, is in transcendental subjectivity, and is specifically my transcendental ego. 
Husserl’s interpretation of the ego developed over the course of his career through a variety of complex 
permutations, but his position in the Meditations is clear: all meanings, all objects, and, as we shall see, 
all alter egos, are for me constituted in and by my transcendental ego, which since it continually reflects 
upon the evidence of its own existence is itself constitutive of itself; is in fact a perpetual act of self-
constitution [Selbstkonstitution]. It is in this sense that Ricœur, Moran and others emphasise Husserl’s 
“egology,” that is, the transcendental subject’s self-constituting origin of meaning-making for which the 
world is, and from which meaning is bestowed.93 
 “Objects exist for me,” Husserl states in the opening of the fourth meditation, “and are for me 
what they are, only as objects of actual and possible consciousness.”94 The same, then, must hold for the 
regular, psychological ego: 
 
I exist for myself and am continually given to myself, by experiential 
evidence, as “I myself.” This is true of the transcendental ego and, 
correspondingly, of the psychologically pure ego; it is true, moreover, with 
respect to any sense of the word ego.95 
 
In the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl names what he calls “the ego taken in full concreteness [in voller 
Konkretion]” the monad, a term borrowed from Leibniz. By “full concreteness” Husserl refers to the 
sense in which all the variety and “flowing multiformity” of experience is consolidated in a single life. 
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The passage directly above from §33 continues: 
 
Since the monadically concrete ego includes also the whole of actual and 
potential conscious life, it is clear that the problem of explicating this 
monadic ego phenomenologically (the problem of his constitution for 
himself) must include all constitutional problems without exception. 
Consequently the phenomenology of this self-constitution coincides with 
phenomenology as a whole.96 
 
Ricœur announces that this passage “marks the total triumph of interiority over exteriority,” and 
explicates its sense as the first step towards the Husserlian phenomenological conception of the alter ego, 
the Other, as constituted for me in my consciousness.97 The second is the eidos ego. This is the realm of 
pure possibility of which the transcendental ego is one actualization. The eidos, says Husserl, “is a beheld 
or beholdable universal, one that is pure, ‘unconditioned’ – that is to say: according to its own intuitional 
sense, a universal not conditioned by fact.”98 The transcendental ego exemplifies the eidos ego by 
pertaining to one concrete possibility among a universe of possibilities. The eidos is “the purity of myself 
reached through imaginative variations on my own life” of which the transcendental ego determines only 
one.99 The eidos ego provides the grounds for Husserl’s apparently solipsistic cul-de-sac at the end of the 
fourth meditation, and, as Ricœur’s gloss suggests, anticipates the Meditations’ account of 
intersubjectivity which prioritises absolutely the constituting ego over “objective” correlates. 
 The manner in which the eidos ego is ascertained, and in Ricœur’s commentary especially so, 
bears a strong similarity to Oliver’s description of the self–other distinctions in the Chaucerian narrator. It 
involves: 
 
[1] the transcendental reduction of the being of the world and [2] the eidetic 
reduction of the factual ego. [...] The remarkable and strange thing is that this 
passage to the eidos ego brings into play only variations on my own ego 
(Selbstvariation meiner Ego) and has no reference to the Other in the second 
person. Thus, I imagine myself as other without imagining an Other.100 
 
We have seen that since consciousness is sense-bestowing, entities receive their meaning from the ego. 
What is true for objects given by experiential evidence is also, in Husserl’s system, true for other people. 
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Phenomenological method, the method of the epoché, disqualifies an examination of the relation between 
subjects from some third-person, as it were, perspective; it can thus “only be treated as a transcendental 
problem through a radical mich-selbst-befragen [...],” or relation to another subject as they are given to 
me in my experience.101 Ricœur begins his analysis of the fifth meditation with the explanation: 
 
[...] the sense “Other” is drawn from the sense “me” because one must first 
give sense to “me” and to “my own” in order then to give sense to the 
“Other” and to the “world of the Other.” There is something “alien” 
(étranger) because there is something “own” (propre), and not conversely. 
The sense “ego” is transferred from me to the Other if it is true that the Other 
is “alter ego.”102 
 
The account of intersubjectivity [Intersubjectivität] in the Cartesian Meditations is amongst the most 
provocative and controversial of Husserl’s theories. It is through the account of temporality as it pertains 
to egological genesis in the latter stages of the fourth meditation, and the lengthy explanation of 
intersubjectivity that comprises the majority of the fifth, that provide the most relevant material for 
Oliver’s project, and comprise therefore the particular facets of Husserl’s work that we must tackle before 
the sense behind Oliver’s hunch about the other’s “appresentation,” above, can be fully understood. 
 During the composition of the essays, particularly the second and sixth, Oliver read Suzanne 
Bachelard’s 1968 critique of Husserl’s Transcendental Logic. Bachelard summarises the priority of the 
self-constituting ego in the following terms: 
 
Not only the world of things, but also others exist for me in the same way. It 
is in my ego that the alter ego as such has his sense and his status. It is for me 
that the alter ego has that sense whereby for him I am an alter ego just as he 
is alter ego for me [...] Hence, all that exists has existence only for me; all 
that exists is “constituted” in me.103 
 
The importance of all this for Oliver’s theme resides primarily in the Husserlian conception of the ego, 
and in the deductive move from transcendental subjectivity to transcendental intersubjectivity. Oliver 
does not, as I have already indicated, import Husserl’s structure of the ego, transcendental or otherwise, 
from the Meditations or anywhere else, wholesale into his account of the creative dynamic. Instead, 
Oliver leaps in and out of Husserl’s Meditations in order to furnish his own poetic theory with an equally 
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“creative” appropriation of phenomenological process.104 Thus his first port of call in the second essay is 
transcendental subjectivity as it pertains to Husserl’s fourth meditation. Oliver intended this second essay 
not as an explanatory sibling to the first, but as a parallel investigation into the creative dynamic. “In no 
sense,” he declares, “am I seeking to extend the significance of my Chaucerian analysis by bald use of 
Husserl’s theories.”105 He aims instead to set alongside the explication of the vagaries of the poetic self he 
identifies in ‘The Tale of Sir Thopas’ a description of one philosopher’s theory of the transcendental ego 
in order to illuminate a condition that subtends them both: “For the two men are employing or 
investigating a dynamic fundamental to creativity.”106 And “fundamental” to this dynamic are the twin 
strands of temporality and self–other distinctions. 
 “What we are talking about here,” Oliver remarks, “is the experience of the ‘other’ seen as a kind 
of genesis.” 
 
Now, it could theoretically be that in his normal experience of the “other” 
and also as he considers the “other” notionally for the sake of writing a poem, 
the poet puts his own ego into a kind of flashpoint, an absolute flux moment 
in which there is absolutely no difference in status between himself and 
“other” and in which both are originally present within that moment. It could 
seem that in the “±” signs with which I endowed the Chaucerian ego at such a 
flashpoint (in my first essay) this implication could be drawn – not least since 
I called that instant a plenum in which the signs “really” held true. In fact, 
what we have at such a moment is but an imperfect, fleeting glimpse of 
transcendence, however how much hope it may give us [...] What goes into 
the experience from our perspective is our own ego, voyaging into the 
maelstrom in search of the other, and what comes out of it is still our ego as 
the potential agent, again from our perspective, of our approach to any new 
encounter of self and other. Either the ambiguity of sign is a condition we 
more or less perfectly strive for in this genesis or there would have to be 
some explanation of how identity emerges from loss of it – if we believe the 
fusion of self and other really to be perfect in some instant of the 
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encounter.107 
 
The key passage from Husserl’s fourth meditation that Oliver quotes directly beneath these speculations 
is the following, from §39: 
 
Only through the phenomenology of genesis does the ego become 
understandable: as a nexus, connected in the unity of an all-embracing 
genesis, an infinite nexus of synthetically congruous performances – at 
levels, all of which fit the universal persisting form, temporality.108 
 
Oliver comments: “A refinement of this picture of genesis, removed from considerations of epoché, will 
be one of my aims during this series.”109 In other words, Oliver abandons the central tenet of Husserlian 
methodology, the epoché, whilst retaining the structural and hierarchical divisions between ego and alter 
ego that emerge in the course of that methodology’s progression. He does this in order to assert that 
poetry creates “moment[s] in which there is absolutely no difference in status between [the poet-author] 
and ‘other’ and in which both are originally present within that moment.”  
 Oliver thus deliberately employs a philosophical system in his exegesis of the creative dynamic 
that cannot support on its own terms the ends he intends this dynamic to attain: the philosophical attitude 
must therefore be abandoned in favour of the “natural attitude” of “the crude world of the everyday which 
the poet wrestles with.”110 Only poetry can solve the problem of “perfect identity between self and 
Other,” because philosophy, in the shape of Husserl, declares that it is impossible. Or rather, it declares 
that it is not really a problem for philosophy, or not, at least, for phenomenology. For Husserl the notion 
of original presentation of the other is simply a category error, since 
 
Neither the other Ego himself, nor his subjective processes or his appearances 
themselves, nor anything else belonging to what is essentially his own, 
becomes given in our experience originally. If it were, if what belongs to 
what is essentially the other’s ownness were directly accessible, it would be 
merely a moment of my own essence.111 
 
Yet becoming a “moment of [each other’s] essence” is precisely what Oliver desires of the self–other 
dyad in the moments engendered by the creative dynamic. 
 Here is another example of the divergence between Oliver’s use of Husserlian terminology and 
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the schema that terminology was designed to support. Husserl’s concept of genesis in the Cartesian 
Meditations relates to the temporal constitution of the ego for itself: “The ego constitutes himself for 
himself in, so to speak, the unity of a ‘history.’”112 Time is thus “the universal form of all egological 
genesis.”113 Genesis, divided in the Meditations into “passive” and “active” variants, is essentially the 
manner in which my transcendental ego constitutes the world around me through time, whether in terms 
of a generally acknowledged, but never directly attended to, background behind which life goes on 
(passive genesis) or in terms of “productively constitutive” ego-acts that pertain to the foreground, as it 
were, of the life of the ego (active genesis). Genetic phenomenology supposes that I constitute, whether 
actively or passively, objects for my perception; furthermore, “it is owing to an essentially necessary 
genesis that I, the ego, can experience a physical thing and do so even at first glance.”114 If we are looking 
for an application of these philosophical coordinates to a literary theory, then plainly the passage from 
Oliver’s essay quoted above weaves in and out of Husserl’s meanings so casually as to be obfuscatory.  
 “Genesis,” for example, seems in Oliver’s prose to refer more to the meeting of self and other as 
engendered through literary means, than to the manner in which objects in the world are given sense by 
temporal intentional consciousness. Similarly, “transcendence” in Oliver only scans in terms of a glimpse 
of an authorial self escaping his ego towards the realm of another, fictional or otherwise, for the briefest 
of moments; it is nothing to do with a reduction effected by the epoché which reveals the fundamental 
structures of Sinngebung. But no strict application is intended or effected. Rather, Oliver effectively 
translates phenomenological jargon into a schema for literary creativity. Fleeting “transcendence” gives 
us “hope,” since it entails the relinquishment of selfhood in the ambiguity of self–other relations activated 
by the poem, a relative unity available only in verse, in which we potentially lose ourselves in order to 
find the Other. We recall that the theme of these essays is the “dynamics of poetic consciousness at the 
moment when it acts” and not transcendental consciousness at each and every moment; we recall too, that 
“an exploration of the dynamics of ‘self’ as it acts poetically” is not the self acting within the universal 
potentialities of the Husserlian lifeworld [Lebenswelt], but within the lines and ligaments of a poem. This 
goes some way to explaining the idiosyncratic digestion of the Meditations in the essay. 
 As a further example, take Oliver’s treatment of the eidos ego. After explaining its role in 
Husserl’s system as “the universal transcendental background to what actually ‘happens’ when the de 
facto transcendental ego intends an object,” Oliver goes on to admit that: 
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I can make little sense of the eidetic ego unless I see it in the context of a 
haphazard, drifting dynamics[,] not those fiercely directed dynamics of 
artistic creation. This would be a cost, for my present purposes, of the 
phenomenological reduction.115 
 
Despite seeming to reject the eidos ego “for [his] present purposes,” Oliver certainly does employ certain 
conceptual ramifications that emerge from its description in the Meditations. At the end of the second 
essay, Oliver makes recourse to Werner Brock’s general introduction to Heidegger’s thought in Brock’s 
1956 edition of Existence and Being.116 Oliver’s presentation of Heidegger is secondary in nature and 
short in duration. He emphasises, after Brock, that “for the Temporality of Dasein the future is the 
somehow ‘guiding’ and dominant mode” of all three temporal ecstasies.117 Such a schema, in which 
“[t]he ‘past’ originates from the ‘future’ so as to engender the ‘present,’” is fortuitously suited to a poetic 
theory in which the relationship between moment (of poetic consciousness acting, of intersubjectivity) 
and motion (of readerly experience that is comprised of such moments) is fundamental.  
 After introducing Heidegger, Oliver returns to the question of the “moment” he identified in 
Chaucer, citing six characteristics of that moment. These characteristics figure the moment in terms of a 
Heideggerian ecstasy that “seems to unite mysteriously [...] all the self–other relationships that occur” 
within the poem, implying “an assumption of responsibility for the whole poem during this brief 
instant.”118 This, Oliver suggests, now explicitly recalling the sense of Husserl’s eidos ego, could be 
called “a glimpse of the total potential of the poem (and so of the author) as it stands at this instant,” 
before evoking the distinction between transcendental and eidos egos by asserting that “we are [in this 
moment] in contact with a de facto transcendence, arising from the poem as given [...] we are offered time 
as at maximum potential forwards or backwards within the poem.”119 This is certainly characteristic of 
what Oliver calls his “predatory use” of Husserl, although perhaps not exactly what he himself meant by 
this phrase.120 
 As a summary of his use of Husserl, Oliver lists seven points of relevance of the philosopher to 
the theory of creative dynamics he is developing.121 The most important of these is the seventh, in which 
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is summarised the interpretative schema Oliver claims for his reading of the philosophical system found 
in the Meditations: 
 
I don’t think that making Husserl more crude by discussing not the 
phenomenologically-reduced ego but the natural-attitude’s “self” need 
prevent me from reverting to this Husserlian insight: by each constituting act 
of the ego we originate in a genesis (to a greater or lesser extent perfected, I 
add) a de facto state of the (transcendental) ego from a background of wider 
possibility. I suggest that this general pattern remains true at whatever level 
we enquire.122 
 
What Oliver performs here is an explicit re-working, and an implicit criticism, of the epoché in order to 
suit the dynamics of “artistic creativity.” The fact is that Husserl’s method would precisely prohibit the 
kind of manoeuvre that Oliver wants to make. To discuss the “transcendence” of the natural ego “from a 
background of wider possibility [...] at whatever level we enquire” is already to move outside the remit of 
the reduction within which all the thinking of the Meditations takes place. Phenomenological method 
would prohibit Oliver’s freedom of enquiry because the entire process, for Husserl, is only possible 
within the reduced sphere of phenomenal understanding set in train by the bracketing of the world in the 
service of transcendental reflection. Oliver ignores the very systematic procedure of transcendental 
phenomenology in order to adapt its terminology to what he asserts are the “more crude” creative 
processes employed by poets, and in doing so he effectively levels the criticism at Husserl that the 
distinction between the “eidetic” and “natural” attitudes should be discarded. Nevertheless, it would be a 
mistake to assume that Oliver’s adaptation of philosophical jargon can be understood merely as a set of 
signs delivered of their referents. Crucially, Oliver clearly understands the production of what he has 
previously called “self–other ambiguity” in a manner that is fruitfully comparable with, if not consciously 
drawn from, egological constitution. His theory figures the author-poet’s production of narrative and lyric 
selfhood (as in the example from Chaucer) as the primordial sphere of constituting subjectivity, in and for 
which “others” are constituted as part and parcel of the creative process, and with which the reader, in 
their own sphere of constituting subjectivity, comes into contact by a reciprocal effort of attention. 
 A philosophical exposition of intersubjectivity is thereby folded into a general theory of literary 
communication and consensus: Oliver’s description of what happens when we read a poem is structurally 
akin to, but emphatically not the same as, Husserl’s description, late in the Meditations, of what the latter 
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refers to as a “community of monads.”123 Oliver’s theory is not the same as Husserl’s because Oliver 
reads poetry as striving to obtain as closely as possible, in those moments of fleeting duration, a relational 
coincidence of original presentation. For Husserl, this promise is not only impossible, it is decidedly 
beside the point, since something so epiphenomenal as my desire to experience the other originally can 
have no bearing on the complex of Sinngebung by which I understand “two primordial spheres [...] 
separated by an abyss I cannot actually cross.”124 Oliver’s entire appropriation of Husserl is founded on 
the desire to interpret poetry as the one object of experience which is most closely capable of crossing this 
“abyss.” He explains the process in the fifth essay in the series, ‘An examination of “prosody” in the light 
of theories already expressed,’ thus: 
 
My point is – as throughout – dynamic; the way in which poetic music works 
to bring the poet, as “self,” and the reader, as “other,” into a creative 
ambiguity, a “text,” in which each bears a double-double sign [...]125 
 
The “double-double sign” refers to the ambiguity between self and other on both sides of the author-
reader divide. In both the fifth and the unfinished sixth essays, this ambiguity is the pre-condition for 
what Oliver calls a “sharing of consciousness” – an absolute moment of consensus achieved through 
mutual recognition of common emotion. Creative ambiguity is necessarily intersubjective: the divide 
between author and reader is bridged by poetry that through its minutest iterations provides the grounds 
for this recognition.126 
 It is worth examining in more detail Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity, since Oliver’s second 
essay abstracts from this account a set of priorities which are held to be as relevant to the creative 
dynamic as the moment from Chaucer we have seen analysed in the first essay. These priorities are 
developed by Husserl throughout the Meditations and culminate in the fifth meditation’s description of 
intersubjectivity. There, they are collected under the rubric “ownness” [Eigenheit]. Because the 
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phenomenological reduction effects a reflection upon the pure transcendental ego as primordial sense-
bestowing subjectivity, 
 
We must, after all, obtain for ourselves insight into the explicit and implicit 
intentionality wherein the alter ego becomes evinced and verified in the 
realm of our transcendental ego; we must discover in what intentionalities, 
syntheses, motivations, the sense “other ego” becomes fashioned in me and, 
under the title harmonious experience of someone else, becomes verified as 
existing and even as itself there in its own manner.127 
 
“These experiences and their works,” Husserl tells us, “are facts belonging to my phenomenological 
sphere. How else than by examining them can I explicate the sense, existing others, in all its aspects?”128 
The phenomenological method demands this starting point: it has always been the starting point for a 
philosophy beholden to Cartesian principles as the only fitting basis for the understanding of objectivity. 
 It is important to note here that Husserl explicates intersubjectivity as the ultimate ground of 
objective reality. The “retreat,” as it were, into transcendental subjectivity was always effected with the 
world of the experience of others in mind. Since my body is the originally perceived location of my 
experiences of the world, the centre and circumference of myself, the problem the fifth meditation 
broaches is: “how another body can be constituted in my experience: hence, how can I perceive an 
external material object as sensitive, as active, and as the null-centre of perspectives on the world.”129 The 
answer brings us back to Oliver’s sense, above, of what “rings true” for him in Husserl’s philosophy: by 
analogy.  
 Smith describes the process such that 
 
taking an external material thing to be a body is founded upon a perceived 
likeness between that thing and my own body. It is such a likeness that 
motivates a ‘transfer of sense’ from my own body to the external thing, 
whereby the latter is apperceived as a living body.130 
 
And quotes directly from his own translation of the Meditations: 
 
There is an ‘analogizing apprehension whereby a material thing in my 
primordial sphere, being similar to my own body, becomes apprehended 
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likewise as a body.’131 
 
Such is the nature of appresentation: someone else is appresented to me because their experiences are not 
originally accessible; “they are alien to my sphere of ownness.”132 Another ego is constituted in me like 
any other external object considered by my transcendental ego; but other egos are also the seat of true 
objectivity, since “as a result of the other’s ‘insertion’ into my world I perceive the other as perceiving 
[...] the very things that I perceive.”133 The world of objective things is constituted in its objectivity thanks 
to its perception by monads other than myself – “Every object perceivable by me is open to alien 
perspectives that I, given my actual situation, cannot have.”134 It is in this sense that “the alienness of the 
other at one stroke transforms my ‘world’ into a truly objective world.”135 The objectivity thus made 
manifest consists of a “community of monads,” each of whom by acknowledging the co-constitution of all 
the objects for transcendental subjectivity themselves constitute “a single universal community.”136 
 This is the background to the sense of intersubjectivity that Oliver inherits from Husserl and 
folds into his theory: 
 
Lacking a reduction, poets do not construct a systematics of self–other 
relations; they don’t need to, since by expert practice of the dynamic they 
enter the process of that relation which is a more vital and poetic experience 
of the dynamic (though less systematic) than a philosophical explification 
[sic] of its structures. Consequently, in its overt statements much poetry is a 
mix of naïve and profound statement about the self of the poet, as far as it 
appears in the poem as persona, or in various guises. At all its great moments, 
the poem implies the profundity even where it cannot explicitly match the 
subtlety of a philosopher like Husserl. For such a case, it is enough for my 
purposes that I should have a notion of self sophisticated enough to create the 
dynamic in a way that poetry really does create it – a notion moreover which 
should correspond to a “natural attitude” in a way sufficiently general as to 
remain applicable to a very wide spectrum of good poetry and to remain 
sufficiently versatile at this level of analysis as not to contradict Husserl’s 
best findings at more fundamental levels.137 
 
Poets do not reduce; they expand. Specifically, they create the conditions for the experience of expansion, 
of transcendence, in Oliver’s (leap-frogging Husserl’s) terminology; they are responsible for the moments 
that allow for the fleeting perception, by the reader, of the “figure of giant-like significance” within whom 
the primordial distinction between self and other is made sufficiently “ambiguous” to engender a “sharing 
                                                            
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid., p.228. 
133 Ibid., p.232 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p.140. 
137 ‘Who does the poet,’ p.7. 
44 
of consciousness.” Such a theory follows the conceptual priority of Husserlian distinctions at the same 
time as abandoning the method which Husserl demands we must follow in order to understand that 
priority. Oliver conceives poetry to be the object whose formal properties not only allow but actively 
encourage us to encounter, as far as is possible, a state of original presentation of the other. Oliver 
consistently asserts the poet’s crudity compared the philosopher, as we have seen. He does not do this in 
deference to philosophical thinking, but because such crudity is the measure of an “everyday” authenticity 
that confirms poetry’s distinction from philosophy, and from philosophy’s own hierarchy of the 
“authentic” itself; it can do things that philosophy cannot, or refuses to do, because it is grounded in the 
world of self–other relations, not removed from them by the abstractive subtleties of hermeneutic 
reflection. It is for this reason that poetry is able to come closer than anything else to establishing the 
“perfect identity between self and Other.” 
 But Oliver’s system nonetheless figures some basic assumptions fundamental to Husserlian 
phenomenological method into its theoretical agenda. Firstly, and primarily, that the poet-author as poetic 
“self” is productive (in phenomenological jargon, constitutive) of a self–other ambiguity in verse. 
Secondly, and secondarily, that the reader of poetry, designated “other,” is capable, through readerly 
“work,” of experiencing, even re-producing this ambiguity in the equal and opposite experience of 
appresentation of the authorial “other” engendered, likewise, in verse. “Ambiguity,” described in terms 
which display the influence of the pure possibility of Husserl’s eidos ego, is the blurring of the line 
between self and other that tends towards the direct experience of another person. 
 
1.5 – The moment and poetic stress 
 
The ideas developed over the first four essays are concluded, both chronologically and conceptually, in 
the fifth. The fifth essay returns to the question of the “moment” identified in the first essay. It completes 
Oliver’s argument about self–other relations in poetry by identifying prosody – by which Oliver refers 
simply to the entire gamut of “verse techniques” – as that which “significantly aids (and does so 
constantly in the ‘perfect poem’) a self–other transcendence of equivalent dynamic to that which I 
discerned in Chaucer.”138 A “self–other transcendence” both draws on, and eludes the conceptual remit of 
what is called, in Husserl’s terminology, transcendental intersubjectivity. Oliver’s phraseology draws on 
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Husserl in the sense that, as I have shown, the diagrammatic relationship between poet-author and reader 
is figured by Oliver in terms analogous to those of Husserlian monadological appresentation. The kind of 
intersubjective encounter that Oliver wants to describe shares the prioritising of a poetic subject who 
creates (constitutes) the conditions for otherness in verse; this is the poet’s “creative dynamic” that is 
encountered by the reader. But what Oliver names a “self–other transcendence” equally eludes Husserlian 
conceptual boundaries through an active promotion of “ambiguity” tending towards a “sharing of 
consciousness,” desirous of a “perfect identity between self and Other.” What we have been calling 
“ambiguity” is thus the possibility engendered in verse of what Oliver would later call a “special 
intersubjectivity,” reminiscent of the impossible realm of Husserl’s negatively defined original 
presentation. 
 The fifth essay offers readings of poems by the American poets Ed Dorn and Robert Creeley. 
During a close reading of the latter’s canonical ‘I Know a Man,’ which discusses the varying forms of 
tension and release produced by the poem’s consonantal patterns, Oliver remarks that “the impression that 
is of deciding importance is the transcendent union of two minds, poet and reader, along the detailed 
process of versification[.]”139 And in relation to Dorn, 
 
the major effect of [certain verses of Dorn’s The Cycle] is created in their 
finest details, though in poetry it is often at moments of special poetic 
expertise that this build-up of emotion created in detail is discharged in a 
sudden transcendence.140 
 
Oliver was influenced in his emphasis on emotional tension and release, in effect throughout the essay, by 
Barbara Herrnstein Smith’s 1968 Poetic Closure: A Study of How Poems End.141 Smith’s study employs 
models extracted from early twentieth-century psychologies of music to account for the experience of 
poetic form. Its theme is the perception of poetic objects as they pertain to our understanding of formal 
structural coherence. The reader’s experience “is not only continuous over a period of time, but 
continuously changes in response to succeeding events,” enjoining the reader to engage “in a steady 
process of readjustment and retrospective patterning.”142 Poetic structure is “an inference which we draw 
from the evidence of a series of events. As we read the poem, it is a hypothesis whose probability is tested 
as we move from line to line and adjusted in response to what we find there,” causing “every disruption 
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of our expectations” to engender “some kind of emotion.”143 Oliver’s readings of Dorn and Creeley are 
designed to accomplish a description of an experience of close reading that would identify, in more 
minute terms than Smith’s book, such a “disruption” – of the solidity of the difference between self and 
other, resulting in the “transcendent union of two minds.”  
 Whereas the example of this disruption from ‘The Tale of Sir Thopas’ was large-scale and 
narrative in nature, the examples in the fifth essay are all local to the minutiae of Dorn and Creeley’s 
syntactical “fissures” and “tiny cracks,” operating on the level of syllable, sound-patterning and stress.144 
The crux of the entire essay series, a summary of the function of prosody as it encapsulates and produces 
the effects we have been discussing throughout this chapter, is presented, as we noted above, in a 
Coleridgean article of poetic faith: 
 
CREDO: the function of all details of prosody, especially the finest details, is 
to ensure that the reader, by assenting all along to the music of the language 
as emotionally apt for himself as well as for the poet, tunes the process of his 
thought to that of the poet more exactly than ordinary language makes 
possible.145 
 
“We create,” Oliver continues, “between reader and poet a self-other ambiguity, a dynamic process of “±” 
and “∓,” that now familiar dialectic of singularity, the mode of love and relativity.”146 These are moments 
of “love” because the union between self and other is fleetingly yet nominally complete; of “relativity” 
because the union is one of absolute equivalence. It is debatable whether this “dialectic” has become 
“familiar” over the course of the essays, or whether, for that matter, it is in fact a “dialectic”; certainly 
Oliver does not discuss “love” at any length in the essays previous to this statement. The statement serves 
to ground the conceptual remit of the essays by nominating “love” as the form their discovery takes in the 
“crude world of the everyday.” This world is invoked again in the fifth essay when Oliver describes the 
relation of the “moment” in Chaucer to the “moments” of prosodic minutiae. The difference is one of 
degree: moments such as the Host’s recognition of Chaucer, those “‘great moments’ of poetry [...] arise 
when we are suddenly, because of some gifted discovery by the poet, made more consciously aware of 
                                                            
143 Ibid., pp.13-14. 
144 ‘An examination,’ p.7. 
145 Ibid., pp.8-9. Returning to Oliver’s “CREDO” as we do here, we may now appreciate what speech-act theory 
might designate the perlocutionary consequences of his concept of prosody. Indeed, poetic language in the shape 
of poems entails perlocutionary acts par excellence, since “what we bring about or achieve by saying something,” 
i.e. when reading a poem aloud, or in silence to oneself, emphatically transcends Austin’s examples “such as 
convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, surprising or misleading” by bringing about – in addition to all 
of these possible affective orientations – the attunement of the reader’s consciousness to that of the poet-author’s. 
See J.L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), p.109. 
146 ‘An examination,’ p.9. 
47 
the sharing of consciousness which has been conducted along the rhythms and word-signs.”147 
 Oliver then compares the experience to a moment of social clarity: 
 
Anecdotally, it is comparable to one of those instants involving a group of 
people sitting amid some atmosphere of unusual seriousness when one person 
suddenly says something which catches everyone athwart his feelings. 
Because each person knows then that all are sharing the same thought and the 
same consciousness there’s a sudden quite extraordinary deepening of 
awareness which spreads almost like a blush across the countenance: it is the 
uncanny experience of mutual transcendence.148 
 
The knowledge asserted in the experience of collective emotion during intimate social gatherings, perhaps 
those of the community of poets gathered at the University of Essex during the time of the composition of 
these essays, is not the apodicticity of phenomenological method. This knowledge is, however, described 
in the terms Oliver has consciously liberated from exactly such methodology. What Oliver intimates by 
“transcendence” is the prosaic striking clarity of mutual understanding. Yet the residual semantic freight 
of Husserl’s terminology ensures that the “CREDO” operates at least within the purview of 
transcendental intersubjectivity; it is certainly beholden to Husserlian phenomenological intentional 
priorities concerning the constitution of the objective world by a mutually corroborating community of 
monads. The reader “tunes the process of his thought to that of the poet more exactly than ordinary 
language makes possible.” The appearance of a new musical analogy (perhaps suggested by Smith’s 
reliance on psychologies of music) should not blind us to the fact that this description is essentially of a 
piece with the claims Oliver had been making for verse since the first essay. And they are the same 
claims, albeit expressed in a more professional and academic tone, that Oliver makes fifteen years later in 
Poetry and Narrative in Performance. 
 Between his graduation from Essex in 1975 and the publication of Poetry and Narrative in 
Performance in 1989, Oliver published four articles which contain thinking either directly or indirectly 
relevant to his theory of prosody. These are: the article ‘Even Poets Can Have Beliefs About Poetic 
“Stress,”’ published in Grosseteste Review in 1979, two papers on phonetics from 1983 and 1984, both 
published in the Journal of Phonetics, and a comparative article on English and French poetry, published 
in 1986 in the Journal of the British Institute in Paris.149 All four contain material that Oliver later folded 
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into the book-length Poetry and Narrative in Performance.150 In the latter, Oliver maintains that poetic 
stress is a paradox, a “notional instant with content.”151 The reason for this is that although we can “tap an 
instant of stress with a finger,” an instant “should have no content” or duration; thus “[b]y a sort of mental 
trick we ‘give’ this instant a tiny sonic, intellectual and emotional content from the past of the poetic line 
and from its future considered from the standpoint of that instant.”152 We know the instant has occurred, 
and yet it is imperceptible in its singularity given the flux of temporality.  
 At least since the 1979 article ‘Even Poets Can Have Beliefs About Poetic Stress,’ Oliver 
considers “stress” to be the aspect of prosody most conducive to producing the effects of what is called 
“prosody” in the early essays. By 1989, stress is more broadly defined as the concatenation, in a spoken 
line of verse, of natural linguistic rhythmic properties (with or without the imposition of metre), and the 
concomitant emotional and psychological effects of these properties, in relation to the poem as a whole: 
 
Our sense of poetic stress arises from our conscious belief that we have, just 
recently, in a notional instant, unified some of our experience of a poem’s 
developing sounds [...] with some of its developing intellectual-semantic and 
emotional significance, attaining that unification through the medium of the 
sound and bringing into the unity at least some of the poem’s past and future 
by anticipation and retrospection. By ‘unity’ is meant a working model of it 
in memory to which we attend and which includes our sense of 
expectation.153 
 
The moment of stress, Oliver argues, cannot be confined to an empirical-metrical analysis of the type 
undertaken in the two articles published in the Journal of Phonetics, but is inflected by the emotional and 
semantic attributes of the syllable, word, line and ultimately the entire poem, not to mention the emotive 
sensitivity of any given reader. It is “notional,” therefore, not only because a truly isolated instant in time 
is imperceptible to even the finest, most detailed empirical survey, but also because it is determined 
precisely by what cannot be measured empirically and must remain, ultimately, “a matter for 
speculation,” namely, a felt or intuited experience of unity.154 
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 This rationale is in effect a version of the emphasis on “ambiguity” that we saw in the early 
essays. Recall the statement, quoted above, that 
 
Literary form fills the apparent ‘instant’ of time with mental content, an 
operation which ought to be impossible and, in fact, is only achieved in a 
paradoxical way. But because the paradox is infinitely repeatable, literary 
form allows the reader to think he is sharing this ‘instant’ with the imagined 
author of the text.155  
 
Oliver continues: 
 
Its full value only appears when the text is activated by a performance, 
because in the repeatability of a shared mental experience lies the hope that 
we can enrich our perception and human sympathy.156 
 
Significant in this line of argument is the figuring of the paradoxical moment as being filled “with mental 
content,” since such a characterisation is continual with the proximity of Oliver’s thinking to the 
phenomenological conception of “constitution” discussed above. The “moment” is bestowed with a 
certain sense in any given reading that generates the constantly shifting dynamics of articulated prosody; 
this is an elaboration of the discussion of “sharing of consciousness” in the early essays. Another 
elaboration is that the “perfect identity between self and Other” is here and elsewhere in Poetry and 
Narrative developed into an ethical program of “human sympathy” to supplement the structural, 
phenomenologically-influenced formulations expressed fifteen years prior; intersubjectivity is now as 
clearly defined as it ever would be in Oliver’s prose as the utopian prospect of unfettered inter-personal 
unification. 
 We now return to the statement, quoted above, that: 
 
Author and reader create, through their own implied personification in the 
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text, a special intersubjectivity – a perfecting of the emotional and semantic 
fields through a shared experience of space and time [...] The process reveals 
what our everyday experience and speech could be like, if, when our 
emotions were real and not imaginary, our hearts and heads were in temporal 
consonance.157 
 
Ideally, our “everyday experience and speech” would be more like the experience of reading a poem, 
because only within this experience can “temporal consonance” between poet-author and reader, in the 
form of the “notional instant with content” be fleetingly achieved. “Emotion in ordinary life cannot fuse 
perfectly with thought,” but poetry “discovers a way to unify the time-scales of emotion, concept and 
verbal music,” and it is “through the accord of concept and emotion that a more profound perfection and 
intersubjectivity are attained.”158 This spiritually-inflected intersubjectivity thus begins and ends in 
poems: it requires the poet to create an object in the world to which the reader must attune, and which will 
then provide an exemplary case of the condition of perfected identity desirable but ultimately unavailable 
in everyday life, yet repeatedly available in poems. 
 
1.6 – Conclusion 
 
Thinking about moments of what the early essays call “perfect identity between self and Other” is at the 
centre of Douglas Oliver’s poetics. It is a thinking with a clearly identifiable phenomenological 
inheritance. In various guises and permutations it remains the conceptual heart of Oliver’s poetry and 
prose from his early 1970s work until his death, whether implicitly (as in The Diagram--Poems, The 
Infant and the Pearl and Penniless Politics) or explicitly (as in ‘An Island That Is All The World’). This 
thinking combines a creative interpretation of phenomenological method with the closest attention to the 
music of verse to identify and nominate the “precious origin of our lives’ form, or of a true politics” in 
poems. Poet-author and reader co-constitute, at every potentially realisable moment of prosodic iteration, 
a readily available model of harmonious intersubjective unity. The ethical dimension that inheres in such 
an encounter is effectively assumed, and not rigorously worked out or demanded in Oliver’s post-Essex 
work; it is the necessary correlate to a theory of communicative authenticity whose ideally harmonious 
configuration is transferred by metaphorical economy to the status of a behavioural code. This code forms 
the moral backbone of the poetic oeuvre between 1979 and 1991.  
 In the chapters that follow I trace the arguments that arise from the consideration of this code in 
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the light of specific political contexts, and its ramifications for political thinking more generally, through 
Oliver’s major works of the 1970s and 1980s. Before I do so, it is worth pausing over the quiet enormity 
of Oliver’s claims for poetry. Recall that poets, in Oliver’s account, “do not construct a systematics of 
self–other relations” like philosophers; “they don’t need to,” because 
 
by expert practice of the [creative] dynamic they enter the process of that 
relation [between self and other] which is a more vital and poetic experience 
of the dynamic [...] than a philosophical explification [sic] of its structures.159 
 
Poets “enter the process” of that which the philosophers can only systematise, and what they do there is to 
create in verse the “precious origin” not only of an intersubjective harmony, but of a “true politics.” What 
the philosopher calls “a single universal community” need not, in the poet’s hands, necessitate the rigour 
of philosophical expostulation, because its image is found in the very grain of prosody, its promise lodged 
in the very nature of composition. 
 This is the demand Oliver places on poetic composition as political intervention. What it comes 
to necessitate in Oliver’s own work as a poet, as we noted above and explore in greater detail below, is 
that political context in the major poems of the 1970s and 1980s be suspended at crucial moments in 
order to assert the value of a “true politics” over currently existing political ideology of all stripes. And 
here is where the phenomenological inheritance of a particular kind of “single universal community,” that 
is, Husserl’s “community of monads,” exerts its continued influence on the politics of the major poems. 
What emerges in the poems after 1975, as socially and conceptually prior to politics itself, is a potentially 
universal pacifistic consciousness freed from the harmful depredations of any and all political dogma or 
allegiance. This poetic must establish the pre-conditions for a “true politics” and thus the relative falsity 
of all existing versions of such a thing, a process for which the phenomenological reduction inherited 
from Husserl provides a useful model, because Husserl’s method suspends the question of the existence 
of the world in favour of what is given, decrees the objective equality of all men be understood as the 
universal community of mutually constituting transcendental subjects, and nominates the sphere of 
“politics” as every bit as epiphenomenal as any other content of the world. Such a poetic also ensures 
Oliver’s major poems of the 1970s and 1980s manifest an extraordinary faith in the material efficacy of 
poetical work, and it enables his poems to exercise a power and a breadth of emotional conviction largely 
unparalleled in contemporary Anglophone poetry. 
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Chapter 2 
 
2.1 – Introduction 
 
In this chapter I follow the narrative arc and major arguments of Oliver’s first sustained and cohesive 
work of political poetry, The Diagram--Poems, in order to critically assess these arguments and their 
implications. I do so by following the preoccupations of Oliver’s poetry, prose and letters up to and 
beyond The Diagram--Poems, including the important early novel The Harmless Building. Any critical 
assessment of Oliver’s mature political poetry must contend with the fact that his politics are, as the 
conclusion to the previous chapter suggests, extraordinary. A mixture of mystical and medieval Christian 
paradigms combined with an insistence, heavily reminiscent of Rousseau’s writings, on the virtuous 
innocence of infantine ignorance, are developed in Oliver’s poetry and prose of the 1970s and 1980s into 
a writing that urges the pacifistic transformation of political subjects into a community of individuals 
unified by their common, essential nature. The utopian grain in Oliver’s writing between 1979 and 1991 
is both its greatest strength and the source of its most glaring contradictions. The treatment of political 
violence in The Diagram--Poems, and the eschewal of state-sponsored violence and left-radicalism alike 
in favour of the spiritual and international harmony that the poems advocate, is as extraordinarily 
ambitious as it is politically problematic.  
 This chapter will elucidate these problems through close attention to The Diagram--Poems and 
relevant moments in the rest of Oliver’s oeuvre. It should be kept in mind throughout that it is sometimes 
extremely difficult to paraphrase Oliver. The nature of his development of concepts like “stupidity” is 
such that a critical voice risks sounding tendentious even when the intention is simple explanatory 
recapitulation. Oliver’s use of “stupidity” in the early 1970s, like his use of “ignorance” in The Infant and 
the Pearl, is so challenging that to deracinate it from its context in verse or prose often risks the feeling of 
a critical shortcoming, of not having done justice to the concept as it is deployed within Oliver’s writing. 
This is a necessary risk of scholarship on such a complex and idiosyncratic poet. A concept such as 
“stupidity,” as we shall see, abjures and refutes the necessity for, and even the intelligibility of, any such 
critical apparatus. It is thus not only difficult to assess the valency and critical purchase of “stupidity” and 
its various permutations across the oeuvre, but appropriately so. 
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 The Diagram--Poems is the third book of poetry that Oliver published.1 Throughout this 
dissertation I refer to The Diagram--Poems using a double hyphen in order to accurately reflect the 
imagistic typography on the front cover of the first complete individual collection of the poems, the 1979 
Ferry Press edition, in which a connective hyphen between the all-caps “M” and “P” of the title appears 
split in two, leaving two facing ends in jagged, broken dovetail. We recall that the phrase “self–other 
relations” in Oliver’s early type-written essays contains an unbroken hyphen or en-dash.2 1979’s broken 
hyphen, which is not reproduced in any other edition’s typesetting of the title, presents a visual metaphor 
for the following condition, explored in the poems and in detail throughout the present chapter: the 
disconnection between human beings, caused by our inability to realise the “perfect identity between self 
and Other” globally, in terms of what Oliver later called “an international kinship.”3 In The Diagram--
Poems, the image of this “international kinship” is a “land silvery with democracy,” “glistening” with 
Elysian “wheat,” and the representative figures of our failure to establish such a place on earth are 
Uruguay’s urban guerrillas of the 1960s and 1970s, the Tupamaros.4 The specific context upon which the 
poems draw is the Tupamaros’ raid on the town of Pando, on 8th October 1969, which ended in defeat for 
the rebels. But the guerrillas’ actions and the repercussions of their actions, which include the capture and 
torture of many of the guerrillas, are also the impetus in The Diagram--Poems for the discovery of 
“spoken kindness” in the most desperate of situations.5 “[S]poken kindness” is the communication of 
pacifistic commonality that is the natural expression of “kinship.” As such the guerrillas’ story, as it is 
narrated by Oliver in the poems, provides a limit case for the universal nature of “kindness” itself: the fate 
of the Tupamaros is the vantage point from which our common humanity becomes most shiningly and 
pertinently visible. For the poet of The Diagram--Poems, our capacity for unity is recognized as innate 
and essential at the very moment at which unity is most surely destroyed by conflict and antagonism.  
 Here is the second stanza of the penultimate poem of The Diagram--Poems, ‘U’: 
 
The lost child’s voice should speak softly but undyingly 
across a land silvery with democracy 
and glistening with wheat, trembling at the spoken kindness; 
the voice should temper the muttering 
of bank clerks across the mica counters 
and ring in the money slipping from their fingers. 
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We know this. Everyone. But we let the voice break in our throats 
the laughs, little distinguished from coughs, 
echo discretely across stone floors; 
softness unheard; 
until a man with a light machine gun this day 
springs on to the cash desk and, astride there, 
we know this, waves the muzzle where all the arrows 
of acquisition, law and management have come and gone.6 
 
In The Infant and the Pearl and Penniless Politics the discovery of something essentially human does not 
depend upon, or even feature, a moment of such distinct and localised crisis. The disconnection between 
human beings in the particular context which The Diagram--Poems describe is part of the evidence the 
poems marshall in support of their central argument: that the origins of ethical human action are in 
harmony with their (our) naturally connective links of “kindness,” “innocence” and “mildness.”7 It is not 
an injunction that is urged lightly, or without complication. The last poem of The Diagram--Poems, ‘The 
Diagonal is Diagonal,’ explicitly discovers “innocence in the heart of swift cruelty.”8 The use of the 
adjective “swift” in this context recalls, and is likely a reference to, Pound’s ‘The Return’: “These were 
the swift to harry; / These the keen scented; / These were the souls of blood.”9 To “harry” is, by the 
OED’s first definition, “to make predatory raids or incursions; to commit ravages,” a definition that, in 
Oliver’s account, aptly fits the “predatory raid” committed by the Tupamaros.10 They too, the reference 
intimates, are a band of fallen warriors gone “pallid” from the failure of their adventure and the violence 
which they inflict and which is inflicted upon them.11 “[C]ruelty” is not innocent, and it is destructive of 
self–other relations. Nevertheless, “innocence” is found “in the heart” of “cruel” people and events, such 
as the situation described in the passage from ‘U,’ above, in which a “man with a light machine gun” (a 
Tupamaro guerrilla) both interrupts and makes audible (this is the twofold effect of the word “until”) the 
“softness” and the “kindness” which “we know” to be innate and inalienable. “[S]poken kindness” is thus 
revealed as the articulation in speech of a common bond of universal identity. 
 Innocence, kindness and mildness are very closely related concepts in The Diagram--Poems. 
They are all attributes of the poet-speaker’s dead son, “Tom,” the “lost child” referred to above.12 Tom, 
Oliver’s real-life Down’s syndrome child who died in infancy, appears in The Diagram--Poems as a 
guide to the “land silvery with democracy.” He is a guide in the form of an exemplary manifestation of 
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the qualities of “kindness,” “innocence” and “mildness.” An “innocent” baby like Tom naturally radiates 
“kindness” and “mildness”: he is the perfect image of our capacity for “perfect identity” between people 
everywhere, regardless of age or intelligence.13 The Tupamaros are not like Tom. They, like us, lack “the 
one innocence” that would confirm our “international kinship.”14 They exhibit a “revolutionary 
flamboyance” and because of their violent means are fated to meet violent ends.15 The Diagram--Poems 
and their introductory prose call for an “authentic politics” that would abjure all forms of violence, 
whether state-sanctioned or in the form of armed resistance.16 The work’s introductory prose defines this 
“politics” as a combination of “the mildness of your [in the context of the introduction, Oliver’s own] 
dead baby with the stern wisdom of an elder minister: some beneficial balance.”17 This “authentic 
politics” is the precursor in Oliver’s oeuvre, I contend, to the “true politics” which “[u]nity of form” 
engenders in the later autobiographical prose/poetry sequence ‘An Island That Is All The World.’ The 
three terms “land silvery with democracy,” “an authentic politics” and “an international kinship” are, I 
suggest, closely linked. Considered together, they indicate a major preoccupation of Oliver’s poetry and 
prose across the decades: the elucidation of a state of political harmony the constituent elements of which 
are partially visible, but the full realisation of which is finally unobtainable. In The Diagram--Poems, 
elements of an “authentic politics” in the world at large are sometimes glimpsed, and they are sometimes 
audible, but a truly “authentic politics” is finally unavailable; in the poems’ extended aural metaphor it 
remains “unheard.”18 Since this is the case, the best that “we” can “hope” for, as the final line of The 
Diagram--Poems reads, is that “grace and courage arrive calmly in us.”19 An “authentic politics” based on 
“beneficial balance” remains, therefore, the preserve of the poems themselves, in the prosody of which 
the “special intersubjectivity” we discussed in Chapter 1 is most nearly achieved. 
 Numerous different versions of The Diagram--Poems were published during Oliver’s lifetime. 
The poems present Oliver’s first attempt to consolidate and systematise, in verse, some major 
preoccupations of his previous writing, both published and unpublished. A total of eight different versions 
of The Diagram--Poems, in part or in whole, were published between 1972 and 1996. The textual 
variations between successive publications of the poems are most significant between the first appearance 
of the first two poems of the sequence in 1972, and the third printing of the full sequence of eight poems 
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in 1987. The poems’ numerous textual variants, which include major revisions to the work’s introductory 
prose, are an indication of the efforts to which Oliver went, over the years of their publication, to 
establish, clarify, complete and develop both the poems’ textual and diagrammatic content as well as an 
interpretative framework for their reception. The latter is effected by means of variations on the 
explanatory prose introductions accompanying either individual poems, the sequence as a whole, or both, 
and which supplies historical, political and anecdotal or autobiographical background to the poems; this 
prose first appears in 1974. The introductory material is occasionally edited, revised or removed 
completely depending on the place of publication. It achieves a somewhat arbitrarily final form in the last 
version of The Diagram--Poems to be published before Oliver’s death in 2000, that is, the prose that 
introduces the selection of The Diagram--Poems made for the Selected Poems (1996). The content of the 
text and diagrams of the The Diagram--Poems differs significantly from their first to their last appearance 
in print. 
 The Diagram--Poems’ publication history begins in the early 1970s. The first published versions 
of two of the poems, ‘Team Leader’ and ‘Importantly,’ appear in the Winter 1972/1973 issue of Sesheta 
magazine.20 These two poems were published again, accompanied by additional introductory/explanatory 
prose and with the diagrams re-drawn, in the second issue of the “European Edition” of Chicago 
magazine, edited by the American poet Alice Notley, Oliver’s future wife, in February 1974.21 An excerpt 
from Oliver’s In the Cave of Suicession also appears in the same issue of Chicago; the full text of this 
poem was published later the same year by the poet Wendy Mulford’s Street Editions. The first printing 
of the complete sequence of eight Diagram--Poems appears in Ochre 4, under the editorship of Oliver’s 
colleagues and co-editors at Essex, the poets Ralph Hawkins and Charles Ingham.22 This issue of Ochre is 
undated; it is most likely to have appeared in 1978.23 Both ‘Team Leader’ and ‘Importantly,’ the latter 
now re-titled ‘P.C.,’ are herein revised and the diagrams once again re-drawn. In Ochre 4 the 
introductory/explanatory prose which in Chicago announces and describes the textual and diagrammatic 
elements of each poem is removed from the head of any and all poetic texts. The Ochre publication of the 
poems does, however, include the first prose introduction to the sequence of eight poems as a whole, 
composed in part from the excised portion of introductory prose which previously accompanied the poem 
‘Importantly.’ Subsequent publications of The Diagram--Poems, either whole or excerpted, follow the 
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basic presentation of the eight poems and eight diagrams established in Ochre 4. The 1979 Ferry Press 
edition, the first printing of the work as a single book, contains more revisions and alterations; the 
diagrams were again re-drawn, this time by the poet David Chaloner. Twelve copies of the Ferry Press 
edition feature holographic material on the back-inside cover. The hand-written poem, which begins with 
the quotation “Do not always revolve your thoughts around yourself...,” is reproduced in a slightly revised 
form in the infernal methods, Street Editions and Poetical Histories publication A Meeting for Douglas 
Oliver, where Peter Riley identifies it as the poem replaced by ‘The Fire Station’ in The Diagram--
Poems.24 
 The version of the complete sequence of Diagram--Poems which appears in the 1987 collected 
poems, Kind, contains yet more revisions to prose and poetry alike, and the diagrams were once more re-
drawn for this edition, at the publisher’s request, by Oliver himself.25 Both the Ferry Press and Kind 
versions are dedicated to Ted Berrigan and Alice Notley. After Kind, changes made to the work included 
in the anthology A Various Art (1987) and the Talisman House publication of Oliver’s Selected Poems 
involve only alterations to the explanatory prose that introduces the poems. Such changes are not, 
however, devoid of interest. They continue to show Oliver concerned to influence the reception of the 
poems, and to a certain extent also concerned to legislate for the reader’s interpretation of the poems’ 
mediation of political events. Work on the introductory prose segment continued during and after 1987 as 
a response to the publication opportunities afforded by the poems’ collection and anthologisation, in the 
first instance through a selection made for the anthology edited by Andrew Crozier and Tim Longville, A 
Various Art, also published in 1987 but after Kind; and secondly through the selection included in the 
Selected Poems.26 The introductory prose that accompanies the three texts (‘Central,’ ‘U,’ and ‘The 
Diagonal is the Diagonal’) re-produced, without diagrams, in A Various Art, contains, for example, 
significant emendations to the prose that introduces the full sequence of eight texts and diagrams 
published earlier that same year in Kind. The introductory passage in Selected Poems reverts to the same 
version used in Kind. All in all, The Diagram--Poems went through more public revisions, were 
published in a greater variety of versions, were more widely collected and anthologised, and were revised, 
re-written and published, in all their various guises, over a longer period of time than any other of 
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Oliver’s poetic sequences, collections or individual poems. 
 
2.2 – Knowledge, stupidity and modernism 
 
The length of time over which the periodic revisions to The Diagram--Poems were made resulted in the 
poems’ composition and re-composition overlapping with a number of other projects. During the years 
between Oliver’s exposure to The Diagram--Poems’ source material between 1970-1971 and the 
publication of the poems as a single book by Ferry Press in 1979, Oliver published the novel The 
Harmless Building (1973) and the poetic sequence In the Cave of Suicession (1974), as well as 
completing the essays and editorial projects detailed in the previous chapter whilst a student at the 
University of Essex. The year of The Diagram--Poems’ publication by Ferry Press coincided with an 
issue of Grosseteste Review (12) containing two substantial articles by Oliver.27 Work on The Diagram--
Poems was thus intermittently sustained whilst other writing projects were undertaken and completed. 
One reason Oliver returned to these poems so many times over the course of his career, during and in 
between the composition of other works, I suggest, is that they represent his first attempt to consolidate in 
verse the preoccupations, themes, political arguments and biographical experience that he had explored in 
his writing in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. Thematic content, characters and political 
reference from The Harmless Building, In the Cave of Suicession and, to a lesser extent, Oppo Hectic, are 
carried through into the composition of The Diagram--Poems in a manner which enables the 1979 poems 
to develop and reflect upon this content. 
 Oliver’s son Tom first appears in Oppo Hectic in the poem ‘Mongol in the Woods.’28 Uruguay 
and the Tupamaros make their first appearance in Oliver’s oeuvre in The Harmless Building.29 The 
Tupamaros are referred to in the book by the fictional name “Creadores.”30 The name is Spanish for 
“creators.” This moniker may conceivably have been chosen in humorous, deliberate reference to its own 
thinly-veiled fictitiousness; the name is “created,” “made-up.” Or it may refer more seriously to an aspect 
of the guerrillas’ actions which Oliver felt he could uncomplicatedly admire; that is, their creation of 
situations full of the promise of what the Various Art prose introduction to the poems calls “emotional 
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urgency.”31 In all likelihood, however, the name was also intended to convey the negative connotations 
denoted by Oliver’s denigration of the guerrillas’ “flamboyance”; the poem ‘Central’ from The Diagram--
Poems refers to the guerrillas’ “creations of total emergency.”32 The name is therefore further likely to be 
a reference to the near-contemporary (in the late 1960s) “creations” of the Situationist International, 
whose stated “central idea” was “the creation of situations,” “the concrete construction of momentary 
ambiences of life and their transformation into a superior passional quality.”33 As we shall see, Oliver’s 
perception of these kinds of activities was coloured by his antipathy towards what he understood to be an 
irresponsible and overweening optimism on behalf of the contemporary radical left, especially and 
precisely its “passional” excesses. Invoked as they are by association through the term “Creadores,” any 
response to the Situationists’ own claim that they were “gambling that change will usually be for the 
better” by “pushing ever further the game of creating new, emotionally provocative situations” remains 
undeveloped in The Harmless Building.34 But it is a central motivating factor of The Diagram--Poems’ 
argument about revolutionary violence that this “gamble,” and those motivated by similar ideologies in 
the field of organised insurrection were, and always are, a bad bet. 
 In The Harmless Building, the first version of a series of related claims in various publications of 
The Diagram--Poems appears. This claim is that the novel does not refer to the concrete reality of 
political struggle in Uruguay: 
 
[...] do not imagine that I know any more about Uruguay than the next man. 
It would be unpardonable if an ill-informed fiction sought to have some 
factive meaning for the affairs of that country. Particularly, I do not refer to 
any real guerrilla movement or to any real elements of a “current situation” 
there, however apparent a connection may seem.35 
 
Oliver here makes pains to distance himself from the twentieth-century tradition encompassing Ezra 
Pound, Charles Olson and J.H. Prynne, whose poetics share the absolutely central position allocated to 
knowledge in terms of an organising literary and philosophical principle, and to the poet’s knowledge in 
particular as precisely differentiated from “the next man[’s]” by the fact of its comprehensive scope and 
special insight. I discuss this tradition – and Oliver’s break from it – in greater depth below. Oliver makes 
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a similar claim in the first edition of The Infant and the Pearl, stating in his Author’s Note that “no real 
politicians either appear or are attacked in the dream: only the phantasmagoria that flit across the world of 
the media and float into our subconscious.”36 A footnoted caveat in the second edition of the poem states 
that “Margaret” in the poem “stands not for Margaret Thatcher herself, but Mrs. Thatcher as presented to 
the electorate.”37 Penniless Politics (1991) and A Salvo for Africa (2000), however, make no attempt to 
distinguish their respective representations of Reagan’s or Bush’s America, or African colonial history 
and contemporary political situations, and the corresponding situations on the ground. 
 Early versions of The Diagram--Poems develop and moderate the claim. The 1974 Chicago 
publication of two Diagram--Poems includes the following as part of the prose introduction to 
‘Importantly’: 
 
Whatever the factual basis for these events, I want to disavow any direct 
relationship between them and the poem which, in any case, distorts the 
facts.38 
 
Claiming not to refer to “any real guerrilla movement” has become a disavowal of “any direct 
relationship” between the poems and political reality. There is nonetheless a relationship between the two. 
A disavowal would ignore, repudiate or refuse that relationship, not deny its existence. This claim does 
not appear in either the Ochre or the Ferry Press publications of the complete set of Diagram--Poems. It 
all but disappears too, from the prose introductions to the Kind and A Various Art publications of the 
poems. There, in both cases, the claim is complicated into one that no longer “disavow[s] any direct 
relationship” between politics and the poetry, but rather insists on the imaginative transformation of any 
such relationship as a necessary condition of the poet’s creative dynamic.  
 In Kind, for example, the Tupamaros are named and their “Operation Pando,” the day of 
insurrectionary action which was the major inspiration for the poems, is described. But Oliver maintains 
that 
 
[the] poems that came from this [information] cannot be pure: they begin in 
the guerrillas’ movements in the notes made about them, before reaching 
their own imaginary landscape, singed by the real.39 
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In A Various Art, the artifice of the project as it moves away from the political reality to which it 
nonetheless cannot help but refer, is emphasised thus: 
 
Poems emerged, more distorting even than journalism. The final job of this 
deliberately impure art was to recreate emotional urgency out of fantasy.40 
 
These later assertions are attempts to refine exactly what kind of “relationship” to political reality the 
poems do articulate if they do not refute a “direct” one. “[E]motional urgency out of fantasy” is 
qualitatively different from the Situationists’ “emotionally provocative situations” because the former 
resides and has its effects in the “fantasy” of literary artifice, not in the street or on campus; it is thus 
incapable of hurting anyone. All these claims emerge from Oliver’s thinking about the status of 
knowledge both in general, and with specific regard to literary, narrative or poetic fiction. From his 
earliest work onwards, Oliver valorises the unlearned, the undogmatic and the intuitive in 
contradistinction to what he identifies and lambasts as the intellectual assertion of established, especially 
political, opinion. He does this not to reduce the possibility of unity and “perfect identity,” but rather to 
expand and encourage it. “[I]nternational kinship” is founded on the universality of common humanity; as 
such it is untainted by the pretensions to specialised knowledge which obscure its reality and prevent its 
recognition. Such assertive knowledge is represented in The Diagram--Poems by the vanguardist Marxist-
Leninist insurrectionary praxis of the Tupamaros. 
 In order to follow the trajectory of Oliver’s thinking about “stupidity” or “ignorance” and its 
repercussions for his poetic practice, we must first attend to the most extreme iteration of the claims 
above, that is, the specific assertion that The Harmless Building’s “Creadores” do “not refer to any real 
guerrilla movement.” This assertion is in part designed to ventriloquise a particular strain of post-
structuralist emphasis on the production of meaning within narrative fiction: that it is intrinsic to the play 
of signification and difference within a given texte. In Whisper ‘Louise’, Oliver reminisces that 
 
The Harmless Building [...] satirised French deconstruction and American 
fragmented prose styles [...] there is decoherence, absurdist metaphor, much 
about writing and body image, a parody of Lacan introduced by the line 
“Late abed seagulls circle overhead calling out Jacques Lacan, Jacques 
Lacan!”, and a Derridean refusal of unity and closure.41 
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The “line” Oliver refers to is part of the first sentence of the twelfth chapter of The Harmless Building.42 
It is likely to have been influenced by Lacan’s essay ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of 
Desire in the Freudian Unconscious,’ first published in French in 1966.43 In the essay, Lacan describes the 
child’s induction into the metaphorical landscape of signification. When a child declares that “the dog 
goes meow, the cat goes woof-woof,” it thereby 
 
in one fell swoop [and] by disconnecting the thing from its cry, raises the 
sign to the function of the signifier and reality to the sophistics of 
signification, and in his [the child’s] contempt for verisimilitude, makes 
necessary the verification of multiple objectifications of the same thing.44 
 
Oliver parodies Lacan’s example by having the seagulls “go” “Jacques Lacan, Jacques Lacan,” thus 
“raising” the psychoanalyst’s name to “the function of the signifier and reality to the sophistics of 
signification.” The reason Oliver jokes about Lacan in The Harmless Building in this way is that Lacan’s 
writings became, for Oliver, the contemporary representative of a form of elitist, specialised knowledge, 
proponents of which would pride themselves on their own esoteric sophistication. 
 During his employment as a local reporter for Cambridge’s local newspaper, the Cambridge 
News (later the Cambridge Evening News) in the late 1960s, Oliver encountered student radicals whose 
glib philosophical and theoretical pretensions seemed to him riven with hypocrisy. He twice recounts the 
following anecdote:45 
 
The student left had a mouthful of democracy but expressed it in anti-
democratic sneers. At the height of the ’68 sit-ins, I became exasperated with 
a bunch of them: “How on earth is a whole nation’s consciousness going to 
change just because you’ve changed the ownership of the means of 
production?” “Haven’t you read Hegel, p. xyz?” snarled a well-bred 
student.46 
 
In the version of this anecdote that appears in the 1997 Contemporary Authors Autobiography Series, 
Oliver’s account contains an important extra clause: “the student left had a mouthful of democracy but 
                                                            
42 THB, p.102: “In the park, late-abed seagulls [...]” 
43 For this insight I am indebted to Tomas Weber, whose unpublished undergraduate ‘Part I’ dissertation on Oliver 
and Lacan points out some useful correspondences between ‘The Subversion of the Subject’ and The Diagram--
Poems. 
44 Jacques Lacan, Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, trans. Bruce Fink, in collaboration with Héloïse 
Fink and Russell Grigg (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), p.682. 
45 WL, p.81. 
46 Ibid., p.54. 
63 
they didn’t have a democratic tone; so I didn’t think them socialist.”47 The (retrospective) ascription of 
socialism depends not on political ideology, party allegiance or even principle, but upon the “democratic 
tone” of the individual. The importance of “tone” for Oliver is established by its manifestation as part of 
the spoken language of prosodic music, the value of which in turn, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
emerges from prosody’s intimations of intersubjectivity. Elsewhere Oliver notes that students “had a 
mouthful of Herbert Marcuse[.]”48 The imputation is that it is precisely these mouthfuls of theory which 
prevent the students from understanding and utilising a truly inclusive language. Whether or not the 
students were less interested in “democracy” than, for instance, communism, especially since, given the 
discussion of “the ownership of the means of production,” they may conceivably have been discussing the 
Communist Manifesto, is perhaps a moot point. They fail to express in civil, day-to-day social interaction 
what they profess to believe in, or what Oliver assumes in retrospect they believed in. 
 In Cambridge, Oliver experienced first-hand the class caricatures perpetuated by “Conservative 
dons” and student radicals alike: “Townies like me,” he recalls, “were patronised as, fundamentally, 
second-rate intellects.”49 Oliver’s seagulls, despite his later claims, do not present a very cogent “satire” 
of either Lacan or Lacanian psychoanalysis. Rather, they mimic the sneering name-dropping practised by 
the Cambridge students whom Oliver felt patronised by and condescended to because of his non-
University affiliations. The seagulls in The Harmless Building sycophantically parrot the name of a 
contemporary French theorist. Oliver’s exasperation with those whom he calls Cambridge’s particular 
brand of “privileged brats” extends, at least in retrospect, to the entire radical student left in 1968, whom 
he upbraids in Whisper ‘Louise’ by asserting that the “student revolutions of the late 1960s achieved little 
but a transition accompanied by a rapid loss of hope,” and that the activists were betrayed by their own 
“irresponsibility and over-optimism.”50 Oliver notes that his reading of the works of Marxist and utopian 
thinkers in this period was extensive. He read, “struggling through the French where necessary,” works 
by “Marx, Engels, Lenin, Kropotkin, Gramsci, Marcuse, Althusser, Vaneigem” and “Debord,” as well as 
“Tel Quel magazine,” Foucault and Sorel.51 Yet as we have seen from his 21st February 1978 letter to 
Peter Riley, Oliver was not keen on “scampering to the latest French magi to borrow insights.”52 An 
interest in theory must be “kept in its place,” this letter affirms, and not allowed to assert any special 
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prominence above “ideas of your own.”53 The students Oliver met in Cambridge in the late 1960s had no 
ideas of their own: they could only squawk in facile one-upmanship the page references of German 
idealist philosophers. 
 The claims in The Harmless Building and in versions of the introductory prose to The Diagram--
Poems, about knowledge of Uruguay and the “factual basis for [the] events” from which the poems 
emerge through a process of textual and diagrammatic representation, emerge from Oliver’s thinking 
about the value of knowledge itself. This thinking begins negatively in Oliver’s oeuvre. The Harmless 
Building lampoons the privileged promulgation of a certain type of theoretical knowledge that Oliver 
experienced as bratty arrogance. In consecutive versions of The Diagram--Poems Oliver sheds the 
“satirical” element of the novel in favour of a more directly positive affirmation of the value of “fantasy” 
and “impur[ity],” and an emphasis on the importance of “mildness” for an “authentic politics,” a 
simplicity devoid of the revolutionary “flamboyance” of the student radicals and the Tupamaros alike. 
Just as the students stuff their mouths with theory but lack a “democratic tone,” the Tupamaros are stuffed 
full of revolutionary “heroics” but cannot hear the “spoken kindness” of a “child’s voice” behind their 
own “laughs.”54 Both are effectively accused of practising an inclusive, coterie politics exacerbated by 
selfishness. By emphasising and recounting, twice, the anecdote about the Cambridge students citing 
Hegel, Oliver claims this moment as a primary scene of his political enlightenment. The revulsion that he 
experienced when confronted with the snotty intellectualism he felt epitomised student radicals in 1960s 
Cambridge is offered as a precursor to his attitude towards the Tupamaros in the 1970s, and towards the 
left-wing in the United Kingdom and the United States in the 1980s and 1990s. It seems to have been a 
conscious literary-biographical manoeuvre on Oliver’s part to make this connection; certainly his 
comments about the students echo across all his future denunciations of what he would later call “loony 
left” politics.55 Oliver’s discomfort with what he characterises as harmful myopic intellectualism is thus 
an important background to the poetry and prose’s insistence on the value of “innocence,” “mildness,” 
“stupidity” and “ignorance.” All variations on this theme valorise “ideas of one’s own” over those of 
“sophistical” theory and its pseudo-“insights,” and “imagination” and “fantasy” over the “factive” and 
documentary.56 
 The death in his cot of Oliver’s son Tom in November 1969 was the tragic impetus for the 
                                                            
53 Ibid. 
54 K, p.105, pp.121-122. 
55 WL, p.207. 
56 WL, p.83. 
65 
following reflections on intellectual bravado, this time amongst poets, rather than students or activists. 
They were made in Oliver’s correspondence with Peter Riley during Oliver’s employment with Agence-
France Presse in Paris. The letter makes clear that at this time Oliver was completing the manuscript of 
The Harmless Building.57 Over the course of the previous few months, Oliver would have heard reports of 
the Tupamaros’ activities in Uruguay, including their capture and execution in July-August 1970 of the 
American FBI agent Dan Mitrione, whom the guerrillas accused, among other things, of training the 
Montevidean police force in the torture techniques to which members of their organisation had been 
subjected.58 
 
I come down to this fact: there is in me – and I swear in most other people 
too – an area which is basically stupid, quite unargued, perhaps nineteenth 
century, perhaps suburban, whatever. It is an area I can easily ignore, for 
which I have many available antidotes (sometimes they are masks); but 
ultimately I cannot escape it because its foundation is the necessary 
impossibility of knowing fully all that we “know.” You take the current 
English or American poet. You know damn well that stupidity is there but it 
never appears in a text that is, in every one of its stages, clever. Meanwhile, 
what are all these ellipses, these slick jump-cuts between image and image, 
thought and thought? They are, of course, part of developed modern 
technique, cinema influenced and so on. Behind the ellipses skulks an area of 
personality the poet never puts into his poem.59 
 
The “area of personality” that Oliver accuses contemporary poets of dissembling through “clever[ness]” 
is “basically stupid.”60 “You know,” and you know “damn well,” that it is there. The truthfulness of this 
“area of personality” is confirmed by the “impossibility of knowing fully all that we ‘know.’”61  
 It is interesting to note here the convergence of Oliver’s thought with a central tenet of Lacan’s, 
despite the former’s hostility towards the latter. The “impossibility of knowing fully all that we ‘know’” 
is highly reminiscent of Lacan’s conception of savoir [knowledge], (as opposed to connaissance [also 
translated as ‘knowledge’]), that is, knowledge of the symbolic order and of the subject’s relation to the 
symbolic order, as well as “that relation itself.”62 Since this kind of knowledge pertains to the symbolic 
                                                            
57 “At present I am writing prose, not poetry, though the text contains poems -- that most dangerous combine [...] 
The task I set myself was to write a stupid book. I may well have succeeded.” Oliver to Riley, 31.12.1970, DOA, 
Box 9. 
58 For near contemporary accounts of Mitrione’s involvement in the increasing sophistication of torture techniques 
and the escalation of their application in Uruguay, see Alain Labrousse, The Tupamaros, Urban Guerrillas in 
Uruguay, trans. Dinah Livingstone (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), pp.102-104, and Tom Wodetzki’s 
afterword in Carlos Núñez, The Tupamaros, Urban Guerillas of Uruguay (New York: Times Change Press, 
1970), pp.47-48. 
59 Oliver to Riley, 31.12.1970, DOA, Box 9.  
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (Hove and New York: Routledge, 2010), 
p.94. 
66 
order in which the subject finds itself, it consists of “the articulation of signifiers in the subject’s symbolic 
universe.”63 The unconscious itself is therefore “simply another name for symbolic knowledge insofar as 
it is an ‘unknown knowledge,’ a knowledge which the subject does not know he knows.”64 
 Bruce Fink, in his reading of Lacan’s ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of 
Desire,’ describes such “unknown knowledge” in the following terms: 
 
There is no self-knowledge at the level of the subject of the unconscious, for 
there is no self there [...] What is unconscious is known unbeknown to the 
“person” in question [...] it [what is known] is written in the subject without 
the subject being conscious of it. This unknown knowledge is locked into the 
connection between signifiers – it consists in this very connection.65 
 
Malcolm Bowie meanwhile, without distinguishing between savoir and connaissance, describes as 
“incurably paranoiac” the condition of knowledge in Lacan’s early work, commenting that “[h]uman 
knowledge begins from an illusion [...] and constructs an inescapable autonomous system in its wake,” 
such that psychoanalysis, in “its play of system upon system and delusion upon delusion[,] is the closest 
approximation to truth that human beings can expect to achieve.”66 In a similar vein to Oliver’s reading of 
Husserl, it would appear that the relation between Oliver’s theorising (in this instance about 
“knowledge”) and his philosophical-critical forebears (or contemporaries) reveals a kind of poetically-
minded conceptual osmosis. Lacan’s ideas seem to have seeped into Oliver’s description of “all that we 
know,” but are interpolated in a manner that demands even less systematic philosophical or analytic 
procedure than the use of the concepts of transcendental subjectivity and eidos ego does in the early 
theories of the poet’s creative dynamic. Again we see a specific kind of accumulation of knowledge 
directed towards specifically poetic ends: if Oliver was influenced in his conception of knowledge by 
Lacan it was certainly not by the letter of the Master’s teaching, but by the tone of his general drift, a tone 
more usefully malleable in the service of Oliver’s polemic against “the current English or American 
poet,” and in particular against poets who “know” so much that they are “concerned to tell other people 
exactly how it is.”67 
 In a letter of 28th March 1970, Oliver had already made explicit the connection between Tom’s 
Down’s syndrome and “the theme of unintelligence” which was to pervade his work from then on: 
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“Because my son was a mongol,” he writes to Riley, “I find myself haunted by the theme of 
unintelligence; he could not hide inadequacy through display which is what the rest of us do the whole 
damn time.”68 In the New Years Eve 1970 letter to Riley, Tom is described as both a limit case of the 
ability of humans to please each other and once-living proof that they can do this through their sheer 
existence, without striving for intellectual superiority. Tom’s Down’s syndrome essentially confirms his 
natural goodness, which shines through his “inadequacy,” as it should through our own: 
 
[...] for two years I had a mongol son whose lack of intelligence did not one 
whit affect his ability to give pleasure (if only we were excellent enough to 
accept that gift unaffectedly) and who, when he died, had less justice in doing 
so than if I had died myself (having taken more of my life share than him).69 
 
In The Harmless Building the child “Uncle Aubrey,” who is a fictionalised version of Tom, glows with 
“the true blessedness allowed only to the really low in IQ.”70 In all of Oliver’s work, Tom is the spiritual 
icon of a universalism proven by reference to the natural state of our humanity which we nonetheless 
refuse to acknowledge or act upon. The truth of our own “inadequacy” does not shine through us; we are 
not anywhere near “excellent enough to accept that gift.” Oliver reserves special opprobrium in the letter 
for “left-wing poets,” describing them in a similar manner to the English and French student-radicals he 
would later condemn: 
 
So why are all the left-wing poets intellectual snobs? Why are their structures 
so carefully cemented so that no one should see through the gaps? Why are 
they so concerned to tell other people exactly how it is? Why are they the 
heroes of their own poems all the time?71 
 
The figure against whom such accusations are levelled is composite, but it seems highly likely that they 
are, in particular, frustrated descriptions of Oliver’s friend and tutor J.H. Prynne. I discuss the reasons for 
this likelihood below in the context of Oliver’s response to his modernist inheritance. 
 The identification of pervasive cultural snobbery remained central to Oliver’s critique of British 
and American poetry, of left-wing radicalism, and of Western manners in general, for the rest of his life. 
Oliver’s letters to Riley in the 1970s and 1980s often lament the arrogance of named and un-named poets 
of all political persuasions that, it seems to Oliver, perpetuate this kind of snobbery. It is perpetuated by 
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both latter-day modernist or avant-garde poets on the one hand, and anti-modernist schools of poetry on 
the other. Oliver, for example, is critical in his letters of both Charles Olson and Philip Larkin, though 
nothing like equally – Olson is denounced with far more frequency than Larkin. Snobbery is perpetuated 
by the poets of the former camp, Oliver repeatedly suggests, in the production of poetry which requires 
what he calls, in a letter of 20th February 1979, “initiates,” rather than readers, that is, poetry that is 
“gnomic” and that, as he characterised it in a letter four years later, neglects “intelligibility.”72 Oliver 
defines the “gnomic” as 
 
a modern sense of writing that means a lot but is so concerned to be “pithy” 
that the “moral concept” doesn’t clearly emerge: like some enigmatic phrase 
uttered with solemn emphasis.73 
 
It is “easier” to write like this, Oliver asserts, because 
 
the lines are more easily made tense; it’s easier to live on the forefront of 
what you say; you can hop quite quickly from one statement with its 
presuppositions to the next with its, without having to bother about the 
linkages enough.74 
 
Pound, and later Olson and his followers, are to blame for the trend: “Ideogrammatic technique, so 
valuable at first, has permitted this [style of contemporary poetry to flourish],” Oliver says on 2nd 
February 1979, referencing Pound’s influential interpretation of the Chinese ideogram, whilst in a letter 
written three months previously he places the blame squarely on Olson, Louis Zukovsky and Robert 
Creeley, as well as unnamed French “rhetoricians” (we can assume, given the letter of 21st February 1978 
we saw in the previous chapter, that Oliver means especially Derrida and Lacan): 
 
I do think the gnomic prose made popular by Olson out of Zukovsky, by 
Creeley, and by, in another way, the French rhetoricians has had grave and 
harmful effects [...] a clarity has gone out of the language.75 
 
In the same letter, Oliver goes on to suggest that 
 
What’s been lacking – in Olson’s work particularly – is a proper humility 
about form [...] That is, it won’t do to have intellectual perceptions about 
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content and apply intellectually those same perceptions to the question of 
form, which is what I think Olson to some extent did.76 
 
 Oliver maintained a sceptical attitude towards modernism and what he identified as a modernist 
inheritance in Anglophone poetry throughout his life. Modernism was to blame for a damaging legacy of 
obfuscation and pretentious sophistry: “I welcome,” Oliver wrote to Riley in 1980, “any attack on the 
elitism of modernism and upon its refusal to be clear.”77 Oliver shared this particular frustration with 
Philip Larkin, whom he interviewed in the University of Hull library in the early 1970s.78 Yet Oliver was 
critical, too, of Larkin-esque conservatism, describing in the same letter from 1980 his own “hostility to 
what the attack [on modernism] comes from, in the case of Larkin,” which is, Oliver goes on, 
 
that old patrician ground become so faux-moderne that you’d hardly think it 
had a hope or a human relationship left in the world of value, except a 
narrowed, Beckett-like sense of life-goes-on at the very rim of defeat.79 
 
Oliver here uses the image of extension denoted by “rim” to define the paucity of humanist generosity in 
the Larkins of the poetry world, an image likely picked up from the last line of one of Oliver’s favourite 
poems by J.H. Prynne, ‘Of Movement Towards a Natural Place,’ from Wound Response (1974).80 To 
summarise the thrust of Oliver’s argument: the anti-modernists are solipsistic, or at least lonely, 
disingenuous pessimists; the modernists wilfully opaque obscurantists. In these letters to Riley from the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, Oliver makes it clearer than anywhere else in his published or unpublished 
prose that he wishes poets would say what they mean as clearly as they are capable. When they do not say 
what they mean, Oliver suggests, they are hiding something, and what they are hiding is the “moral 
concept” of the poem.81 
 Morality is thus obscured by knowledge, or else knowledge, in the form of “pithy” or “enigmatic 
phrase[s] uttered with solemn emphasis,” provides a cover for the simple lack of a “moral concept” 
altogether; this is the sense in which poets “hide inadequacy through display”:82 
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[T]here’s so much American and English huff and puff, so much presumption 
that we know and other poets don’t, that I’ve been led to this simple question: 
if we know why the hell can’t we say what we know with more evident effort 
to share the information.83 
 
One of Oliver’s most vociferous denunciations of what he perceived as arrogant experimentalism in 
contemporary Anglophone poetry can be found in a letter of the 28th October 1983: 
 
My belief, in fact, is that our generation of avant-gardists neglected 
intelligibility and coherence according to a presumption of their own 
authenticity. The amount of sheer allusiveness in much of the poetry of that 
epoche [sic] was quite ridiculous. That, more than anywhere else, was where 
the poetry went out the window.84 
 
Oliver does not date “that epoch” in his letter. But “our generation” is inclusive, and Oliver often makes it 
clear to Riley that he includes himself in the category of those who were guilty of wilful obscurantism, 
commenting in 1979 that “I am by no means the least of offenders.”85 The epoch named is thus surely that 
of the late 1960s, and the poetry would therefore include Oliver’s first published works amongst the 
Cambridge circle with whom he fraternised. Alongside his 1969 collection Oppo Hectic, the early work 
of Oliver’s poet friends J.H. Prynne, John James, Wendy Mulford, Andrew Crozier and Anthony Barnett, 
as well as his present correspondent, Peter Riley, is all implicated. J.H. Prynne again stands out as a 
target, since the “sheer allusiveness” of Prynne’s work of the period – Kitchen Poems (1968), The White 
Stones (1969), and Brass (1971) – in terms of both intertextual quotation/paraphrase and more abstract 
literary and philosophical reference points, is far more densely woven into the fabric of his verse than that 
of any of the other poets here named. 
 Denise Riley, in her eulogy for Oliver in A Meeting for Douglas Oliver, recalls that “Doug’s 
reiterated and confident hope was that poetry could survive whatever poets, at their worst, would do to 
it,” before quoting Oliver: “‘British poetry shoots itself in the foot through a sort of oversophisticated 
sneering, or worse, cowardice.’”86 The perceived snobbery of poets (“left-wing” or otherwise), students 
and radicals, as we have seen, is especially prone to Oliver’s disapproval. He disapproves of it because it 
limits the possibility of the expression of what we know “damn well” is there but which we refuse to 
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embrace, and in the case of poetry it obscures or deletes the “clarity” and the “moral concept” of the 
work, sometimes through the bad modernist inheritance of sophistical elitism and sometimes through the 
reliance on equally unhelpful, specifically French, theoretical discourse. In contradistinction to these 
perceived attitudes, Oliver’s definitive plan for The Harmless Building, and his own evaluation of its 
outcome, was as follows: “The task I set myself was to write a stupid book. I may well have 
succeeded.”87  
 Oliver admits that whilst writing the novel, “I [...] found myself sneaking away to books to 
buttress bits of opinion that very obviously stuck out from my narrative; but generally speaking,” he 
writes, 
 
I have tried to remain as dependent on my natural intellect as possible, 
leaving in things that I know I could correct with a bit of Merleau-Ponty, 
Leibnitz, Schilder or a hundred others.88 
  
What Oliver calls his “natural intellect” is deliberately deployed as part of a concerted compositional 
effort to refuse and contradict the vapid intellectualism he saw bandied about by student radicals and by 
“left-wing poets.” It is this “natural intellect,” unlearned, unreferenced and unintellectual, that becomes a 
pre-requisite of the “authentic politics” described in the introductory prose to the 1987 edition of The 
Diagram--Poems, and therefore a pre-requisite too of the “international kinship” first avowed (three years 
later) in ‘An Island That Is All The World.’ “[N]atural intellect” also recalls Oliver’s attachment to the 
“natural attitude” in Husserl that we encountered in the last chapter. Its symbolic proponent in Oliver’s 
life’s work is Tom, because Tom’s Down’s syndrome prevented him from dissembling his “natural 
intellect,” his “mildness” and “kindness,” by intellectual means. To write a “stupid book” in the literary 
world that emerges through Oliver’s letters was to write a book unbound by the fetters of parochial 
intellectualism and glum conservatism that between them defined that world. The former’s avant-gardism 
is far more often the object of Oliver’s reflection than is the latter’s “old patrician ground.” “Too often,” 
Oliver wrote, publicly this time, in The Harmless Building’s year of publication, 1973, 
 
white spaces and breathy rhythms have been failure itself covering its face 
and not daring to breathe. Tackling harm by trying not to fail risks dulness; 
yet it’s so important to aim as far as possible for continuity, not hiding 
stupidity.89 
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Once again, the impression here is that the avant-garde irresponsibly covers its bases with technique and 
craft in such a manner as to dissemble and refuse a more inclusive expression of moral honesty. 
 Oliver’s thinking about knowledge and stupidity was influenced by his antipathy towards certain 
prevailing winds and literary historical tendencies involving poets he read, admired and in one case knew 
personally and intimately. His thinking about stupidity runs directly counter to the assertions made about 
stupidity (and stupid people) by the three poets who collectively constitute what Keston Sutherland has 
called “the philological tradition in modernist poetry,” and these poets are Ezra Pound, Charles Olson and 
Oliver’s friend and early mentor, J.H. Prynne.90 All three of these poets’ oeuvres maintain a consistently 
vituperative and denunciatory attitude towards other people’s stupidity; in Pound’s case his oeuvre 
positively orbits around this attitude. Pound made the aggressive condemnation of ignorance a 
foundational doctrine of his entire poetic. The stupid, the idiotic, the naïve and the imbecilic appear 
constantly as culturally parasitic deviations throughout Pound’s work, whilst the intelligence that comes 
with “knowing the facts” is praised as the primary condition for the production of any work of lasting 
historical importance.91 “The stupid or provincial judgement of art” is the enemy of the modernist project 
as Pound conceived it; this judgement “bases itself on the belief that great art must be like the art that it 
has been reared to respect.”92 Throughout Pound’s essays it is the “organic stupidity” of the presses, the 
critics, the “low-brow reader[s]” and the universities that are responsible for obscuring the function of 
great art “in the res publica [public realm].”93 This function, which is to maintain the state and the 
legislature, “the very cleanliness of the tools [and therefore] the health of the very matter of thought 
itself” in the service of national sovereignty, is betrayed by “loose expression [and] the loose use of 
individual words” perpetuated by bad art and by the stupid critical misrecognition of bad art for good 
art.94 Good poetry, Pound thought, should be “carried as a communication between intelligent men.”95 
Ideally, the stupid should not be allowed anywhere near it.  
 Olson continued the trend of negatively defining his poetic project through the accusation of 
idiocy when he railed, in ‘Human Universe,’ against “the stupidities of mysticism” and bemoaned, in his 
characteristically hammering grammatical machismo, the 
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filth and lumber which man is led by [...] that he damn well can, and does, 
destroy destroy destroy energy every day. It is too much. It is too much to 
waste time on, this idiot who spills his fluids like some truculent and 
fingerless chamaco hereabouts [...] Man has made himself an ugliness and a 
bore.96 
 
“Chamaco” is colloquial Mexican Spanish for “child.” Less important, for our purposes, than the precise 
object of Olson’s ire at this juncture in ‘Human Universe’ is the fact that he deliberately makes the idiot 
child, “some truculent and fingerless chamaco,” the icon of a humanity adrift and unnaturally 
disconnected “from that which” formerly, as Olson coined it in The Maximus Poems, “was most 
familiar.”97 Oliver, in a direct inversion of Olson’s denigration, makes the (his) idiot child the anti-
intellectual and moral icon of every human’s natural, peaceful and innate familiarity with each other. 
What is more, Oliver’s claims in The Harmless Building about the disconnection between his work and 
political reality (that it does not seek to convey any “factive meaning for the affairs of that country 
[Uruguay]”) and about the knowledge the author holds about his subject (that he does not “know any 
more about Uruguay than the next man”) are made in the spirit of exactly the kind of “humility” Oliver 
felt Olson’s project, as a direct descendent of Poundian arrogance, lacked.  
 Both Pound and Olson made specific claims about the poet’s knowledge and the political 
efficacy of his (it is always, of course, his) work: Pound through his idealisation of the Chinese ideogram 
via the hi-jacked notes of the misinformed art historian Ernest Fenollosa and through his belief in the 
cultural holism of linguistic accuracy, that “the governor and legislator cannot act effectively or frame his 
laws” unless poets keep the language efficient through properly rigorous usage; and Olson through his 
bombastic assertions about the Mayan hieroglyphs he could not read but which he nonetheless believed 
he understood well enough to proclaim that 
 
I have found [...] that the hieroglyphs of the Maya disclose a placement of 
themselves toward nature of enormous contradiction to ourselves, and yet I 
am not aware that any of the possible usages of this difference have been 
allowed to seep out into present society.98 
 
Oliver’s statement in The Harmless Building, quoted above, implicitly refuses this kind of pontification, 
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and it implicitly refuses the adoption of the kind of braggadocio sense of poetic vocation from which such 
pontifications issue. In his letters to Riley, as we have seen, Oliver identifies such behaviour as one of the 
defining traits of modernist practice. It was a practice he came into direct contact with through his 
intimacy with J.H. Prynne and his fellow poets in Cambridge in the late 1960s. Oliver’s valorisation of 
stupidity should be read historically as the deliberate contradiction in poetic practice of the tradition he 
himself inherited through his education in the avant-garde, amongst “our generation of avant-gardists,” 
during his time in Cambridge. 
 This brings us to the third poet in the “philological tradition,” and the poet with which this 
tradition, as Sutherland argues, comes to a close: J.H. Prynne.99 Oliver’s relationship to Prynne was 
formative and complex, spanning three decades of friendship, correspondence, mutual influence and 
disagreement, and I touch upon here only what is most relevant to the topic at hand.100 Oliver and Prynne 
met, or at least began their acquaintance and friendship in earnest, in Cambridge in 1968. Oliver recalls 
that at this time “Prynne would give me free tutorials and the first ‘booklist’ I’d ever had.”101 Over the 
years both poets published enthusiastic critical appreciations of each other’s work. ‘From a Letter to 
Douglas Oliver,’ an extract from Prynne’s letter to Oliver of 9th January 1972, published in Grosseteste 
Review in 1973, is a rhapsodic endorsement of (the then unpublished) The Harmless Building.102 One of 
the earliest published reviews of Prynne’s poetry was written by Oliver and appears in the Saturday, 
August 6th 1968 edition of the Cambridge News. The review is a fascinating and valuable early document, 
not least for the insight and perspicacity it displays in its reading of Prynne’s Kitchen Poems, but also for 
what it tells us about Oliver’s understanding of Prynne’s politics and Prynne’s poetic project as it 
diverged from the modernists we have already discussed. Consider this paragraph: 
 
He [Prynne] has an insight into the inflationary falsity of personal and 
political values that takes him beyond the Poundian conception of usury. His 
elegant, leftist philosophies are totally different from Pound, yet the aim is 
towards an analogous development of purity in the process.103 
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Prynne is a left-wing poet, antagonistic to Pound’s politics and anti-semitism yet consciously extending 
the Poundian drive towards rigour and “purity” in the language. Oliver praises Prynne in the review, and 
the Cambridge avant-garde milieu in which they both took part, in contradistinction to the general 
atmosphere of contemporary British letters. Prynne’s work, Oliver maintains, “has established a quality of 
experiment and of technical advance which has not been equalled by an English poet for some years,” and 
 
underlines that there is an English initiative to take—and that puts him 
[Prynne] way ahead of all those writers here [in England] who, incredibly, 
drag their stale, so-called free-verse rhythms about like sacred relics of a 
forgotten religion.104 
 
It is also significant that in this, Oliver’s earliest published commentary on Prynne’s poetry, he later refers 
to the “portentous atmosphere” of Kitchen Poems’ “large-scale economic constructions.”105 
 Above I mentioned that Oliver’s letters to Peter Riley are full of both named and un-named 
objects of critical distaste. At the same time as acknowledging the historical importance and technical 
innovation of Prynne’s verse and in some instances openly praising it, Oliver also, in his letters to Riley, 
consistently attacks the failings of the speculative figure of a poet whose characterisation amounts to a 
critical description of J.H. Prynne in all but name. Throughout the letters to Riley we discussed above, 
Oliver rails against the unintelligible, the obfuscatory and the clandestine in contemporary Anglophone 
poetry. A short recapitulation of the main objects of his dissatisfaction with poets that we have already 
seen must include: “left-wing” poets who are “intellectual snobs”; poets whose “structures [are] so 
carefully cemented [...] that no one [can] see through the gaps”; poets “concerned to tell other people 
exactly how it is”; poets who are “the heroes of their own poems”; poets whose diction is “pithy” and who 
write in “enigmatic phrase[s] uttered with solemn emphasis”; poets who neglect “intelligibility” in favour 
of the “gnomic”; poets who write for “initiates”; poets who assume that they “know” what other people 
don’t; poets who favour a large amount of “allusiveness”; and to this list we should add poets who 
incorporate and, in Oliver’s estimation, passively rely on, “fragmentation,” and who do so “to prevent us 
from exposing what is unpoetically worked out in what we have already done.”106 It is difficult, if not 
impossible, not to see behind the accumulation of these frustrations a very profound dissatisfaction not 
just with the poetry of J.H. Prynne, and the poetry of the post-Brass period in particular (although some 
phrases speak more of the “portentous” lyric sermonising of Kitchen Poems and The White Stones than 
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anything else), but with the very grain of poetic labour epitomised by Prynne’s contemporary method and 
style.  
 Sometimes Oliver’s decision not to name names in his letters to Riley is explicitly announced, 
such that the excision of moniker itself becomes the clearest indication of exactly who it is he is talking 
about, as in this letter from 9th October 1977: 
 
On the intervention of a certain “nameless” poet at Cambridge I remember 
thinking irritably, the person as source won’t disappear through reading 
books about its disappearance.107 
 
The disappearance of “the person as source,” that is, the disappearance of the lyric subject as organising 
principle, in full prophetic, emphatic and austere effect in Kitchen Poems and The White Stones, is 
arguably a major feature of the “negated lyric” of Prynne’s poetry, as Sutherland has referred to it, from 
Brass onwards.108 When Oliver does discuss Prynne by name in his letters to Riley it is almost always in 
defence of Prynne’s work, or to draw a distinction between Prynne and Prynne’s “followers.”109 In the 
mid-1970s Oliver wrote to Riley that he “felt very close to Jeremy’s contemporaneous production of 
Wound Response” during the composition of In the Cave of Suicession.110 In 1977 Prynne was “still the 
Englishman to look to, in [Oliver’s] estimation.” In a curiously ambivalent statement in the same letter 
that speaks more of loyalty than of affection or even of critical appreciation, Oliver also wrote that 
Prynne’s “current work is so difficult that it [...] need[s] our support.”111 
 In 1979 Oliver published an extended commentary on a poem of Prynne’s he admired 
throughout his life, ‘Of Movement Toward a Natural Place,’ from the 1974 collection Wound Response. 
The introduction to this commentary raises to the level of the explicit the object of some of the 
frustrations in the letters to Riley. Oliver writes 
 
I suppose I understand [Prynne’s] poetry rather fitfully myself but the best 
way to restore a decent public discussion of Prynne’s work is to insist upon 
the most bald and obvious role of its meanings [...] No doubt Prynne’s work 
could sometimes, without important cost, be more explicit about its subject 
matter – much valuable modern poetry of “difficulty” hasn’t in my view yet 
solved this Pound-like problem of allusiveness.112 
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A struggle between the appreciation of innovation and common purpose on the one hand, and frustration 
with the “allusiveness” and therefore (in Oliver’s view) elitist dishonesty of the work on the other, 
characterises Oliver’s response to Prynne’s poetry from the beginning to the end of their long friendship. 
A letter to Riley from the early 1990s helpfully summarises Oliver’s ambivalence from a later historical 
juncture: 
 
Jeremy’s recent writing [...] seems motivated by concerns very close to my 
own heart. His line seems to take against Western individualism: if the 
individualistic voice is abstracted as far as possible out of the language 
surface (attraction of the ideogram), then a more universal spirit may have 
more ready access to the creation of meaning [...] While I sympathise with 
this – although not by giving anyone a free ride over questions so important – 
I am too worried about poetry’s elitist isolation from common culture to want 
to follow it [...]113 
 
The “creation of meaning” by “a more universal spirit” is attractive to Oliver, but its assumption through 
an “elitist” abstraction “out of the language surface” of difficult, allusive lines of poetry is no substitute 
for the admission by the lyric voice of the ground from which we may all have ready access to that same 
“universal spirit,” and that ground is the unpolluted subjective substance of our commonness or kind. 
 To reveal the stupidity or ignorance in ourselves, otherwise hidden by “elitist” difficulty, 
acknowledges rather than recoils from our individualism and thus confronts it for what it is; it does not 
hide this basic fact of inadequacy through allusive display. Put simply, Oliver believed that Prynne’s 
poetry was guilty, in the last instance, of avoiding the very issue to which it seemed at first to speak so 
demandingly. Oliver goes on to say that 
 
I want to admit back into the text that kind of self-reflectiveness which 
permits modesty; also the white Western poet’s vulnerability and inadequacy 
and tendency to a bad kind of individualism should be on display. My 
motives are almost identical to Jeremy’s, I think.114 
 
The motive of Prynne’s identified by Oliver with which he claims solidarity is the fact of the compromise 
and complicity of the white Western male voice with the injustice which it would explicate and denounce: 
 
The western voice is hideously compromised in all that goes wrong: agreed. 
Not to reveal that in the voice seems to me – in Jeremy’s followers, though 
less in his own originating approach which is properly motivated – a kind of 
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arrogance.115 
 
Solidarity of purpose and motivation is thus combined with distrust of the ramifications of Prynne’s work 
as Oliver interprets it.116 
 Oliver’s problem with Prynne by this point in time at least, although arguably since the 1970s, is 
that Prynne deletes from his poetry the natural, innate locus of “inadequacy,” the lyric voice, and hides it 
with prosodic “display.” No matter how technically brilliant the resulting poetry might be, it fails this 
fundamental test of moral honesty that for Oliver meant the difference between a “democratic tone” that 
could speak to a “common culture” on the one hand, and elitist arrogance that was displaced from such 
commonality on the other, and that resulted in a poetry destined to be consumed only by sycophantic 
“initiates.” To return to the 1970s, we should note that one of the ramifications of Prynne’s project, in line 
with Prynne’s modernist precursors, was the treatment of the figure of the stupid person. Prynne, in work 
directly contemporaneous with the Ferry Press edition of Oliver’s The Diagram--Poems, treats the figure 
of the stupid person in much the same way as we have seen Pound and Olson treat it, and that is as a 
parasitic distraction that is the epitome of human indolence and failure. These stanzas are from Down 
Where Changed (1979): 
 
Is that quite all, the stupid creep 
under the stairs and in the gloom 
will do their best to fall asleep 
 
and in the shadow of that room 
we hear the shallow call to deep 
and fail the test, and miss our doom.117 
 
The “stupid creep” is condemned by the lobotomised nursery-rhyme tetrameter of these quatrains (their 
“Idiot’s Guide monoglotese,” in Sutherland’s gloss) as the irredeemable fool incapable even of securing 
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116 Prynne makes assertions of common purpose and shared position central to his correspondence with Oliver. In a 
letter of 23rd February 1993, Prynne describes three “terminal point[s]” of his contemporary poetic, before 
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of precisely how each poet defines both their bond of common purpose or motivation and the divergent results of 
their individuated literary, ethical and political commitments, must take into account the full archive of 
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117 J.H. Prynne, Poems (Tarset, Northumberland and North Fremantle: Bloodaxe Books and Fremantle Arts Centre 
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the means of his own destruction.118 Here is an important contrast between Oliver’s and Prynne’s work of 
the period: whilst for Oliver the stupid child is a limit case for the possibilities of human kindness and 
thus the perfect icon for a universalism founded on just such kindness, for Prynne the stupid person is fit 
only to be the bathetic image of our capacity for witless annihilation. In Oliver the child “with really low 
IQ” is blessed, the figure of redemption itself; in Prynne the stupid person barely sleepwalks through the 
apocalypse. In his letters to Riley, Oliver measures Prynne’s poetry against a standard of universalism 
based on democratic inclusivity, and by this standard Prynne consistently comes up short. 
 And yet Oliver writes to Riley that his “motives are almost identical to Jeremy’s.” How are we to 
understand this identity? One way to do so would be to compare the conceptualisations of “stupidity” that 
emerge from Oliver’s and Prynne’s poetry. For Oliver, it is vital to remember, to admit of stupidity in 
ourselves is the intelligent thing to do.119 In The Infant and the Pearl, Oliver writes that “the highest 
human intelligence is a near / relation of ignorance,” and the same can be said of the concept of 
“stupidity” as Oliver works it out in his writings of the 1970s. To admit of “stupidity,” and not to hide it, 
is a way of acknowledging and securing a bond of common feeling by recognising that which is deeply 
and inalienably human. Arrogant intellectual posturing is precisely that which prevents us from 
acknowledging such a bond. For Prynne, the common lapse into stupidity is a perfect representation of 
our current state of historical entrenchment in moral ruination, and of our propensity to accept as an 
ethical salve the thrilling sanctimony of despair. In Down Where Changed, “deep sadness is a perk / of 
the iron will,” a simple recourse to the indolence and “lazy, dishonest misery” of contemporary political 
lassitude. The “stupid creep” in Down Where Changed refuses his own access to the depths of human 
knowledge. The “shallow call to deep” is likely a deliberately mutilated quotation from Psalm 42, “Deep 
calleth unto deep at the noise of thy waterspouts: all thy waves and thy billows are gone over me.” To 
“hear the shallow call to deep” is not only to hear a “shallow,” and thus inauthentic and inadmissible, 
“call to deep”; profundity itself suffers a wretched demotion expressed by the grammatical clumsiness of 
the phrase “call to deep.” Profundity is damaged by our very articulation of it. It is damaged because we 
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are too stupid to realise it is damaged. Prynne thus identifies stupidity as part of a poetical diagnosis of 
contemporary political enervation; Oliver enlists stupidity in the service of a utopian project whose aim is 
the revitalisation of the body politic in the shape of poems. For both poets, the motive force for deploying 
“stupidity” is the condemnation not just of, as Oliver puts it, a “bad kind of [white, Western] 
individualism,” but of the entire shape of political discourse built upon the foundations of precisely such a 
hegemonic ideology. 
 
2.3 – Tom, “authentic politics” and unity 
 
The Diagram--Poems are the first work of Oliver’s to attempt to formulate and exemplify what he calls in 
the poems’ 1987 prose introduction “an authentic politics.”120 They do so by drawing on revolutionary 
armed struggle in its context, in the case of Uruguay, in military dictatorship and the economic hegemony 
of foreign capital, in order to critique both dictatorial and revolutionary socialist standpoints. Beyond 
these standpoints, the poems favour a “political ideal” which develops the “perfect identity between self 
and Other” discussed in the previous chapter into a utopian democratic vision.121 The The Diagram--
Poems name this condition “a land silvery with democracy.”122 There is some measure of ambiguity in 
this phrase, and it is not unambiguously a utopian description. “[S]ilvery” is a peculiar word choice. I 
explore its connotations in terms of monetary value below.123 It is likewise important to note that it was 
favoured by poets of the 18th century writing in a neo-classical pastoral mode to describe scenes of 
georgic idyll, and that from a classical and neo-classical perspective the word has further connotations of 
social and political decline in the sense of a “silver age” following a “golden” one. Despite the ironical 
tinge the word accrues when these associations are considered, the overwhelming sense of a yearned-for 
democratic Elysium which its context in the poem ‘U’ brings to mind leads me to treat the phrase here as 
a utopian vision.  
 In the introductory ‘Night Shift,’ recounting the poems’ conception whilst working as a 
journalist in Paris, Oliver writes: 
 
whether the guerrillas were right or wrong, you were dreaming quite 
obliquely, as you tapped the [news] stories out, of how an authentic politics 
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might combine the mildness of your dead baby with the stern wisdom of a 
judicious elder minister: some beneficial balance, instead of revolutionary 
flamboyance and a dictatorship’s response of iron rule.124 
 
The use of the term “authentic” inevitably brings to mind Heidegger’s eigentlich [authentic] and 
Eigentlichkeit [authenticity]. Writing in 1987, Oliver would have been well aware of the philosopher’s 
terminology – he read Heidegger, or at least about Heidegger, as we saw in the previous chapter, in the 
early 1970s. He would possibly have been aware of the fact, too, that the term had since been ruthlessly 
critiqued in Adorno’s The Jargon of Authenticity, first published in English in 1973.125 Given his 
antipathy to Marxist ruthlessness (as an extreme form of left-wing snobbery), if Oliver was aware of this 
critical development he may well have employed the term “authentic” in philological loyalty to 
Heidegger’s sense of owning up to the truthfulness of Dasein’s [Being-there’s] existential project in the 
face of the inauthentically normalised public of das Man [the They]. It seems far likelier, however, that 
the Heideggerian term resonated with Oliver in the same way in which we have seen Husserl’s 
descriptions of transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity, and Lacan’s savoir, resonate with him, 
that is, as a rigorous, philosophical exposition of a far simpler, more “everyday” truth: that, for example, 
“ideas of [one’s] own” are preferable to the intellectual sophistries of contemporary theoreticians. Oliver 
was a pragmatist and his brief excursions into philosophy are full of the promise of the layman’s common 
sense. I propose, therefore, to follow the moral and political implications of “authentic politics” as they 
emerge through immanent critique of Oliver’s oeuvre, rather than to develop an ontological framework 
for their explication which risks obscuring the complex moral arguments of the work. 
 Tom Oliver’s death in November 1969 precipitated Oliver and his family’s move to Paris early 
the following year.126 There he began work on, among other projects, what would later become The 
Diagram--Poems. Tom is a constant presence in all of Oliver’s poetry and prose between 1973 and 1985. 
What Oliver calls in ‘Night Shift’ Tom’s “mildness,” and which is elsewhere in the oeuvre referred to as 
“stupidity,” “innocence,” or “ignorance,” operates in all of the work between 1973 and 1985 as a 
pacifistic moral compass, often combined with a form of “wisdom,” or “mature cleverness,” that tempers, 
in equal measure, what Oliver increasingly perceives as the exploitative nature of capitalist societies and 
the harmful pretensions of the radical left-wing politics that would revolutionise those societies.127 
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Whenever they are deployed in Oliver’s writing, the terms “stupidity,” “mildness,” “innocence” and 
“ignorance” all indicate a natural, innate and morally sound capacity for pacifistic human co-existence.  
 An “authentic politics” sounds at first like an oxymoron: how can a “politics,” a social 
phenomenon defined by difference and compromise, be singularly “authentic,” or for that matter, “true”? 
The answer is that Oliver’s conception of “authentic politics” based on “beneficial balance” does not 
only, or even primarily, refer to some middle-ground of the political spectrum between capitalist 
oligarchs and revolutionary socialists. It also refers, and it refers most pressingly, to an ideal social 
relation that is first theorised in Oliver’s unpublished essays from his time at Essex, and subsequently 
developed in The Harmless Building, In the Cave of Suicession, The Diagram--Poems, The Infant and the 
Pearl and Penniless Politics, in terms of harmonious, sympathetic and “harmless” human interaction. 
Between 1973 and 1980 the behavioural code inspired by Tom, and Tom’s death, is developed into a 
political argument of which The Diagram--Poems is the first major expression. The notion of 
harmlessness in Oliver’s work originates in The Harmless Building. In Oliver’s own words, recorded late 
in his life, the novel was “the mother plant” amongst his publications, because future books emerged from 
its conceptual field, “propagating like strawberries, as by tendrils leading from [it].”128 The Harmless 
Building begins with the narrator explicitly mimicking the “harmlessness” of his “mongol” son in order to 
better project to those around him “an outgoingness and kindness, a lock of coherence, an area of almost 
no-harm like a clearing in the middle of harm.”129 Oliver persistently refers to his son’s disability as 
“mongolism.” In the novel, “mongolism” is the most prescient expression of harmlessness because it 
makes explicit the underlying “unintelligence” of the affected person, and therefore provides access to an 
experience of common humanity otherwise hidden, obscured or dissembled.130 
 The Harmless Building’s first chapter, ‘Kind Regards,’ opens: 
 
For the moment the truth is hiding in obstreperous fiction. I can, however, 
say that a real mongol baby died and that his memory affects my life. In his 
mongolism I find an analogy for my own stupidity. He and I are united at that 
                                                                                                                                                                              
“[j]oined to an energetic and mature cleverness, [...] may become a force for good” [p.5]; “innocence” is used at 
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primitive level of thought where our ideas are fairly random, not ambitious, 
only half out of thought-chaos itself. How aptly mongolism is a symbol for 
the sweetness, ‘stupidity’ and near-harmlessness of a baby! Joined to an 
energetic and mature cleverness, such sweetness may become a force for 
good.131 
 
To be “united at that primitive level of thought” exposed by “stupidity” is to enjoy an experience at least 
analogous to, if not directly congruous with, that of “perfect identity between self and Other.” In the 
pamphlet The Three Lilies, first published in 1982 but based on some introductory remarks Oliver made 
before a reading of The Diagram--Poems in 1980, Oliver describes the female figure who represents in 
his work “the proper resolution of time seen as passing and time seen in its successive instants.”132 This 
figure, he goes on, is “also a political ideal in which the one-sidedness of idealism itself may be figured, 
paradoxically, as transcended.”133 The “political ideal” is already by this point explicitly bound up in the 
language of “unity,” specifically that of “time seen as a unity of what has passed and what is passing.”134 
In 1985, Oliver literalises this metaphorical and temporal “unity” into the ideal social relation of the 
“union between / people,” named, in The Infant and the Pearl, “Socialism.”135 
 By 1990, Oliver explicitly refers to the kind of social relation defined by kindness, unity and 
harmlessness as “an international kinship.”136 In the autobiographical prose/poetry sequence ‘An Island 
That Is All The World,’ “international kinship” is defined as a universal commonality apprehensible by a 
process of subtraction: 
 
Even if, as I was, we’re brought up in some middle-class, snobbish, racist 
suburb, once we touch more profoundly natural unconscious sides of 
ourselves all the cultural rubbish falls away and we recognize a deep kinship, 
an international kinship.137 
 
This is the moment amongst Oliver’s numerous explications of his own poetic labour in which the 
phenomenological theory of the early essays finds its most cogent expression in terms of a literary project 
of avowed universalism. This “kinship” is “profoundly natural.” It is for everyone, and it is for everyone 
once “all the cultural rubbish falls away” to engender “recogni[tion]” of ourselves and each other as we 
really are. It is also the language of the transcendental epoché elevated to a vision of global social 
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harmony. We “recognize” our “kinship” because it was there all along, buried “deep”; it is the natural, 
inalienable property of our common humanity. The section of ‘An Island That Is All The World’ quoted 
above concludes an anecdote about a reading of The Diagram--Poems Oliver gave in Luxembourg in 
1987. This reading was particularly successful; Oliver recounts noticing an “unusual tension” in the room 
during the reading; after the reading he was complimented by friendly poets.138 “[I]nternational kinship,” 
like “perfect identity,” is most potently recognized through the spoken language of poetry. 
 We saw above how, in the second stanza of the The Diagram--Poems’ ‘U,’ that the “spoken 
kindness” with which “[t]he lost child’s voice should speak” is precisely the inalienable human 
characteristic that “we know,” yet fail to recognize, meanwhile “let[ting] the voice break in our throats” 
“until” the Tupamaros’ gross “flamboyance” speaks with a different “voice” altogether. We are now in a 
position to note the repetition in this stanza of the emphatic assertion we saw in Oliver’s New Years Eve 
1970 letter to Peter Riley, this time with an inclusive plural pronoun substituted for the second person: 
“You know damn well that stupidity is there,” becomes, in ‘U,’ “We know this. Everyone.” In The 
Harmless Building, Oliver is “united [with Tom] at that primitive level of thought”; through the 
“mildness” and “kindness” exemplified by Tom, the “lost child” in The Diagram--Poems, we 
acknowledge the radical similarity of humankind as the condition for the realisation of “a land silvery 
with democracy.” It is not, therefore, ironic that the phrase “we know this” in The Diagram--Poems is an 
emphatic expression of what in The Harmless Building and in his correspondence Oliver calls “stupidity,” 
because this phrase is in fact a corroboration of the same concept. To “know” one important thing does 
not preclude the possibility of our being harmlessly stupid. What we “know,” even, or especially, in “the 
heart of swift cruelty” that symbolises both the Tupamaros’ reckless actions, and their subsequent abuse 
and torture by the police, is that our “unity” in “international kinship” presents a “natural” imperative to 
manifest the “land silvery with democracy.”  
 The term “imperative” is used here, and throughout the present chapter, with the implication of 
its Kantian connotations fully intact; it is crucial for Oliver, I suggest, that what “we know” be made into 
an incontrovertible moral law. The less we cling to pre-established doctrines of political dogma that 
justify everything from capitalist exploitation to violent revolutionary praxis, the better we are able to 
understand, recognize and act upon Oliver’s imperative. This imperative urges us against divisive 
political creed and towards the inclusivity of universal intersubjective harmony. Oliver believed that 
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poems provide a glimpse of the “perfect identity between self and Other” in each syllable of prosodic 
iteration, and that “stupidity” provides access to the natural “kindness” it reveals to be innate and 
universal. The “true politics” and the “special intersubjectivity” of the former, contained within Oliver’s 
theory of prosody, is conceptually congruous with the “authentic politics” of the latter. All three of 
Oliver’s major political poems take this “authentic politics” as their underlying theme; it is the standpoint 
from which the entire scene of political behaviour, from fascist dictatorships to left-wing extremists, is 
understood to be morally and spiritually lacking. 
 In my first chapter, I identified in Oliver’s early essays a phenomenological theory of prosody 
that tends towards the establishment of a “perfect identity between self and Other,” or a “special 
intersubjectivity,” by the articulation of poetic music. We saw that, for Oliver, the “moments” of shared 
consciousness that poetry engenders between poet-author and reader are decidedly non-intellectual, and 
that they shed the sophistries of philosophical rigour to produce a unity of “everyday” commonality.139 In 
this chapter I have so far explored Oliver’s thinking about “stupidity” as a counter to intellectual 
(poetical) snobbery and left-wing radicalism. This thinking emphasises an “area of personality” that is 
universal and therefore a potential basis for an “international kinship,” or a “special intersubjectivity” on 
a global scale. It is only a potential basis; as the last poem in The Diagram--Poems has it, we “[lack] the 
one innocence” that would allow an “authentic politics” to emerge. At the core of Oliver’s poetic project, 
two simultaneous strands of thinking co-operate: the first determines the possibility of “perfect identity” 
through poetic music; the second abjures what Oliver comprehends as arrogant snobbery, which includes, 
but is not limited to, the expression of revolutionary left-politics, in favour of pacifistic common 
kindness. Oliver’s three major “political” poems, The Diagram--Poems, The Infant and the Pearl and 
Penniless Politics, all argue in different ways that our failure to recognize the fundamental original unity 
of human beings, whether in “kindness,” “innocence,” “the union between / people,” or “Spirit,” is the 
condition of our failure to institute an “authentic politics.” This politics becomes, instead, most 
prominently accessible in poems themselves. Reading poems traces the microcosm of “perfect identity” 
whose macrocosmic social articulation remains largely impossible because our “origin[s],” like the 
Tupamaros’, are “rotten.” In a perfectly literal sense, the “spoken kindness” of The Diagram--Poems 
consists in the poems being read.140 “[T]rue politics” remains congealed in poems, until our reading of 
                                                            
139 “The poet writes from a centre that we may as well identify in an everyday sense as his notion of self [...]”; see 
‘Who does the poet,’ pp.1-2; and cf. Chapter 1, section 1.4. 
140 In the mid-1990s Oliver wrote that “Only at those moments [when a poem is read silently or aloud, or chanted, or 
sung by the poet or by a reader] can it [the poem] be truly a poem, an artwork alive in time; otherwise it remains 
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them articulates this relation anew. 
 There is a long and polyvalent history in literary, political and religious thought of the 
coincidence of the valorisation of unconventional or otherwise debased, non-doctrinal, unlearned or 
natural knowledge on the one hand, and spiritual and/or political union on the other. The particular 
manifestations of Oliver’s conception of “stupidity,” which include the later emphases on “mildness,” 
“innocence” and “ignorance” should be read, I suggest, in the context of this multi-faceted tradition, 
which extends from medieval Christian theology and mysticism, through French Enlightenment 
philosophy, to 18th and 19th century Romantic tenets, to early twentieth-century anarchist individualism. 
This history further illuminates the moral imperative towards pacifistic, democratic unity that “spoken 
kindness” declares “we know.” Two bodies of thought in this vast tradition are of particular relevance, 
and their resonance with Oliver’s poetics will be investigated in what follows. These are Rousseau’s 
political philosophy as contained in the Discourses, and Langland’s descriptions of kynde [kind] and 
kynde knowyng [kind knowing] in Piers Plowman. 
 
2.3a – Langland and kynde 
 
There is a broad scholarly consensus that the concept kynde, the faculty kynde knowyng and the 
personification Kynde all play extremely important roles in William Langland’s fourteenth-century 
dream-vision, Piers Plowman. Evidenced by the sheer volume of critical attention to the terms, their 
significance is also explicitly emphasised by various scholars. Hugh White, for example, states that “the 
concept kynde plays a highly significant role in Piers Plowman in all versions of the poem,” and points to 
the fact that, “strikingly, God is identified as Kynde in the second part of the poem.”141 Mary Clemente 
                                                                                                                                                                              
just a text, closed up within a book or opened to critical attention, an object whose relations with time a critic may 
describe but which remain potential, not actual.” It is unclear exactly what kind of “truth” Oliver is appealing to 
here; it is nevertheless tempting to read the identification of truthfulness with the sonorous iteration of poetic 
language in terms of the type of authentic intersubjective encounter we explored in the previous chapter. See 
‘Poetry’s Subject,’ originally published in PN Review 105 [not, as Oliver cites himself in WL, 95] (Vol. 22, No. 1; 
Sep.-Oct., 1995), pp.52-58, later revised and extended in Davis, ed., Real Voices on Reading, pp.83-102. 
141 Hugh White, Nature and Salvation in Piers Plowman (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1988), p.1. The reflections in the 
present chapter on kynde and kynde knowyng (or knowynge) draw heavily on the following literature: Mary 
Clemente Davlin, ‘Kynde Knowyng as a major theme in Piers Plowman B,’ The Review of English Studies, New 
Series, Vol. 22, No. 85 (Feb., 1971), pp.1-19 and ‘Kynde Knowyng as a Middle English equivalent for ‘Wisdom’ 
in Piers Plowman B,’ Medium Ævum, Vol. 50 (Jan., 1981), pp.5-17; Britton J. Harwood, ‘Langland’s “Kynde 
Knowyng” and the Quest for Christ,’ Modern Philology, Vol. 80, No. 3 (Feb., 1983), pp.242-255; Michelle 
Karnes, ‘Will’s Imagination in Piers Plowman,’ The Journal of English and Germanic Philology, Vol. 108, No. 1 
(Jan., 2009), pp.27-58; M. Teresa Tavormina, ‘Kindly Similitude: Langland’s Matrimonial Trinity,’ Modern 
Philology, Vol. 80, No. 2 (Nov., 1982), pp.117-128; Edward Vasta, The Spiritual Basis of Piers Plowman 
(London, The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1965); White, Nature and Salvation, and Nicolette Zeeman, Piers 
Plowman and the Medieval Discourse of Desire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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Davlin, meanwhile, refers to the “crucial importance” of kynde knowyng “as a major theme informing the 
whole of Piers Plowman.”142 There is no comprehensive critical consensus regarding the exact meaning 
of each of the three terms. Nevertheless, the interpretative work to explicate the basis and importance of 
kynde, kynde knowyng and Kynde has resulted in some useful interrelated critical distinctions. For our 
purposes, the two most important of these distinctions are: firstly, kynde and kynde knowyng’s 
connotations of natural or innate, and innately moral, understanding; this includes, in some accounts, the 
essential goodness of mankind as expressed in their kyndeness, that is, their relation to kynde, and their 
kynde relation to each other, as a natural “force for good”; and secondly, the kynde connaturality between 
human beings, and between the human and the divine that constitutes union with God (personified in 
Plowman as Kynde) through Christ.143 These aspects of Piers Plowman present a Christian devotional 
worldview which bears a strong similarity to the behavioural, moral and political imperative that develops 
in Oliver’s poetry and prose before, in and after The Diagram--Poems. They provide, too, a medieval 
redemptive paradigm, and a strong emphasis on civic and spiritual unity, which were enormously 
influential on Oliver’s later writing. The Infant and the Pearl is narratively, prosodically and structurally 
based on the Pearl of Langland’s contemporary or near-contemporary, the anonymous poet of Pearl and 
Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. 
 It is not entirely clear whether Oliver read Piers Plowman before or during the composition of 
The Diagram--Poems. Certainly he read Chaucer, as can be seen from the readings of The Canterbury 
Tales in the essays discussed in my first chapter. Despite this, it does not seem that Oliver had any great 
interest in other medieval or Middle English texts before his introduction to Pearl by John Hall in the 
mid- to late-1970s – Oliver’s reading of Pearl at least post-dates his composition of The Harmless 
Building, and may post-date the composition of In the Cave of Suicession. Oliver writes that “John Hall 
remarked once that The Harmless Building reminded him of the medieval Pearl poem because of the role 
a child plays in it. That struck home [...].”144 John Hall recalls that he gave his personal copy of Pearl to 
Oliver during Oliver’s stay with Hall and his partner in Devon sometime in the 1970s. Hall writes that “I 
don’t think he knew it [Pearl] at all.” Hall also notes that 
 
I did more than recommend Pearl to him. I put my own copy in his hand to 
take home with him and didn’t see it again for a very long time, when he 
returned it by post without, as I recall, any accompanying note. When he sent 
                                                            
142 Davlin, ‘Kynde Knowyng,’ p.1.  
143 The phrase “force for good” is White’s. See Nature and Salvation, p.92. 
144 CAAS, p.254. 
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it back I didn’t know about The Infant and the Pearl. Our conversation may 
have been prompted as much by In the Cave of Suicession as The Harmless 
Building.145 
 
If indeed Oliver had the inclination to explore other Middle English dream narratives after Hall’s 
intervention, then even if the conversation was prompted by In the Cave of Suicession (1974) rather than 
The Harmless Building (1973), this would still allow plenty of time for the influence of Piers Plowman to 
be felt before the first full sequence of Diagram--Poems was published in 1978 in Ochre magazine. If 
Oliver did not have a reading knowledge of Piers Plowman before he finished composing The Diagram--
Poems, this does not negate the literary-historical resonance of the following connotations and 
implications of kynde and kyndeness, to which Oliver’s “kind” and “kindness” still bear witness, intended 
or not.  
 After the period of The Diagram--Poems, it becomes easier to assume that Oliver was aware of 
Piers Plowman. Not only does the intense study of the 14th-century Pearl that the entire composition of 
The Infant and the Pearl displays, and that Hall’s recollection corroborates, suggest that Oliver was also 
well-read in the small number of roughly coeval Middle English dream narratives by the mid-1980s at 
least; furthermore, Oliver’s protagonist-dreamer in Penniless Politics shares the name of the protagonist-
dreamer of Piers Plowman, “Will.”146 Despite the lack of corroborating evidence in the correspondence or 
published prose, this seems too much of a coincidence to attribute to chance. What is more, the concept 
and frequent usage of the Middle English “kynde” is not unique to Langland. It is a feature, too, of the 
Pearl-poet’s vocabulary, who used it throughout his oeuvre. In his highly informative essay on The Infant 
and the Pearl, John Kerrigan records personal communication from Oliver that the title of the 1987 
collected poems Kind was “partly [...] suggested to [Oliver] by Pearl.”147 “Kynde” appears six times in 
the text of Pearl (“kyndely” once), and I take Oliver’s communication to Kerrigan on this point precisely 
as it was given. It was only “partly” suggested to Oliver by Pearl because the term’s most fecund and 
productive usage in the Middle English canon occurs in William Langland’s Piers Plowman. In the same 
article Kerrigan points convincingly to the influence on The Infant and the Pearl of both Piers Plowman 
                                                            
145 John Hall to the author, personal communication, 13.12.2013. In 1997 Oliver published a short commentary on 
Sir Gawain in Nick Rennison and Michael Schmidt, ed., Poets on Poets, (Manchester: Carcanet, 1997), with a 
section of the poem in a “slightly compromised modernisation” (p.138). The title of his late poem ‘The Video 
House of Fame,’ collected in the posthumous collection Arrondissements (Great Wilbraham, Cambridge: Salt, 
2003, pp.53-156), riffs on Chaucer’s ‘The House of Fame.’ A detailed survey of Oliver’s reading of medieval 
literature follows in the next chapter. 
146 Oliver’s “Will Penniless” in fact appears to be a conjunction of Piers Plowman’s “Will” and Thomas Nashe’s 
eponymous hero “Pierce Penniless.” 
147 John Kerrigan, ‘Mrs Thatcher’s Pearl,’ The Body and the Soul in Medieval Literature (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 
1999), pp.181-199 (189). 
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and Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. In all of the works attributed to the Pearl-poet, kynde and its 
associated terms display nothing like the range and depth of moral and spiritual repercussions to which 
the contemporary literature on Piers Plowman attest. I therefore proceed here to scrutinise these 
repercussions and to articulate their relevance to Oliver’s poetic. 
 “Kynde” is used in Piers Plowman as a noun, an adjective and a pronoun. The term’s “great 
semantic richness,” as White describes it, is as much Langland’s “resource” as it is the critic’s 
“impediment,” since the “extreme polysemy” of the Middle English results in a variety of interrelated 
meanings and connotations.148 Langland scholars agree that the term is of vital importance to the dreamer-
protagonist Will’s allegorical journey towards wisdom and salvation. The Norton editors’ gloss of the 
term provides a useful simplification of three core meanings: 
 
(1) God conceived of primarily in his creative aspect [...] (2) the nature of 
something, as in the modern expression “this kind of thing rather than that 
kind” (Langland uses the expression “the law of kynde” to cover what we 
would call the law of nature as well as the instinctual morality of decent 
human beings, insofar as the latter seems to be cross-cultural[)]; (3) kindness 
in the modern sense, i.e., benevolence, but conceived of as the norm of 
human behaviour rather than as some special sort of altruism: to be “unkind” 
is to be distorted and unnatural as well as cruel. Kind love, “natural love”: a 
love that is an instinctive and a natural expression of a benevolent will and 
cannot be taught [...] Langland’s most crucial [...] use of the word is in the 
term kind knowing, “natural knowledge”: experiential knowledge – whether 
interiorly or exteriorly derived – as opposed to reasoning and to book 
learning.149 
 
Already we can see something of the continuity of connotation between Langland’s kynde and Oliver’s 
“kindness.” What the Norton editors refer to as the “instinctual morality of decent human beings” Oliver 
stresses in The Diagram--Poems’ ‘U’ as that which “we” can learn from Tom that we already 
instinctively “know”: “We know Tom’s voice, we now know this, we see[.]”150  
 Nicolette Zeeman emphasises that “the Latin noun natura and its Middle English equivalent 
kynde signify ‘innate structure or disposition,’” and points out that the Middle English Dictionary “gives 
weight to this ‘innate’ and ‘not acquired’ aspect of Middle English kynde[.]”151 She further notes that 
 
kynde has been seen to refer to the essential or habitual nature of things and 
to a moral and social natural order; it is a name for God the creator as it is for 
                                                            
148 White, Nature and Salvation, p.1. 
149 William Langland, Piers Plowman, ed. Elizabeth Robertson and Stephen H.A. Shepherd (Norton Critical 
Editions: New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 2006), p.630. 
150 K, p.122. 
151 Zeeman, Piers Plowman, p.160. 
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his creation [...] Kynde and its cognates appear when Langland discusses 
practical or secular ethics and politics, where they retain strongly moral 
connotations. Kynde is associated with the provision and sharing of material 
goods, sexuality and bodily relations, the means of life on earth; it is 
connected to ideas of human ‘kindness,’ the affective bonds between human 
beings [...]152 
 
That which rings with the sound of “spoken kindness” in The Diagram--Poems certainly speaks of an 
“affective [bond] between human beings,” a bond obscured and severed by the species’ subdivision into 
mutually antagonistic elements. Such a bond is, in both cases, determined by a “strongly moral” 
connection, that is, a connection that determines what we “should” do. Britton J. Harwood asserts that 
kynde knowyng in Piers Plowman 
 
resonates with – conceivably replaces for him [Langland] – notitia intuitiva, 
one of the terms essential to philosophy for the previous hundred years 
[before the composition of Piers Plowman]. In effect, Will [the narrator and 
protagonist of Piers Plowman] makes intuitive cognition the psychological 
test for his knowledge of Christ.153 
 
Harwood also points out that “the ‘kynde’ in ‘kynde knowyng’ signifies first of all the evident character 
of the knowledge in question, its safety from skepticism.”154 Harwood notes that other, “nontechincal 
[sic]” interpretations of kynde knowyng include “intuition,” “physical apprehension,” “immediate and 
experiential,” and “direct” and “unratiocinative” knowledge.155  
 The “law of kynde” is invoked in Piers Plowman by various allegorical characters to admonish 
and teach Will. Hugh White has written carefully and cogently on the various instances in the poem of the 
expression “law of kynde.” He suggests that there is “a general desire on Langland’s part to see the 
natural as a force for good,” since 
 
Langland much more frequently treats the kynde as morally positive than he 
finds it conducing to evil. The law of kynde may on occasion seem 
questionable in its authority or influence, but Langland is also able to 
understand it as urging to the good.156 
 
As evidence for this, he quotes the following “exhortation regarding those who have suffered at the hands 
of Fortune or false men” from Passus VI: 
                                                            
152 Ibid., pp.160-161. 
153 Harwood, ‘Langland’s “Kynde Knowyng,”’ p.245. 
154 Ibid., p.246. 
155 Ibid., fn. 25. The definitions are, respectively, those of Neville Coghill, David Fowler, Edward Vasta and J.A. 
Burrow. 
156 White, Nature and Salvation, p.92. 
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Conforte hem with thi catel for Cristes love of hevene; 
Love hem and lene hem, for so lawe of [kynde wolde]: 
Alter alterius onera portate157 
 
[Comfort such at your own cost, for the love of Christ in Heaven; 
Love them and relieve them – so the law of Kind directs. 
Bear ye one another’s burdens.]158 
 
And comments: 
 
Langland seems to have identified the law of Christ with the law of nature in 
a way that is perfectly orthodox, but which accords a very high status to the 
law of nature, and which [...] would be in line with a desire to find the natural 
a power for good.159 
 
In White’s commentary, kynde is therefore associated with the expression of a natural moral law, a 
“general law” ingrained into the very fabric of human being. 
 Zeeman, meanwhile, attends to the Pauline and Augustinian roots of this law’s explication; St. 
Paul 
 
uses the term naturaliter to describe the moral law placed by God in creation 
[...] Their [the gentiles’] bodies are marked with an inner ‘writing’ of the law, 
for they show ‘opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis’ (‘the work of the law 
written in their hearts’). This natural law is indelible, Augustine claims, 
‘written in the hearts of men, and not even wickedness itself can erase it.’160 
 
St. Augustine’s heart upon which the moral law is inscribed is alluded to in the line “and a heart on which 
the diagram is scored” in the final section of the concluding poem of The Diagram--Poems, ‘The 
Diagonal is Diagonal’: 
 
just a final diagram almost straight 
and a heart on which the diagram is scored 
beside the deaths of innocences we have known 
and even caused a little in the scarface heart.161 
 
The quotation from St. Augustine that Zeeman cites is from Book II of Augustine’s Confessions: “Furtum 
                                                            
157 Ibid. White here uses the B-text. The Latin is from Galatians 6:2. 
158 Langland, Piers Plowman, p.107. 
159 Ibid.  
160 Zeeman, Piers Plowman, pp.171-172. 
161 K, p.126. 
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certe punit lex tua, domine, et lex scripta in cordibus hominum, quam ne ipsa quidem delet iniquitas.”162 
[“Theft is punished by Thy law, O Lord, and the law written in the hearts of men, which iniquity itself 
cannot delete.”] We know that Oliver read the Confessions and numerous other works by St. Augustine; 
he is referred to extensively in Poetry and Narrative in Performance (1989), the central thesis of which, 
as I argued in the last chapter, dates back to the early 1970s. The type of diagram that is “scored” onto “a 
heart” in these lines is “almost straight.” Straightness, of purpose and of design, is contrasted in the The 
Diagram--Poems with the confused premises and chaotic violence upon which the Tupamaros’ 
meticulous plans are built, and into which they unravel.  
 The poem ‘P.C.’ opens with the “hope” that a raid on a police station will “go straight and 
quick” in order to “immobilise a commissariat,” but the guerrillas are interrupted and the plan “curv[es] 
into turbulence.”163 In ‘The Diagonal is Diagonal,’ it is the “diagonal” trajectory towards violence that is 
unfavourably compared with some alternate course of action, left un-described, which would stem from 
an entirely “innocent” starting point: 
 
[from] the point at which the innocence stays clean 
the diagonal does not speed down 
to these loaded reversals 
police exchange no shots 
there’s no sequel of bestiality.164 
 
The “swift diagonal / that slants from the cemetery” also ends up there, and we shall have more to say 
about the presentation of the guerrillas’ endeavours as inevitably tarred with failure below.165 
“[B]estiality” is Oliver’s euphemism for the torture visited on the captured guerrillas by Uruguay’s 
Metropolitan Guard and the Montevidean police. A “diagram almost straight” “scored” onto “a heart” 
refashions St. Augustine’s impression of the legibility of the moral law into an image of ratiocinated 
abstract knowledge, knowledge won by ambition and quantitatively rated – “scored” puns on both cutting 
and ranking. Instead of divinely ordained ethical jurisprudence, what is disastrously “scored” onto the 
                                                            
162 James J. O’Donnell, ed., Augustine: Confessions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, 3 Vols.), Vol. 1: Introduction 
and Text, pp.18-19. The translation is Zeeman’s. See also Simon J. Gathercole, ‘A Conversion of Augustine: 
From Natural Law to Restored Nature in Romans 2:3-16,’ in Daniel Patte and Eugene TeSelle, ed., Engaging 
Augustine on Romans: Self, Context, and Theology in Interpretation (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 
2002), pp.150-151: “The lex aeterna [...] is the Divine Intellect by which the whole cosmos is ordered, of which 
the lex naturalis, the norm by which rational souls act morally, is a subset. Thus ‘the lex naturalis, according to 
St. Augustine, is the conscious participation of rational man in the lex aeterna.’ This lex naturalis is that which is 
written on the heart of every human.” (p.151). Gathercole quotes A.-H. Chroust, ‘The Fundamental Ideas in St. 
Augustine’s Philosophy of Law,’ American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1973), pp.57-79 (68). 
163 K, p.107. 
164 Ibid., p.126. 
165 See below, this section, and section 2.4. 
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heart by the turbulent radicalism of the late 1960s are over-ambitious revolutionary designs. 
 The diagrams to which the texts in The Diagram--Poems refer and respond are, at least in part, a 
representation of the imputed inevitable failure of the Tupamaros’ schemes, and the guerrillas’ 
subsequent arrest and torture. A diagram is a pictorial representation of a foregone conclusion – its ends 
are at once as discernible as its beginnings. The poem ‘The Diagonal is Diagonal’ continues by asserting 
that “we,” in this case seemingly sympathetic distant Western observers of the carnage in Uruguay, have 
“no right to justify” the “foreign courage” of the rebels, 
 
no right to borrow it, jig it into shapes, 
display it like a wound on our own opening palm. 
But, lacking the one innocence, we are driven into this foreign time 
into falseness in funerals, rehearsals 
leading from the cemetery [...]166 
 
True “innocence” would abjure representation as crude as the “shapes” of the diagrams in The Diagram--
Poems because it would be “excellent enough” to admit to its fundamental ignorance about the complex 
historical and social contexts of Uruguayan and Latin American politics. Lacking this “innocence” 
facilitates the poems’ composition but at the cost of a brutalising complicity; “we are driven into this 
foreign time” as into an epoch in which humankind are condemned to an alienated servitude. A “heart on 
which the [almost straight] diagram is scored” represents what is left of an original and originally innate, 
kynde and harmless moral fortitude embedded in the musculature of our body politic during a time in 
which social and geopolitical relations are determined by our “lacking the one innocence” necessary to 
either justify or condemn the Tupamaros’ actions. ‘The Diagonal is Diagonal’ laments that, rather than 
united in transcendental reflection upon what is true for all of us, our selves (our subjects) are ruinously 
scarred with extremist plots to prove what is not true for all of us. 
 In Langland scholarship the interpretation of kynde extends to its discussion as that which 
characterises the essential bond between man and man, nature and man, and God and man. Often this 
bond is discussed in the language of “union.” Thus M. Teresa Tavormina speaks of “the kynde order 
underlying the similarity of God and man, and the ultimate union of man and his Maker that follows from 
that similarity.”167 White concludes, in greater detail, that in Piers Plowman the concept kynde 
 
becomes the place of reconciliation for mercy and justice, for law and love; 
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metaphysically, it proclaims the nature of man and of God, as God and as 
Man, displaying them as, essentially, Love, and through it suggestions arise 
concerning an essential unity of human and divine.168 
 
Whereas Davlin: 
 
kynde knowyng can be a knowledge which grasps the nature of the person 
known through connaturality between knower and known; a knowledge 
which is experiential, loving, kind, and second-nature to the knower; a 
knowledge available to humans only because we share the nature of God 
through the incarnation and grace [...]169 
 
In Edward Vasta’s mystical interpretation, “[t]o know love ‘kyndely’ is to be consciously aware of the 
Holy Spirit dwelling in one’s heart.”170  
 White, though skeptical of Vasta’s mysticism, makes a similar claim concerning the coincidence 
of kyndeness and the Holy Ghost in Passus XVII of the poem: 
 
Langland may be suggesting that the kynde man partakes of the nature of the 
Holy Ghost, which is fully expressed only when He is being merciful. Lines 
[in Passus XVII] seem to point to an identity between the nature of the Holy 
Ghost and the kynde man.171 
 
White quotes the following (from Passus XVII) to support his claim – here to be unkynde “is a failure to 
have the kynde of the fire which is the Holy Ghost”: 
 
Ac hewe fit at a flynt foure hundred wynter – 
But thow have tache to take it with, tonder or broches, 
Al thi labour is lost and al thi long travaille; 
For may no fir flaumbe make, faille it his kynde. 
So is the Holy Goost God and grace withouten mercy 
To alle unkynde creatures – Crist hymself witnesseth: 
Amen dico vobis, nescio vos &c.172 
 
[But strike fire from a flint four hundred winters, 
Unless you have tow to take fire from it, tinder or taper, 
All your labor is lost, and all your long slaving; 
For no fire may burst into flame if it lacks kindling. 
So is the Holy Ghost God and grace without mercy 
To all unkind creatures: Christ himself bear witness: 
Verily I say unto you, I know you not, etc.]173 
 
                                                            
168 White, Nature and Salvation, p.111. 
169 Davlin, ‘Kynde Knowyng,’ p.11. 
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171 White, Nature and Salvation, pp.102-103. 
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In his treatment of Passus XVII, White argues that the poem 
 
suggests that man is under an obligation, which the unkynde man fails to 
fulfil, to be as the Holy Ghost is in his true and full nature, that is, blazing 
with a warm and comforting flame of mercy and love.174 
 
Such love is not only reserved for the bond between mankind and the divine, but is an element of 
connatural harmony between all of God’s kynde creatures. Zeeman stresses the communal associations of 
kynde as follows: 
 
Langland’s kynde is moral, communitarian, familial, ‘kindly,’ loving, 
experiential, bodily; it is associated with the proper use and sharing of 
material goods and a positive view of the life and functioning of the body.175 
 
 Does Oliver’s poetry lament the diminishing returns of a natural moral law, nonetheless latently 
persisting, that binds us in essential spiritual unity to each other and to God? Certainly the style in which 
Oliver chooses to present the interruptions and imperatives of “harmlessness” and “kindness” in his work 
seem redolent with spiritual associations. The fictionalised Tom in The Harmless Building has “the true 
blessedness allowed only the really low in IQ.” The political party established in Penniless Politics is 
named simply “Spirit.” We recall that, in the early essays, the “perfect identity between self and Other” 
most nearly achieved by the articulation of prosody and stress is unverifiable by any standard of 
philosophic, or any other, proof: it could therefore potentially be described as a mystical notion. If this 
union is mystical, then its potential for realisation in the expression of democratic “kindness” would seem 
to retain positively spiritual connotations. The most fully worked-out expression in Oliver’s poetry of 
these connotations, and their political ramifications, is to be found in The Infant and the Pearl, with 
which the following chapter is concerned.  
 The final lines of The Diagram--Poems recall the final passage of Piers Plowman’s Passus XX. 
Here they are: 
 
We cannot ask the prisoners to forgive 
our foreign nations 
but we may hope the dead can kiss 
for us the face of innocence in the rushing dark 
and grace and courage arrive calmly in us.176 
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The “hope” that “grace and courage” will “arrive calmly in us” is expressed in the manner of Christian 
prayer. The inclusion of “grace” intimates that the reception of divine favour will be a necessary 
component of our future salvation. The appearance of “grace” in this manner echoes the last line of Piers 
Plowman, and follows Conscience’s invocation at the close of Will’s dream: 
 
“Bi Cryste,” quod Conscience tho, “I wil bicome a pilgryme, 
And walken as wyde as the wordle [renneth] 
To seke Piers the Plowman, that Pryde [myghte] destruye, 
And that freres hadde a fyndyng that for nede flateren 
And contrepleteth me, Conscience; now Kynde me avenge, 
And sende me happe and hele til I have Piers the Plowman.” 
And sitthe he gradde after Grace til I gan awake.177 
 
[“By Christ,” said Conscience then, “I will become a pilgrim, 
And walk as wide as the world reaches 
To seek Piers the Plowman, who might expunge Pride, 
And see that friars had funds who flatter for need 
And contradict me, Conscience; now Kind avenge me, 
And send me heart and health till I have Piers the Plowman.” 
And Conscience cried for Grace until I became wakeful.]178 
 
At the close of The Diagram--Poems, then, reference to an Augustinian image of innate moral law 
corrupted under the influence of contemporary radicalism is combined with an intimation of Christian 
salvation. Despite the perceived failings of such radicalism, both European and Latin American, “hope” 
remains that “the face of innocence” may yet be retrievable from the damage it has been caused by our 
diagonal “slant” into harmful depredation and catastrophic violence. 
 The ‘The Diagonal is Diagonal’ refers to the Uruguayan state’s systemic torture of captured 
Tupamaros, widely reported at the time, which “our foreign nations” had no interest in abating; but this 
violence is itself the result of the Tupamaros’ own version of political violence in which consists their 
original fall from “grace,” a fall in which “we” are implicated but one that “we” might yet “hope” to 
reverse, even if the guerrillas cannot. Here is The Diagram--Poems’ most urgent expression of the book’s 
central dialectic: 
 
[...] the poetry won’t move from it 
that innocent point exactly neighbour to that other start 
from which team leader became a finger pointing left, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
O’Hara, whose use of this word in many poems, including the oft-cited ‘In Memory of my Feelings’ and ‘For 
Grace, After a Party,’ pun on the name of O’Hara’s close friend, the painter Grace Hartigan. 
177 Langland, Piers Plowman, p.362. 
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that’s audience left: for the teams 
the old sinister direction was, from the beginning, 
the cemetery.179 
 
However proximate in ideals and utopian desires to the innocent pacifism of the human condition 
exemplified by Tom and his voice of “spoken kindness,” revolutionary left activism is bound “from the 
beginning” to end in violent failure. The etymology of “sinister,” from the Latin “sinister,” is “left.”180 
The revolutionary left is, in fact, closer than any other political faction to the “innocent point,” because it 
is “exactly neighbour to [it].” But a diagram drawn from a starting point whose “origin[s]” are “rotten,” 
however “nearly straight,” can never be “straight” enough. Here is one central paradox of Oliver’s most 
pressing antagonism with, yet consistent return to, radical politics: the egalitarian ideals exemplified by 
the Tupamaros are hamstrung for Oliver by the methods used to attempt to realise these ideals. Their 
methods are doomed to fail. I explore this argument in more detail below. For now we must attend to 
origins of a different kind. 
 
2.3b – Rousseau 
 
Sometimes in Oliver’s work the expression of a latent universal connection between human beings is 
determined by a more materialist agenda, one perhaps more akin to Ludwig Feuerbach’s (and later the 
young Marx’s) concept of “species-being,” than it is to any mystical holism. In Three Variations on the 
Theme of Harm (1990) Oliver published a poem which explicitly differentiates between a colloquial, 
artificial or inauthentic “kindness” on the one hand, and an essentially natural “kind” on the other. Here is 
the poem in its entirety: 
 
For Kind 
 
Kindness acts idly or unnaturally, 
leads you into fear. Act in kind. 
Kindness makes you idle, worse, unnatural. 
Don’t be afraid of the darkness of kind; 
for it’s the birth darkness, vertical twist 
of opening lips in the night: life that follows 
belongs to you in kind. Don’t be frightened 
of darkness of origin: it is this darkness, 
similar tints of our flesh in the night 
of kind. The kind you are, with slim 
mammalian chest and, walking to the bathroom, 
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hip-swag: how naturally your walk sways 
in kind. You are humankind, 
my kind, kind to me, born well and gentle. 
We believe in kind: 
birth, origin, descent, nature, 
sex, upbringing, race, our natural property, 
so many things we naturally have 
and have no need to struggle for 
merely out of kindness to each other, or, 
worse, to struggle for unnaturally.181 
 
This poem represents in Oliver’s oeuvre a manifesto of the underlying concerns and arguments of the 
major works. “Kindness” in the poem is not the “spoken kindness” of The Diagram--Poems, but a 
deceptive cliché which operates “idly or unnaturally.” The “spoken kindness” of The Diagram--Poems 
should be read in comparison to the “kind” of “our natural property” which in ‘For Kind’ we “have no 
need to struggle for[.]” We have no need to struggle for it because it is already ours. ‘For Kind’ was 
published only three years after the publication in Kind (1987) of the last full set of Diagram--Poems. In 
The Diagram--Poems the Tupamaros, by contrast, do not recognize “our natural property.” They 
implicitly defy what “[e]veryone knows” by struggling “unnaturally,” that is to say, by taking up arms 
and engaging in “revolutionary flamboyance.”  
 The poem’s emphasis on “birth, origin, sex” and “nature” brings us to Rousseau, whose 
Discourses provide a model of natural innocence equally applicable to the universalist concerns of 
Oliver’s work as Langland’s kynde. Oliver read Rousseau, and about Rousseau, in the 1970s. In 1970 
Oliver wrote to Peter Riley that The Harmless Building began “as a (much-changed) project [...] to write a 
Rousseauist confession”; some years later Oliver recommended to Riley Jean Starobinski’s critical 
biography, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, La Transparence et L’Obstacle.182 Read through Starobinski or in the 
original, some important points of contact between Rousseau’s thought and Oliver’s poetic project may 
be discerned.  
 Rousseau’s description in the First Discourse of originally blissful ignorance destroyed by the 
moral corruption concomitant with the evolution of the arts and sciences is a paradigmatic narrative of 
harmonious, innocent unity wrecked by prideful intellect. It is a narrative that re-appears in all of Oliver’s 
political works save perhaps the late collection A Salvo for Africa. But the similarity between the two 
writers extends beyond an adherence to a general structure of a lost moral paradise. We have already seen 
that certain kinds of knowledge in Oliver’s writing are often descried as a kind of posturing radicalese 
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devoid of moral fortitude. This is how Cambridge and Parisian student radicals in the 1960s and the 
Tupamaros, as well as the 1871 Communards, are treated in his poetry and prose. In contradistinction to 
these attitudes, Oliver valorises the “stupidity” and “near-harmlessness of a mongol baby” in order to 
appreciate the pacifistic unity from which any “true politics” must begin. In Rousseau, we find a pertinent 
historical antecedent for such thinking. “Ever since the learned have begun to appear among us,” 
Rousseau repeatedly emphasises, “good Men have been in eclipse.”183 Ignorance, happiness and moral 
virtue are all of a piece in the first Discourse, which laments the sordid vacuity of the “senseless 
education” in which “young people are brought up at great expense to learn everything except their 
duties.”184 Better by far, writes Rousseau, to abjure the “dangerous reveries of such men as Hobbes and 
Spinoza” in favour of the recognition of “ignorance, innocence, and poverty, the only goods that can 
make for our happiness[.]”185 
 In Oliver, the “learned” are often depicted as the bearers of false appearances; recall the sneering 
Cambridge student radicals who “had a mouthful of democracy” but lacked “a democratic tone” and who 
made such a lasting impression on the young poet. The Tupamaros too are stuffed with “flamboyance” 
and theatrical pomposity, as they “[spring] on to the cash desk” in a bank raid. The guerrillas “[lack] the 
one innocence” as much as “we” do, and as a result are literally “driven [...] into falseness at funerals,” a 
reference to the funeral cortège the Tupamaros used to disguise themselves as they made their way into 
the town of Pando, as well as to the wrong-headedness of their plan in the first place. The Enlightenment 
injunction to unveil and rectify false appearances is one Starobinski understands Rousseau to have 
dictated to society at large in the Discourses, and wrestled with inside the confessional scene of his own 
“inner drama” in the Confessions.186 In his account of the historical emotional coordinates of Rousseau’s 
political writings, comparing moments in the Confessions and the Discourses, Starobinski describes how 
Rousseau 
 
learns that inner certainty of innocence is powerless against apparent proofs 
of guilt. He discovers that minds are separate from one another and that we 
cannot communicate the immediate evidence of inward conviction. From that 
moment paradise is lost, for paradise was the state of transparent 
communication between mind and mind, the conviction that total, reliable 
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communication is possible.187 
 
Separation of minds is inseparable from the loss of innocence that accompanies the victory of false 
appearances over the truth of inner conviction and moral “certainty.”  
 The coincidence of a loss of innocence with a sundering of the “paradise” of “total, reliable 
communication” is, as we have seen, proximal to Oliver’s own thinking in the 1970s. “[T]otal, reliable 
communication” occurs between the poet-author and the reader when the reader articulates poetical music 
in a manner that is “capable of making reborn in them something approaching the original writing 
process.”188 Starobinksi goes on to elucidate Rousseau’s nostalgia in terms that must have seemed 
strikingly familiar to Oliver: 
 
The evil of false appearances and the separation of consciousness from 
consciousness put an end to the blissful unity of childhood. Henceforth unity 
is something that must be recovered or rediscovered. Individuals, separated 
one from another, must achieve reconciliation.189 
 
The narrator of The Harmless Building and the poet-speakers of The Diagram--Poems and The Infant and 
the Pearl are reminded of the “blissful unity of childhood” by Tom throughout both works. Tom was 
incapable of “hid[ing] [his] inadequacy through display, which is what the rest of all do the whole damn 
time”; he is therefore the epitome of the type of human being who Rousseau famously describes as one 
whose “outward countenance [is] always the image of [his] heart’s dispositions.”190  
 Early on in the first Discourse, Rousseau contrasts the moral corruption of the nations of the 
earth with “the morals of the small number of Peoples who, protected against this contamination of vain 
knowledge, have by their virtues wrought their own happiness.”191 For Oliver, “vain knowledge” is the 
enemy of “beneficial balance.” The Tupamaros’ slanted fall from “grace” is indicative of the prideful 
human condition now wedded to the mutually antagonistic deployment of knowledge against knowledge 
in the service of two equally harmful exercises of power: dictatorships on the one hand, “revolutionary 
flamboyance” on the other. The Infant and the Pearl, as we shall see, develops this equivalence in its 
denunciation of what it refers to as “rent-a-Marx” and “Margaret [Thatcher] rhetoric.” In The Infant and 
the Pearl, as in The Diagram--Poems, Oliver’s Tom harks back to Rousseau’s polemical speculative 
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purity of the childhood of mankind in the form of an image of infantine, harmless goodwill. There is a 
direct precedent in Rousseau for the insistence on harmlessness as part and parcel of our “natural 
property”; witness the “revulsion at inflicting or even witnessing hurt” that Rousseau expresses in the 
second Discourse as the “natural repugnance to seeing any sentient Being, and especially any being like 
ourselves, perish or suffer” that stems from our innate sense of “self-preservation.”192 The “state of 
Nature” teaches us this, since it is  
 
the state in which the care for our own preservation is least prejudicial to the 
self-preservation of others [and is therefore the state] most conducive to 
Peace and the best suited to Mankind.193 
 
It is Tom that is the cause for “hope” that “grace and courage arrive calmly in us,” just as Rousseau’s 
distinction between “a lost nature and a hidden nature,” in Starobinski’s words, serves to retain the latter 
in the midst of lamentation for the former; our essential good nature  
 
takes refuge in the depths of our being [...] forgotten but not really lost, and 
[...] we can snatch away the veils and recover the hidden nature that has 
remained present and alive within our bosom.194 
 
Oliver’s ‘For Kind’ is a catalogue of the qualities of this very “hidden nature” that remain in “our” 
inalienable possession: “my kind, kind to me, born well and gentle [...] birth, origin, descent, nature, / sex, 
upbringing, race, our natural property[.]” The Diagram--Poems are less explicit about the “hidden nature” 
of man than can trump the “lost nature” that accompanies our inexorable decline. But they nevertheless 
adhere to the same underlying paradigm. Despite being “driven into this foreign time” we “know” the 
“voice of spoken kindness” as our own; “I don’t need to tell you but I do, softly” implores the poet-
speaker at the end of ‘U’: “that I am my children[.]” For Rousseau the return to the natural benevolence 
of savage moral innocence is an historical impossibility.195 But for Oliver the recognition and thus the 
reproduction of our innate connaturality remains not just a possibility, but a singular and pressing 
imperative. 
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2.4 – “the factual basis for these events”: The Diagram--Poems and the suspension of politics 
 
The Diagram--Poems combine material adapted from Oliver’s reading about a guerrilla raid on the 
Uruguayan town of Pando, then approximately twenty miles northeast of the capital Montevideo, on 8th 
October 1969, with autobiographical reminiscence and political and moral argumentation.196 The poems 
exhibit a fascination with extreme left-wing anti-capitalism, a fascination matched only by an 
impassioned moral critique of (what Oliver interprets as) such radicalism’s intellectual, ideological and 
methodological failings. This approach is developed in Oliver’s subsequent publications. The poems 
begin to make an argument that is made, cumulatively, across The Diagram--Poems, The Infant and the 
Pearl and Penniless Politics. This argument is that no political solution to the world’s ills is possible 
without a fundamental shift in the human understanding of, and in the sympathetic feeling for the social 
relations immanent to, politics itself. The Diagram--Poems begin to make this argument by attempting to 
establish that revolutionary political radicalism, although justified in its opposition to the world it refuses 
to accept, is doomed to failure. It is doomed to failure because it does not acknowledge, take into account 
or act upon the underlying connection between human beings. It therefore obscures and severs that 
connection. All of Oliver’s major political poems imply that poetry, the very poetry that you are reading 
as the implication is made, can help us to recognize and act upon this connection in a way that 
contemporary politics (of whatever stripe) simply cannot. Politics must be suspended so that the blueprint 
for an as yet unrealised “authentic politics” might become as legible as the diagrams (and diagrammatic 
thinking) that currently obscure it. 
 The revolutionaries Oliver read about before and during the composition of The Diagram--
Poems were members of the Uruguayan Marxist-Leninist organisation the Movimiento de Liberación 
Nacional (Tupamaros) or MLN-T, commonly known then, as now, as the Tupamaros, active between 
1963 and 1974. Oliver first came across the actions of this group whilst working on the English desk of 
the French news agency Agence France-Presse in Paris in 1970, as he relates in ‘Night Shift’: 
 
We used to get their [the Tupamaros’] stories on the English Desk night shift 
at Agence France-Presse in Paris; they would be wired through by AFP’s 
local stringer, translated into French and English by the subs, and the next 
you knew the story would be sold on the streets of news-voracious Tokyo 
[...]197 
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The manner in which Oliver received information about the Tupamaros during his employment with AFP 
significantly affected the way in which The Diagram--Poems were composed. The poems incorporate 
into their narrative and thematic content descriptions of Oliver’s original encounters with his source 
material. ‘The Diagonal is the Diagonal’ contains the declaration: 
 
I now name these incidents 
so many years after 
they came to me at night in a busy newsroom.198 
 
The distance between the poet and the information he drew upon for his work, not just temporally (“many 
years after”) but conceptually, that is, the nature of the relationship between political poetry and politics, 
are major concerns of The Diagram--Poems. The poem ‘Central,’ for example, thematises both of these 
relations through the image-complex of a sabotaged telephone line. Information about the politics of a 
distant, foreign land and the interpretation of these events through the optic of a moral imperative 
provided by Oliver’s son Tom, are mediated through each other. The “guerrillas [...] cut the cables” which 
sever the connection to “Tom’s voice,” so that “the ear [which] hears with feeling” can hear no longer – 
the line is “cut dead.”199 When Tom’s voice, the vehicle of “spoken kindness,” cannot be heard, disunity 
and conflict, “creations of total emergency,” ensue.200 It is therefore incumbent upon us to listen to this 
voice – it is what “we,” the plural pronoun explicitly invoked in the later poem ‘U,’ “should” do.201 
 Before we explore this imperative further, as it is expressed through descriptions of the 
Tupamaros’ actions and their reception by the poet, it is important to note that the account of Oliver’s 
reception of reports about the events construed in the poems referred to in the quotation from ‘The 
Diagonal is the Diagonal,’ above, is potentially fictional. Oliver was not working at AFP at the time of 
Operation Pando, but living in Cambridge with Janet and their children. If by “these incidents [...] came 
to me at night in a busy newsroom” Oliver means that he was working at AFP when Operation Pando 
occurred, then the line is a fiction, since he was not; if, however, he is referring to reports about Uruguay 
that he read whilst working at AFP and that informed the poems, it is not.202 In either case, his principal 
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source of information about the raid is the Tupamaros’ own published account of the events of October 
8th 1969. This account forms part of the book Actas Tupamaros, published in Buenos Aires in 1971.203  
 Oliver read the French translation of this book, Nous les Tupamaros, when it was published in 
Paris by François Maspero later the same year.204 Each of the eight poems in The Diagram--Poems, both 
diagram and text, describes, analyses, embellishes and draws conclusions from one of the situations 
recounted in chapter fifteen (on Operation Pando) of Nous les Tupamaros.205 This Operation was planned 
as a lightning raid on the small town of Pando, the immediate objectives being the distribution and 
creation of propaganda for the MLN-T, the requisition of arms and money, and a celebratory birthday 
homage to the Argentine revolutionary Che Guevara. More generally, the raid was designed as a 
demonstration to the Uruguayan state of the power of the movement itself, which the guerrillas hoped 
would inspire increased support and collaboration amongst the Uruguayan people, many of whom already 
either tacitly or openly supported them.206 In the 1987 Kind edition of the poems, the introductory prose 
text that precedes the text of each poem is almost always composed of a combination of unreferenced 
direct translation from Nous les Tupamaros and a paraphrase of information gleaned from the same 
source. Occasionally, as in ‘Team Leader’ and ‘The Diagonal is Diagonal,’ the headings contain 
additional original reflection. The diagrams and poem-texts map the guerrillas’ movements by following 
the descriptions of each separate sub-operation mentioned in Nous les Tupamaros. The sequence of 
poems in The Diagram--Poems follows exactly the order in which these sub-operations are described in 
Nous les Tupamaros, where they are lettered “c)” to “i)”: ‘P.C.’ draws on “c) Commissariat,” ‘The Fire 
Station’ on “d) Caserne de pompiers,” ‘Central’ on “e) Centrale téléphonique de l’U.T.E.,” and so on.207 
The first and last poems, ‘Team Leader’ and ‘The Diagonal is Diagonal,’ draw on material either side of 
these sections. 
 The radicalism of the Tupamaros, who advocated and practised armed struggle against the 
Uruguayan state based in part on the inheritance of the Cuban model of revolutionary praxis, the so-called 
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foco method of guerrilla insurrection, is admired, and, to a certain extent, celebrated in The Diagram--
Poems for what they characterise as the “courage” and “urgency” of the guerillas’ heroic “escapades.”208 
But the Tupamaros’ militarism is vociferously rejected in the poems, their (and its) failure regarded as 
inevitable, and the guerrillas’ “high rhetoric” and “flamboyance” admonished in favour of the “beneficial 
balance” between “mildness” or “innocence” and “stern wisdom,” both of which they lack.209 In The 
Diagram--Poems, a pacifistic democratic vista is depicted as the truly “authentic” ideal that transcends 
the merely spectacular antics of the militant revolutionaries. The crux of this line of thinking in The 
Diagram--Poems occurs in the poem ‘U,’ to which we now return: 
 
The lost child’s voice should speak softly but undyingly 
across a land silvery with democracy 
and glistening with wheat, trembling at the spoken kindness;210 
 
It “should,” but it does not: 
 
the voice should temper the muttering 
of bank clerks across the mica counters 
and ring in the money slipping from their fingers.211 
 
Again, it does not. During Operation Pando a total of three banks were targeted. These were the Bank of 
the Republic, Pan de Azucar bank, and Pando bank.212 In the Tupamaros’ own account of the raid on 
Pando bank, a number of bank clerks feature. The quoted lines from ‘U’ draw on the following anecdote 
in Nous les Tupamaros: 
 
Distrait, n’accordant pas la moindre attention à ce qui est étranger à sa 
discussion, [un] employé lève brusquement la tête, dit sans prendre en 
considération l’arme braquée sur lui : « Oui, attendez un petit moment » et se 
remet à discuter.213 
 
[Distracted and paying no attention to anything going on around him, an 
employee suddenly raises his head and says without acknowledging the gun 
pointed at him, “Yes, just a minute” before returning to his conversation.] 
 
The clerk’s “muttering” is not silenced or “temper[ed]” by “kindness,” the gentle, childish innocence that 
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would designate “international kinship” in action, but by the threat of violence: 
 
Tout aussi promptement que lors de sa première réaction, il [l’employé] se 
réveille brusquement à la réalité, comprend qu’il s’agit d’une attaque à main 
armée et lève les bras.214 
 
[As suddenly as his first reaction, he [the employer] abruptly wakes up to 
reality, understands that this is an attack, and raises his arms.] 
 
Or, as ‘U’ re-works its source material, the clerk ceases his “muttering” when confronted by “a man with 
a light machine gun.”215 
 In ‘U’ “the forces of life are few and precious”; they are “commandeered by the banking 
magnates, by the magnet of their will.”216 Money is represented in the poem as the agent of “iron law” 
and capitalist exploitation; yet Oliver does not therefore condone the revolutionary ideology of the 
Tupamaros.217 He claims in the prose introduction that 
 
[o]nly a fool, while ill-informed, supports anyone else’s violence; so political 
judgment [in The Diagram--Poems] was suspended: it was held at a distance 
by a screen of words.218 
 
It is important to note that Oliver’s position here is divorced from any partisan critique of the Tupamaros’ 
actions: it is not a critique of revolutionary violence that begins from, say, a Marxist standpoint, but one 
whose stated aim is the discovery of a “beneficial balance” that would support “an authentic politics.” In 
order to constitute the “land silvery with democracy” represented in this poem by the compassion of a 
“child’s [...] spoken kindness,” both political judgement and political radicalism need to be “suspended.” 
This suspension is highly reminiscent, and perhaps deliberately evocative, of the phenomenological 
“bracketing” so essential to the Husserlian method whose influence on Oliver’s poetics we examined in 
the previous chapter. Furthermore, as the universal conditions for human experience which Husserl’s 
transcendental subjectivity reveals through the process of suspension are authenticated by appeal to the 
method of prima philosophia and the “pure [...] universal” of the eidos, so Oliver’s poems determine the 
general possibility of an “authentic politics” by assertion of the very nature of this politics as universal, 
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common knowledge.219 The poem ‘U’, referring to the “land silvery with democracy” that “should” echo 
with the sound of “spoken kindness,” continues, as we have already seen: 
   
We know this. Everyone. But we let the voice break in our throats 
the laughs, little distinguished from coughs, 
echo discreetly across stone floors; 
softness unheard; 
until a man with a light machine gun this day 
springs on to the cash desk and, astride there, 
we know this, waves the muzzle where all the arrows 
of acquisition, law and management have come and gone.220 
 
The “know” of “we know this” refers to the same natural, intuitive, sympathetic, mutual understanding 
that “stupidity” reveals in The Harmless Building. To reiterate: to “know” “this” one thing does not 
preclude our being sympathetically and harmlessly “stupid.” Knowledge is in fact, in this sense, very 
much akin to “stupidity,” and “stupidity” needs to be “joined with an energetic and mature cleverness” to 
be a “force for good.” What we innately “know” is that a “land silvery with democracy” “should” exist, 
since its capacity to exist is contingent upon the recognition of our “international kinship.” We “know” 
that this unity is not just possible, but essential; it “should” be the case. But it fails to be the case. 
 “We know this. Everyone” is the kind of “moment” in Oliver’s own poetry that he theorises with 
regard to Chaucer in the early essays, such that it assumes “responsibility for the whole poem during this 
brief instant.”221 The line dramatizes at the level of the sentence the common bond that Oliver’s theory of 
prosody labours to elucidate.222 But it dramatizes such a bond in crisis. In the sentence “We know this” 
we find Oliver stating as simply as he possibly could the inescapable reality of a truth the consequences 
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every, one of those things. The emergent clarity of sense impression registered by the opening lines confirms for 
the speaker the indisputability of what is “understood,” which is then not explained as such but re-confirmed by 
the repeated assertions of understanding, such as the doubled “and I got it” at the beginning of two adjacent lines. 
That which is clarified in sense impression remains unexplained precisely because, as ‘U’ will go on to tell us, we 
already know it. In ‘Central,’ then, the assertion of what the lyric speaker “slowly understood” is resolved by 
subtraction (of what it is he understood) into the emphatic confirmation of subjectivity itself. The “I” in these 
lines becomes, by the second “I got it,” transcendental reflection upon the truth of our subjective capacity to 
understand. See K, p.113. 
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of which we nonetheless fail to act upon. The manifest content of the statement is made powerfully 
emphatic by the imputation of incontestable simplicity. “We know this” is also the most emphatically 
basic indictment in Oliver’s poetic vocabulary of capitalist greed and “flamboyant” insurgency alike. 
Both are admonished by the assertion that “the hierarchies of [the] laws” of “banking magnates” and 
“managers” “should” be imaginatively transformed, “temper[ed],” into a scene in which those “laws” are 
laterally reconstituted “across a land silvery with democracy,” but will certainly not be so transformed by 
“a man with a light machine gun.” His failure is intrinsic to his actions, which, like those of his comrades, 
are, as the final poem in the sequence puts it, “rotten in origin.”223 Despite Oliver’s rejection in his early 
essays of the concept of apodicticity as relevant or useful to the poet’s creative dynamic, the attitude 
struck here is one which rests precisely on the rejection of doubt as a requisite condition of the appeal to a 
universal subject: “We know this. Everyone.” The “hierarchies of [...] laws” should not be abolished, 
destroyed or otherwise violently upended. The sound of the “child’s voice” should “ring in the money 
slipping from the [bank clerks’ fingers].” The re-inscription of monetary value into utopian democracy 
which the adjective “silvery” retains is not accidental. The vision of harmony here is one in which 
“kindness,” in all its harmless warmth and tenderness, is superadded to the world as it exists: “kindness” 
literally “rings” in the same object of social exchange, “money,” that is metonymic of the social order 
predicated upon its accumulation in the form of capital. It also “ring[s] in” that money in the sense of 
accumulating it for the right purpose, i.e., the establishment of “a land silvery with democracy,” rather 
than to the sole advantage of the “banking magnates.” What “we know” is that capitalism is not capable 
of rendering “the hierarchies of [these] laws” benign and utilitarian; what “we” further “know” is that by 
attempting to abolish these hierarchies through armed struggle, violent revolutionary praxis betrays the 
democratic ideal by the use of force, because force inevitably results in “carelessness, and showdowns, 
and innocent bystanders / left to bleed.”224 
 The Diagram--Poems do not exactly lament the existence of groups like the Tupamaros. They 
acknowledge the movement’s cause as just and the impetus for their actions courageous. What Oliver’s 
poems lament is the fact that groups like the Tupamaros need to take up arms in the first place. They 
lament this state of affairs by lamenting the fact that the world is not already a “land silvery with 
democracy”; after all, it “should be,” and “we know this.” Why is it not so? The answer is that we refuse 
                                                            
223 K, p.125. 
224 Ibid., p.122. 
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it; we allow it not to be the case.225 It is “our” fault the world is not like “this”: “we let the voice break in 
our throats.” In other words, we deliberately ignore that which we all already know, and, less complicitly, 
we age (the voice “break[s],”), losing touch with the innocent childhood of our moral, harmless and 
sympathetic connection to others. Furthermore, we have “let the voice break” for so long, specifically 
“until” a point in time, riven with political turmoil, when “a man with a light machine gun this day / 
springs on to the cash desk[.]” The voice breaking as a metonym for ageing relies, of course, on a male 
referent; another “man” then “springs on to the cash desk.” Both these men do something wrong, and they 
are exemplary in their wrongness. The failure to institute the kind of “identity between self and Other” 
that would provide the “perfect” conditions for universal “kindness” is our failure to recognize the truth 
of our humanity in “international kinship.”  
 Our failure is reflected in the failure of the Tupamaros. But the former is also potentially 
redeemed by the latter. 
 
Softness unheard; 
until a man with a light machine gun this day 
 
The grammatical ambiguity of “until” and the reflexive caesura produced by the semi-colon suggest that 
these lines indicate two possible temporal cruxes simultaneously. Narratively and chronologically the 
lines describe the result of a situation in which “softness” becomes unheard; the result of this inaudibility 
is armed, dangerous and “flamboyant” insurrection; a man with a gun “springs on to the cash desk.” But 
prosodically the lines re-assert the possibility of hearing “softness,” and therefore the audibility of 
“spoken kindness,” at the very heart of armed revolutionary praxis. The semi-colon followed by blank 
space and a line break creates a prosodic icon for the present but inaudible. The “softness” of “spoken 
kindness” is “unheard” “until” the violence of Operation Pando is in full swing. It is “unheard” “until” the 
moment at which it is most nearly abolished. “[S]poken kindness” is most pressingly reactivated at the 
very instant of its destruction. At its most recklessly violent, Operation Pando provides a glimpse of the 
“softness” that the guerrillas must ignore in order to carry out their plans. The pacifistic imperative is thus 
inscribed here, at the very point at which the Tupamaros’ actions describe most eloquently their violent 
doom. 
                                                            
225 There is a connection here to the monumental insistence in the early poetry of J.H. Prynne of the possibility of 
our owning up to the Wordsworthian universal fraternity which we essentially are, and the fact of our brute 
refusal of such a condition which has for so long kept us in the dark: “And we are ready for this, the array is there 
in / the figure we name brother, the / fortune we wish for, devoutly, as the dip / turns us to the face we have / so 
long ignored; so fervently refused.” (‘In Cimmerian Darkness’). See Prynne, Poems, p.75. 
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 The poem ‘U’ ends: 
 
I don’t need to tell you but I do, softly, 
that I am my children; 
in me their voice breaks with the ear knowledge.226 
 
What the Tupamaros fail to hear through their obnoxious “laughs” and their arrogant aggression, the 
poem’s speaker understands. It is “Tom’s voice” amongst “[his] children” that “breaks with the ear 
knowledge,” providing the poem’s speaker with the means to comprehend the guerrillas’ failure. 
Throughout the poems, the ear and hearing are symbols for the ability to correctly perceive suffering.227 
In ‘Arrest,’ the “ear” is “[d]amaged [...] so badly that we fail to hear sufficiently / of the true loss” in 
which Operation Pando results.228 In ‘U,’ Tom’s voice of “spoken kindness” teaches the poet-speaker 
otherwise. It “breaks with the ear knowledge” such that the pressure of “ear knowledge” is the very thing 
that “breaks” the “voice,” deepening and maturing it. “[E]ar knowledge” is deeper, and more profound 
than cognitive knowledge. “[E]ar knowledge” enables one to hear and to listen to “spoken kindness.” It is 
the natural understanding that engenders harmless sympathetic unity with other people. The speaker does 
not even “need to tell you” that “I am my children,” that is, that he and they are “united at that primitive 
level of thought,” since “you,” being the reader of this poem, already “know.” The poem designates 
“you” as the subject that does not need to be told this, but is nevertheless told: “I don’t need to tell you 
but I do.”229 What we already “know,” that armed insurrection is a flawed political and ethical act because 
it does not recognize the connective bond of “spoken kindness,” is hereby confirmed. The Tupamaros, 
with their “carelessness, and showdowns,” are deaf to “kindness.” Yet all are complicit: in Uruguay, “the 
voice breaks unheard” by the banks, the guerrillas and the police alike.230  
 Oliver’s rejection of revolutionary violence, whether in The Diagram--Poems, or twenty years 
later in his critique of the Paris Commune in Whisper ‘Louise’, is based in the pragmatic refusal of 
perceived idealism. The Commune, Oliver writes in the last chapter of his combined autobiography and 
                                                            
226 K, p.122. 
227 See also Carol Watts, ‘Piercing the Screen of Words: Reflections on the Political Poetics of Douglas Oliver,’ 
Discourse, Vol. 27, Nos. 2 & 3 (Spring & Fall, 2005), pp.198-214 (210): “The dynamics of [The Diagram--
Poems] are [...] acoustical, their drama about what it means to hear the soft voice of the child (both future, and yet 
past) coming across the wires, and also to refuse it.” 
228 K, p.116. 
229 Another connection to Prynne’s The White Stones, this time perhaps more directly referential, suggests itself; see 
the last five lines of his ‘Song in Sight of the World’ for the emphatic assertion of the need to communicate that 
which “you” already “know”: “The light will do all this, to / love is the last resort, you / must know, I will tell / 
you, this, love, is / the world.” Prynne, Poems, p.77. 
230 K, p.122. 
111 
biography of the anarchist Communard Louise Michel, was as doomed from the beginning of its 
existence as were the Tupamaros from the beginning of Operation Pando: “The Commune was a sham,” 
and it was a sham because 
 
[Louise] Michel and [Théophile] Ferré stand convicted of stoking up false 
hopes that Paris could stand alone and illegally against the rest of France. 
Thousands of working people died in service of their beliefs.231 
 
Against “false hopes” Oliver argues in The Diagram--Poems (and, effectively, in Whisper ‘Louise’) for 
the recognition of that which “we know” as the imperative towards a transformation not based in socio-
political engineering but in terms of individual comportment towards the deepening of intersubjective 
identity. In stark contrast to Communard optimism, the “hope” that “grace and courage arrive calmly in 
us” cannot be “false” because it requires nothing more (or less) than that we acknowledge something 
already implicit in our connaturality with others. 
 
2.5 – Harm, torture and the Tupamaros 
 
The account in The Diagram--Poems of suffering, and especially of torture, is a pertinent example of the 
way in which Oliver’s insistence on the priority of “harmlessness” has a profound effect on the status in 
his poetry of any politics accused of engendering physical and psychological violence. Oliver is disgusted 
by torture. In ‘The Diagonal is Diagonal,’ he refers to the account in Nous les Tupamaros of the aftermath 
of Operation Pando in the following terms: 
 
Almost in humility and loathing I kneel 
at the feet of the next account 
which is of bestiality and sadism 
so mucky it makes the scalp creep.232 
 
Operation Pando ended with the death of three guerillas and the capture of a further eighteen. Most, if not 
all of the prisoners, were brutally tortured on the journey back to Montevideo and upon arrival at the 
capital’s police headquarters.233 The “account” to which this passage in ‘The Diagonal is Diagonal’ refers 
                                                            
231 WL, p.415. 
232 Ibid., p.124. 
233 See NLT, pp.128-131; accounts of the torture of the men and women arrested during or after Operation Pando are 
widespread. A selection of the testimonies of numerous victims of torture were collected in the immediate 
aftermath of Operation Pando in the publication Uruguay: torturas 70 (Montevideo: Ediciones Grito de Asencio, 
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is the section of Nous les Tupamaros headed ‘Une meute sanguinaire’; the following excerpt is in 
particular the source for Oliver’s use of the terms “bestiality” and “sadism”: 
 
Deux des camarades capturés furent blessés par balle et tous les autres le 
furent par les mauvais traitements que leur infligea la police. On pourrait en 
dire long sur le comportement des forces de répression et en particulier sur 
celui de la Garde Métropolitaine ; sur la férocité, la cruauté et le sadisme de 
centaines d’hommes devenus des fauves, à la différence près que les animaux 
ne tuent que pour se nourrir ou se défendre.234 
 
[Two captured comrades were injured by bullets and all the others by the 
abuse inflicted upon them by the police. One could speak at length about the 
behaviour of the forces of repression and in particular about that of the 
Metropolitan Guard; about the ferocity, the cruelty and the sadism of 
hundreds of men become savages, scarcely different from animals who kill 
only to feed or defend themselves.] 
 
The torture of political prisoners was well-known and widely publicised in the aftermath of Operation 
Pando. In the late 1970s, when The Diagram--Poems were nearing the completion of their first full 
sequence, Uruguay was virtually synonymous in the international press with human rights abuses, having 
by 1977 been dubbed “the torture chamber of Latin America.”235 What the Tupamaros refer to as the 
ferocity, cruelty and sadism [la férocité, la cruauté et le sadisme] of the torturers’ preferred methods is 
well-documented.236  
 Oliver’s reaction to this treatment is telling. The “bestiality and sadism” described in the account 
which he read and which is re-presented in ‘The Diagonal is Diagonal’ in the language of the account 
itself is “so mucky it makes the scalp creep.” Immediately following these lines the poet-speaker 
characterises torture as an example of the “swift cruelty” in “the heart” of which he is nonetheless able to 
find “innocence,” before comparing the “innocent point” of the origins of imagined harmlessness with the 
“that other start / from which team leader became a finger pointing left,” that is, “the old sinister 
direction” which the Tupamaros left-wing idealism sent them down in the first place, retrospectively 
                                                                                                                                                                              
1970). Some of the guerrillas’ own recollections of their horrific abuse after Operation Pando, made in interview 
with the dissident journalist Maria Esther Gilio, can be found in her The Tupamaros (originally published in 
Spanish in 1970), pp.141-172; see also Labrousse, The Tupamaros (originally published in French in 1970), 
pp.76-78, which draws on Gilio’s journalism and Uruguay: torturas 70; Carlos Nuñez, The Tupamaros, pp.47-48, 
and Wilson, The Tupamaros, p.53. For descriptions of the widespread use of torture in more recent non-partisan 
accounts, see Peter Waldman, ‘How Terrorism Ceases: The Tupamaros in Uruguay,’ Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, Vol. 34, No. 9 (2011), pp.717-731 (728), and Lindsay Blake Churchill, ‘Imagining the Tupamaros: 
Resistance and Gender in Uruguayan and U.S. Revolutionary Movements, 1960s-1980s,’ unpublished PhD thesis 
(Florida State University, 2010). Churchill emphasises the “gendered characteristic” of torture techniques used 
against female Tupamaro prisoners (p.129). 
234 NLT, p.129. 
235 The phrase is the U.S. Senator’s Frank Church, quoted in Andrew Tarnowski’s’ article in The Times of Tuesday, 
February 8th 1977, ‘Nobody is smiling in Uruguay, the ‘torture chamber of Latin America.’’ 
236 See especially Gilio, The Tupamaros, pp.141-172. 
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confirming their “origin[s]” as “rotten.” Oliver is disgusted by torture because it is an extreme example of 
the operation of harm in general, harm which the Tupamaros, by their actions, have also caused, and 
therefore which in no small sense they have brought upon themselves. 
 This kind of response, founded in revulsion at the “[v]icious events” themselves, as the 
introductory prose to ‘The Diagonal is Diagonal’ summarises them, is not an isolated response in Oliver’s 
work, but has its roots in his thinking about “harm” more generally.237 From his earliest work onwards 
Oliver is keen to stress his own antipathy towards the depiction of “cruelty” and those complicit in cruel 
actions or events, especially those that have as their intended object the infliction of physical pain. In The 
Harmless Building one of Oliver’s autobiographical avatars, Donald, walks out of a “war film” during a 
depiction of torture, overcome by the scene: 
 
In the evening [Donald] went out alone to see his second war film that week. 
The director’s cruelty of intention unsettled him. An airman, captured by the 
Germans, was allowed to see through a chink in his cell wall a neighbour 
being beaten with metal-tipped whips. When the airman himself was given 
electric shocks, the pain pulled his strapped body nearly upright, like sitting 
up in bed. At that Donald left the cinema.238 
 
We know this account is based in biography because Oliver recalled his cinema walk-outs again 
seventeen years later in the autobiographical prose/poetry collection ‘An Island That Is All The World.’ 
There Oliver describes the same event, and others like it, in the emotional context of the stress he 
experienced before the birth of his first daughter. In order to do justice to the traumatic intensity this 
episode clearly engendered in him at the time, Oliver needs recourse to a literary analogy: 
 
I suffered a radical attack from Poe’s Imp of the Perverse: the thought that, 
while you’ve always been good there’s nothing to stop you turning crazed 
and murderous at any moment.239 
 
And continues, 
 
I was interested and went to thriller movies to test my fears. Terrified at 
myself, I walked out of a German film with slab-like bodies and whippings, a 
film about a schizophrenic axe murderess, and The Hands of Orlac [...] Each 
walk-out came at a character’s moment of personality change.240 
 
                                                            
237 K, p.124. 
238 THB, p.36. 
239 VTH, p.100. 
240 Ibid. 
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Oliver’s later revulsion at torture in Uruguay is in part based in this same fear. At the end of The 
Diagram--Poems, fear of causing harm to “innocent” others is combined with the assertion of a moral 
propriety which proscribes for Oliver the possibility either of expressing solidarity with the Tupamaros, 
of “justify[ing]” their “courage,” or of confessing to a geopolitical complicity in their torture by “ask[ing] 
the prisoners to forgive / our foreign nations[.]” The necessity for this propriety derives from the fact that 
the Tupamaros, through their harmful “heroics,” have caused harm to “innocent bystanders.” Yet “our 
foreign nations” are no better, having failed to undertake any serious measures to intervene in the 
systematic torture of prisoners in distant lands – “asking forgiveness” of these “foreign prisoners” would 
therefore be an unpardonable insult to their pain and suffering. 
 Based on this logic of equivalence, it is the fact of the infliction of suffering per se, whether 
directly administered or indirectly sanctioned, that The Diagram--Poems finds anomalous. Contemplation 
of the infliction of suffering leads to its denunciation as quite literally incomprehensible: it makes “the 
scalp mucky,” muddying the clear waters of the untainted consciousness of harmless innocence, which 
“we know” innately to exert a fundamental moral law. The existence of torture is barbarically anomalous 
because it contravenes what has been established in the poems as a moral imperative against the infliction 
of harm; Oliver’s cinema walk-outs express the fear of his personal contravention of the imperative years 
earlier, should he suffer a “personality change” and turn “crazed and murderous.” The lines in ‘The 
Diagonal is Diagonal’: “the deaths of innocences we have known / and even caused a little in the scarface 
heart” return us to Tom, whose death Oliver would later explicitly describe feeling “shame” for not 
having prevented.241 The death of this paradigmatic innocent and the torture of the captured Tupamaros 
are part of the same problem. The problem is the paradoxical nature of the infliction of pain and suffering, 
what Elaine Scarry has called “the simple and absolute incompatibility of pain and the world.”242 
“[L]acking the one innocence,” that is to say, failing to recognize what “we know” to be our common 
humanity, we are “driven into [the] foreign time” of harmful neglect and poisonous abuse alike. All harm 
is “foreign” to our essential nature. 
 One problem with this line of thinking is that it ignores or deletes politics, ideology and agency 
from any given scene of torture. It does this, and it must do this, because as a moral and epistemological 
paradox torture becomes the expression of a failure to recognize a universal law the violation of which is 
                                                            
241 See WL, p.104: “The biggest moment of shame, evidently, was finding my son dead when I should earlier have 
gone to see why was crying. Let’s not go into that. Swallow the damage in, sores in the breath, have the courage 
to live newly. And don’t let sin by habit enter your nature, either.” 
242 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1985), p.51. 
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achieved through deliberate blindness to reality, rather than the ideologically motivated exercise of 
repressive power through a violent assertion of political agency.243 Scarry’s classic account of torture, 
which shares with Oliver’s many underlying assumptions, is similarly flawed. Its premise is that torture 
occurs in a scene in which the “basic moral reflex” of the torturer to the tortured subject’s pain has been 
prevented by the protagonists’ incarceration within a drama of blocked exchange.244 This incarceration is 
deliberate on behalf of the torturer but imposed upon the tortured. As Scarry writes, 
 
to allow the reality of the other’s suffering to enter [the torturer’s] own 
consciousness would immediately compel him to stop the torture [...] It is not 
merely that his power makes him blind [...] it is, instead, quite simply that his 
blindness, his willed amorality, is his power, or a large part of it.245 
 
Since the artifice of interrogation, dubbed “the question” by Scarry, accompanies the infliction of pain, 
 
[f]or the torturers, the sheer and simple fact of human agony is made 
invisible, and the moral fact of inflicting that agony is made neutral by the 
feigned urgency and significance of the question.246 
  
The torturer wilfully refuses the world he knows exists; he perversely allows it, and the humanity of the 
victim of torture, to become “invisible.” Like “human agony,” the world in which “human agony” occurs 
is a “sheer and simple fact” which he ignores.  
 The torturer can torture in Scarry’s account, and the guerrilla can inflict collateral harm on 
“innocent bystanders” in Oliver’s poems, because both acts are imputed by the authors to involve a 
fundamental misrecognition of the “incontestable legitimacy of another human being’s existence.”247 We 
                                                            
243 Oliver’s implicit interpretation and Scarry’s explicit account of torture should not be confused with the legal 
definition of the act, the current internationally agreed version of which can be found in Article 1 of the 1984 
United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: 
“Torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted 
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him 
for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing 
him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful 
sanctions.” Oliver and Scarry’s perspectives are therefore more fundamental and more universal than the 
definition of torture based in jurisprudence, since they are working with philosophical and moral absolutes that 
would not recognize the legitimacy of suffering “inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” Oliver and 
Scarry’s common flaw is not that their definition of torture is not comprehensive enough, but that in their very 
humanist universalism they obscure the reality of political motivation and ideological commitment to torture in 
the exercise of state, or any other, power. See: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx 
[accessed 03.02.2014]. 
244 Scarry, The Body in Pain, p.35. 
245 Ibid., p.57. Emphasis in original.  
246 Ibid., p.29. 
247 Ibid., p.37. 
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have seen this logic before in Oliver’s description of our refusal of what “we know” by letting the 
“child’s voice” of “spoken kindness” “break in our throats” in The Diagram--Poems’ ‘U.’ For Oliver, 
torture is inhuman, animal-like, “bestial.” The compassion for human life in Oliver’s poetry of the 1970s 
is the most passionate testimony to its extraordinary commitment to defining a moral imperative that must 
exculpate itself from the spectrum of political ideology – in the case of The Diagram--Poems, from the 
real interests of the Metropolitan Guard and their managers – in order to reflect upon the failure of 
humanism within the scene of politics itself. All politics is harmful when it fails to recognize the 
inviolability of all life. The refutation of harm, whether state sanctioned, insurrectionary or domestic and 
paternal, is thus, finally, absolute. 
 Oliver believed that Operation Pando was “the beginning of the end” for the Tupamaros.248 The 
final poem in The Diagram--Poems reads: 
 
The place of reassembly in the cemetery 
exactly is the cemetery 
prepared for the ashes of human conduct 
and the fires of human behaviour so rotten in origin 
[...]249 
 
According to the Tupamaros’ account, the guerrilla teams re-grouped after Operation Pando in a cemetery 
north of the town.250 Given the abuses that took place in the wake of Operation Pando, that the “place of 
reassembly” was “the cemetery” is accordingly made morbidly significant in The Diagram--Poems. The 
guerrillas, Oliver intimates in these lines, were always, in more ways than one, heading for the cemetery. 
It is their destiny. This argument begins in the very first poem of the sequence, ‘Team Leader.’ The 
diagram that accompanies the text of this poem depicts the movements of the guerrilla groups on their 
way into Pando from Montevideo. The two largest arrows in the diagram both lead to the word 
“Cemetery.”251 The poem’s italicised prose heading states: “Small boy, nearly hit en route to Pando, is 
                                                            
248 Oliver writes in the 1987 introduction: “Operation Pando was, in fact, the beginning of the end for [the 
Tupamaros].” (K, p.102). Histories of the group contradict this assertion, often locating the turning point in the 
fortunes of the organisation in the years 1970-1971. Fernando Lopez-Alves, for example, locates “a major turning 
point” for the group in the August 1970 abduction and subsequent execution of the American police advisor Dan 
Mitrione, a political kidnapping that “turned out to be fatal” for the Tupamaros, since it caused tensions within 
the group and led to the direct involvement of the armed forces in their repression. In Lopez-Alves’ view, 
however, the crushing blow came in 1971, with the resounding failure of “the so-called ‘Tatu’ plan” for rural-
based guerrilla warfare. See Fernando Lopez-Alves, ‘Political Crises, Strategic Choices, and Terrorism: The Rise 
and Fall of the Uruguayan Tupamaros,’ Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1989), pp.202-241 (228-
229, 231). Richard Gott refers to the year 1971 as the “high water mark of Tupamaro activities” in his afterword 
to Labrousse’s The Tupamaros. 
249 K, p.125. 
250 NLT, p.124: “i) Opération Pando-retour - Toutes les équipes sont arrivées au cimetière.” 
251 K, p.104. 
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called “imprudent”: with this word, all the following heroics begin to lose innocence.”252 This 
information is taken from Nous les Tupamaros: “A la sortie de Montevideo, [la voiture] évite à grand 
peine un petit garçon qui court imprudemment au milieu de la chaussée.”253 [“At the exit from 
Montevideo, the car only just manages to avoid a small boy who imprudently runs into the middle of the 
road.”] The text of the poem re-states the claim: the eponymous ‘Team Leader’ is “[a]lready bereaved of 
innocence and late.”254 Peter Robinson has pointed out that this bereavement is also Oliver’s own.255 Tom 
is thus invoked from the first line of the first poem of the sequence as both autobiographical referent and 
symbol of purity and innocence. The guerrillas are equally immediately deprived of “innocence” by their 
very actions, actions which instil a sense of such “heroic” arrogance they see fit to blame a small boy for 
the near-death experience that they ultimately caused him. 
 They also make jokes in bad taste. In the introductory prose to ‘The Fire Station,’ Oliver notes 
that “The Tupamaros’ account of capturing the firemen tries humour,” before quoting in his own English 
translation the following anecdote from Nous les Tupamaros: 
 
Le gros [homme] continue comme s’il n’avait rien entendu. Sans se troubler, 
il urine jusqu’à la dernière goutte et enfin se retourne. Il regarde Roli [un 
Tupamaro] qui le tient en joue, tout en le couvrant d’injures. Alors, sans 
paraître surpris le moins du monde, il lève paresseusement les bras, comme 
pour s’étirer... Quels hommes apathiques que les soldats du feu !256 
 
[Oliver’s translation is as follows, omitting from the paragraph the first 
sentence and the first word of the second: (The fat one continues as if he 
hadn’t heard anything. Unperturbed,) He pisses right down to the last drop 
and finally turns round. He regards Roli [a Tupamaro] who is holding him up 
with a gun and yelling insults. Then, without appearing in the least surprised, 
he lazily raises his arm, as if stretching. What apathetic men these firemen 
are!]257 
 
Oliver was apparently so struck by this last aside, which no doubt rung in his ears with the same 
arrogance as the recollection of the “petit garçon,” that he returns to admonish it in ‘The Diagonal is the 
Diagonal,’ which recalls “situations which don’t call for wit to be funny.”258 The last line of ‘Team 
Leader’ sums up the entire operation as “the thing [that] carries off awkwardly, with losses.”259 The 
“cemetery” is thus “prepared for the ashes of human conduct / and the fires of human behaviour [...] 
                                                            
252 Ibid., p.105. 
253 NLT, p.100.  
254 K, p.105.  
255 See Peter Robinson, ‘End of Harm: Douglas Oliver,’ PN Review 139 (Vol. 27, No. 5; May-June, 2001), pp.29-33. 
256 NLT, p.109. 
257 K, p.110. 
258 Ibid., p.126. 
259 Ibid., p.105. 
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rotten in origin” from the beginning. Why are the Tupamaros’ “origin[s]” “rotten”? The guerrillas’ 
“heroic” attitude stems from their assumption of knowledge about the correct way to combat injustice. 
They fail to recognize the truth of the “spoken kindness” which arises from the abandonment of such 
claims to knowledge. An essential “vanity,” as The Harmless Building characterises it, taints all such 
claims.260 By contrast, the “authentic politics” of “mildness” and “kindness” stem from the “stupidity,” 
“ignorance” and “innocence” that engenders pacifistic commonality when combined with “stern 
wisdom.” The Tupamaros have none of these attributes: they are full of casual vanity and reckless 
humour. They, like us, “[lack] the one innocence” that would give us, and them, access to the redemptive, 
unifying politics which the The Diagram--Poems name “authentic.”261 Our sympathetic originary pre-
disposition towards such a redemptive politics is revealed, ironically, by the vanity of political 
vanguardism, in theory as in practice; such is the value of “stupidity” as Oliver conceived it. 
 
2.6 – Conclusion 
 
In ‘The Diagonal is the Diagonal,’ “the old sinister direction was, from the beginning, / the cemetery.” 
This claim about “the old sinister direction” is a claim about the inevitable failure of left-wing 
radicalism.262 Oliver concludes the short pamphlet The Three Lilies, first written to accompany a reading 
of The Diagram--Poems, with the characterisation of his “political ideal” as one “in which the one-
sidedness of idealism itself may be figured, paradoxically, as transcended.”263 In the case of The 
Diagram--Poems, the “one-sidedness of idealism” refers to the Tupamaros’ militant anti-capitalism. It is 
“transcended” in the poems by the attempt to show that a world in which left-wing revolutionary violence 
is necessary to combat capitalist violence is the wrong world. What we arrive at when we make the effort 
to transcend this world is the shining “land silvery with democracy” that “spoken kindness” promises. It 
can promise it most pertinently, and most effectively, in poems. The Diagram--Poems articulate a 
specifically poetical moral obligation to subjective transformation. It articulates this obligation to an 
inclusive “we” that are the emblematic representation of the possibility of a “special intersubjectivity” 
because joined, as poet-author and reader, in the performance of a poem. A poem’s language provides the 
                                                            
260 THB, p.5 
261 K, p.126. 
262 Carol Watts notes: “If one movement of the Diagram Poems tracks a remorseless diagonal logic of violence, it 
follows a sinister direction, “fingers pointing leftward,” ending with arrows pointing to the cemetery and loss of 
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most powerful opportunity for glimpsing this unity as microcosm. 
 The Diagram--Poems represent Oliver’s first attempt to write a poetry of sustained political 
engagement overwhelmingly determined by moments, such as “we know this,” in which the entire gamut 
of political context on which the poems draw must finally be relegated to the truth of its inadequacy; such 
moments are recapitulated in The Infant and the Pearl’s “the union between / people,” equally opposed to 
Thatcherite economic policy as it is to trade union politics, and in Penniless Politics during a speech by 
the Hispanic character Dolores: “all solutions are false when the spirit is wrong: the biggest mistake / of 
our age is to think politics will cure our lives.”264 Politics will not cure our lives because unless the re-
definition of politics as “true” or “authentic” involves the ethical imperative denoted by intersubjective 
unity as a starting point it is doomed, like the Tupamaros, to failure. In The Diagram--Poems, the 
suspension of “political judgement” is really the suspension of politics, whether it be represented by 
“cash” or the “muzzle” of a “gun,” in favour of the wished-for “land silvery with democracy.” The 
suspension of currently existing politics allows the pre-political foundations which The Diagram--Poems, 
The Infant and the Pearl and Penniless Politics collectively articulate in their most precious moments of 
personal and political urgency to shine in the light shed by the promise of redemption, of which the 
“hope” that “grace and courage arrive calmly in us” is The Diagram--Poems’ final indication. 
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Chapter 3 
 
3.1 – Introduction 
 
The Infant and the Pearl was first published as a chapbook by Ferry Press for Silver Hounds in 1985. It 
was republished in its entirety two years later in Kind, excerpted (sections I, XVII and XVIII) for the 
anthology A Various Art in the same year, republished again in its entirety as part of Three Variations on 
the Theme of Harm and finally republished, again in its entirety, in Oliver’s Selected Poems. By contrast 
with the numerous revisions made over the course of various publications of The Diagram--Poems, no 
changes were made to the text of the The Infant and the Pearl between its first and its last publication. A 
dedication, “for Jan, Kate and Bonamy” always accompanies the poem. These people are Oliver’s first 
wife Janet Hughes and their two daughters. Oliver became estranged from his family, eventually 
separating from Janet, over the course of The Infant and the Pearl’s six-year period of composition; the 
dedication is perhaps nostalgic, potentially even eulogistic, and may possibly represent the loss of the 
family structure it names. Authorial material surrounding the poem differs slightly over the course of the 
poem’s publications. The 1985 Ferry Press chapbook contains an “Author’s Note” which is not 
reproduced in any subsequent edition, and the last published version of the poem is accompanied by 
original footnoted material by Oliver containing explanations and historical references designed to aid the 
American reader unfamiliar with the poem’s British political context. This context is the British political 
climate during the Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher between May 1979 and the time of 
the poem’s first publication in 1985. 
 The Infant and the Pearl was begun in Brightlingsea in 1979 and completed in Paris in 1985.1 It 
is no exaggeration to say that the poem was written during a time of great upheaval, uncertainty and even 
crisis in Oliver’s life. Oliver’s public and private accounts of the period leading up to the first publication 
of The Infant and the Pearl are fraught with expressions of irreversible and often unhappy transformation 
in his living situation, and contain frequent reports of internal discombobulation and moral panic; these 
feelings are registered across the gamut of his personal-relational, authorial and political commitments 
and affiliations. From at least the mid-1970s onwards Oliver worked sporadically on a novel about 
                                                            
1 CAAS, p.253. In a letter to Peter Riley of 21.08.1981 Oliver writes that he has been “get[ting] on with my long 
Pearl Poem once more”; by the 06.04.1985 “The Pearl poem is virtually finished, except for some tinkering[.]” 
Oliver to Riley, 21.08.1981 and 06.04.1985, DOA, Box 9. 
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boxing. This project dragged on into the 1980s. By the middle of the decade it was still incomplete and a 
source of much frustration and ire. References to this novel in Oliver’s letters to Peter Riley betray an 
increasingly irritable attitude throughout the 1970s and 1980s. A letter of the 2nd December 1975 
mentions that some “boxing prose” is “probably to appear in Bean News 2.”2 Bean News 2 is the ‘Daily 
World Bean Special’; it contains no “boxing prose” by Oliver. By the 21st May 1979 the “boxing text” is 
“showing signs of nearing completion”; on the 31st October 1980 Oliver writes that “I have just finished 
(again) the world’s most conventional novel -- that damned boxing thing -- and want eagerly to get on 
with next projects.”3 On the 6th April 1985 he writes that the novel “is the perennial white elephant 
awaiting yet another rewriting until it becomes a swan.”4 Later, in the Contemporary Authors 
Autobiography Series essay, Oliver refers to the novel as “dreadful” and “wretched.”5 Oliver finally 
abandoned the novel altogether, transferring what must have been a fraction of the projected work into 
sections of the prose and poetry of ‘An Island That Is All The World.’  
 Oliver’s return to France in 1982 to take up a job teaching “English and literature” at the 
University of London Institute in Paris precipitated the dissolution of his first marriage to Janet Hughes 
and a period of estrangement from her, as well as from their two daughters Kate and Bonamy; all three, as 
we have seen, are the dedicatees of every published version of The Infant and the Pearl.6 In his later 
published reminiscences of the early 1980s Oliver is careful to place the blame for the break-up of his 
first marriage squarely on his own shoulders: “It turns out my marriage couldn’t withstand the move [to 
Paris]. I accept all the fault for placing my wife under that choice.”7 These reminiscences are often tinged 
with a shade of bitterness, as can be seen in this account in the Contemporary Authors Autobiography 
Series: 
 
The one who moves agrees to be the villain: that’s the best way to work it for 
those who stay. So be it. Our life ambitions [Oliver’s and Janet’s] had 
diverged too greatly: the separation eventually became complete. Half of my 
life seemed to fall away. Lacking the close contact with my daughters, I 
became unmoored.8 
 
                                                            
2 Oliver to Riley, 02.12.1975, DOA, Box 9. 
3 Oliver to Riley, 21.05.1979 and 31.10.1980, DOA, Box 9. 
4 Oliver to Riley, 06.04.1985, DOA, Box 9. 
5 CAAS, p.253. 
6 WL, p.207. 
7 Ibid. 
8 CAAS, p.253. In WL the moment is reported slightly differently: “I had a chance for a new career teaching 
English and literature; it meant returning to Paris. It turned out my marriage couldn’t withstand the move. I accept 
all the fault for placing my wife under that choice.” WL, p.207. 
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Describing the early 1980s in ‘An Island That Is All The World,’ Oliver refers to feelings of “deep moral 
unease and a rage at necessity that lasted nearly six years of buffeted uncertainty and sea-change.”9 “[S]ix 
years” lasts until Oliver’s move to New York with his second wife, the American poet Alice Notley, in 
1988. That Oliver frames a period of moral and personal “unease” in between two periods of long-term 
relationship may well have a significant bearing on one of the major concerns of The Infant and the Pearl, 
that is, its insistence on sexual “unity” as representing and producing virtue and moral worth. Moral crisis 
characterises all of the reflections upon the period between 1982 and 1988. During his second stint in 
Paris, Oliver was “separated from all [that he] valued,” a separation that “almost cleaved [his] 
unconscious identity in half” as he suffered from debilitating “moral tensions” caused by the “irreparable 
harm” he had caused himself and his family.10 He describes in 1990 “the unease [which] would become 
intensified” each time he crossed the channel to visit his family, as “[his] mind shuttl[ed] between Britain 
and France.”11  
 These are reminiscences written for a published work of autobiography modelled on a Dantean 
structure of confession and moral responsibility in alternating poetry and prose, and so must be read in the 
context of a life reflected through the optic of a conscious literary inheritance.12 Nevertheless, it is clear 
that Oliver’s personal and professional life was in no small measure of disarray during the composition of 
The Infant and the Pearl. Shortly after Oliver’s move to Paris in 1982 his mother died and his sister 
contracted liver cancer, dying shortly thereafter. In 1997 Oliver recounts that  
 
These two deaths intensified the desperation and vivacity which characterised 
the 1980s for me in Paris, as I worried about the effect of separation on my 
family.13 
 
“Vivacity” is a curious word with which to describe a period of mourning; but we may assume this 
feeling of the intensity of “mental animation” and conduct, as well as a “liveliness of perception” (as the 
OED defines the noun) partook of the pervasive nervous tension that Oliver was experiencing at the 
time.14 A candid letter to Peter Riley from Paris dated 11th May 1984 expresses the oppressive atmosphere 
of general crisis recounted in the more self-conscious later writings. Oliver writes that “[m]y own world 
                                                            
9 VTH, p.78. 
10 Ibid., p.76, p.91, p.88, p.91. 
11 Ibid., p.78. 
12 The models are Dante’s Il Vita Nuova and Il Convivio. Oliver asks Peter Riley to send him a copy of the latter in 
a letter of 18.04.1983. See Oliver to Riley, 18.04.1983, DOA, Box 9. 
13 CAAS, p.255. 
14 OED online [accessed 28.07.2014]. 
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has been cracking apart for the last several months,” suggesting despondently that “if I fuck up who else 
is to blame, etc.”15 What Oliver calls “deep moral unease” is particularly in evidence at this time. Of what 
did this “moral unease” consist?  
 In an ambivalent passage from ‘An Island That Is All The World,’ Oliver is less self-castigating 
about his life in Paris in the early 1980s than in the other passages we have seen. This passage is as 
follows: 
 
Daytime, I taught literature; nighttime, I roamed out with journalists, 
enjoying the free relationship between men and women temporarily 
established in bars. Later I would smoke a cigar in bed, be warmly drunk 
[whilst] prostitutes conducted their ballet on the pavement [and] Brazilian 
transvestites crowded the cafes [...] It was a pleasurable time of self-
corruption.16 
 
Later in the same collection Oliver says that “[s]ort of, I loved it [this time in Paris].”17 The ambivalence 
in ‘An Island That Is All The World’ is not strictly contradictory. Oliver enjoyed his new-found freedom, 
but loathed his “moral” delinquency. His “deep moral unease” emerges from his feelings of guilt about 
abandoning his family, whom he loved, and “all [that he] valued” along with them.18 But it also emerges, 
quite clearly, from his reflection upon the very enjoyment of what he judged to be illicit and lewd 
behaviour, namely, casual sexual relationships and drinking a lot.19 That Oliver’s “moral rhythm” was 
“broken” during this time is therefore completely of a piece with his enjoyment of Paris’ “free 
relationship[s] between men and women,” and his sense of “self-corruption” in turn seemingly linked to 
the instability of such a lifestyle. The scene of “self-corruption” and moral delinquency Oliver sketches 
with literary acuity in these memoirs would seem to present the negative mirror-image of the idealised 
“union between / people” celebrated in The Infant and the Pearl. We shall return to this theme throughout 
the present chapter. 
 Oliver is wont to characterise his life during this time in terms of a self-imposed exile, and to 
frame the composition of The Infant and the Pearl in terms of an exilic lament for the Britain he had 
personally abandoned and which was simultaneously lost to the ravages of Thatcherism. In Whisper 
‘Louise’ his break from Janet, Kate and Bonamy and his taking up residence in Paris is compared, with a 
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17 Ibid., p.85. 
18 Ibid., p.76. 
19 “I holed up in a studio above the raucous Avenue de Clichy, had short-lived affairs, and told my friends that 
during my long summer break they could ring me any time and I would get out of bed and join them in some 
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level of self-deprecation but without irony, to Louise Michel’s deportation to New Caledonia in August 
1873 as punishment for her activities in the Paris Commune of 1871:  
 
Exile [...] has two principal meanings: to be thrust out of the nation by 
judicial or other sentence; or to leave the nation voluntarily for a long time. 
The first is the grandiose fate of Louise; the second is the minor story of my 
middle age.20 
 
“Simply,” Oliver notes in Whisper ‘Louise’, “I write better from a standpoint outside Britain,” and 
continues,  
 
Could I have written good poetry in Brightlingsea? Not my urban kind of 
poetry. Well in England, well, in Scotland? Not my kind.21 
 
The period became for Oliver one of broken halves. He had “left in England a whole half of life,” “[h]alf 
of [his] life seemed to fall away” and the stresses of the time “almost cleaved [his] [...] identity in half.”22  
 The example of Dante setting out at the start of the Inferno, “Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra 
vita” [“Midway this way of life we’re bound upon”], is a favoured autographical reference point for 
Oliver; he liked to figure himself as a poet-author in the fashion of the exiled Dante about to embark upon 
his magnum opus.23 References to the opening line of the Commedia appear in two sections of 
autobiographical narrative prose. A passage of recollection in ‘An Island That Is All The World’ dryly 
compares Britain’s plunge into Thatcherism in the 1980s to the descent into the arms of gloomy Dis in 
Dante’s Inferno: 
 
Halfway through my life, Britain changed to long-lasting Conservatism 
which, while I don’t say it oppressed all poetry, oppressed my own.24 
 
In the ‘Preface’ to Oliver’s posthumous Arrondissements (2003), he notes “More than mid-way through 
my life I have begun writing Arrondissements,” a huge project whose corpus was to include the poetic 
sequences ‘The Shattered Crystal,’ ‘China Blue,’ ‘The Video House of Fame’ and ‘A Salvo for Africa,’ 
as well as the entire text of Whisper ‘Louise’.25 A brusque, pragmatic letter to Riley of the 18th April 1983 
                                                            
20 See WL, pp.206-215 (206). 
21 WL, pp.206-207. 
22 VTH, p.85; CAAS, p.253; VTH, p.91. 
23 Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy 1: Hell, trans. Dorothy L. Sayers (London: Penguin, 1949), p.71. 
24 VTH, p.78. 
25 Douglas Oliver, Arrondissements (Great Wilbraham, Cambridge: Salt Publishing, 2003), p.x. 
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confirms this scene of authorial and personal exile from the perspective of Oliver’s contemporary 
malaise; it lists in numbered bullet points his reasons for leaving England. These include “I am out of 
Thatcherite Britain and its depressing political discussions, [and] can take a better interest in world 
politics,” and the blunt (considering the letter is to a dear and trusted correspondent) “[p]ersonal 
reasons.”26 
 Throughout this traumatic period, Oliver continued consciously to distance himself from his 
origins as a self-avowed “avant-garde” poet, writing to Riley in an undated letter of 1980 that “I am 
shedding my avant-garde manners but not, I hope, my poetic attitudes in other respects.”27 These “other 
respects,” as may be conjectured from his assertions of loyalty to J.H. Prynne and his poetry that we noted 
in the previous chapter, Oliver considered largely personal and collegial rather than formal or stylistic. As 
a continuation, too, of his disgruntlement with the British and European left that we saw influencing the 
composition of The Diagram--Poems, Oliver recounts in Whisper ‘Louise’ his growing frustration with 
popular left politics under Thatcher. In Brightlingsea, 
 
Former students conducted bitter, powerless political discussions in the pubs: 
easy just to hate Thatcher and cheer on the doomed miners’ strike. 
Conversations combined loony left with anarchism.28 
 
The tone of Whisper ‘Louise’ is more belligerently sceptical of left-wing politics than Oliver’s earlier 
writings, and its tendency to dismiss as student arrogance much of the political disaffection of the 1980s 
more reductive and reactionary than in Oliver’s poetry of the 1970s and 1980s. But these reflections are 
nonetheless instructive. They contribute to the overall mood of disaffection and disillusionment that 
certainly characterised, and arguably defined, the scene of the six-year composition of The Infant and the 
Pearl. They also, especially when read in conjunction with earlier writings, give us a sense of the relative 
shape and size of the political objects of Oliver’s disaffection: he certainly loathed “Thatcherite Britain,” 
but it is the “depressing” and “powerless political discussions” on the left that Oliver upbraids and 
denigrates with more energy and clarity of expression than he invests in attacking Thatcher or the 
Conservatives.  
 Lastly, note once more the dedication of the poem, “for Jan, Kate and Bonamy.” On the same 
page as the dedication, in his “Author’s Note,” Oliver glosses the “prescribed extra verse” of his medieval 
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27 Oliver to Riley, 1980, DOA, Box 9. 
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stanzaic model (on which more below): it represents “a return to the sign of unity.” The poem is in part a 
deliberate and conscious attempt to provoke and realise in verse exactly the kind of “unity” (political, 
sexual, relational, moral and spiritual) that Oliver felt at the time of composition was sorely lacking in his 
life, as well as in the world at large. 
 
3.2 – The question of unity 
 
The Infant and the Pearl is Oliver’s crowning poetic achievement. It is the most formally brilliant and 
conceptually demanding poem of Oliver’s entire career as a poet, one that has been regarded by poets, 
reviewers and critics with equal measures of awe and bafflement. John Kerrigan calls the poem 
“ambitious [and] often bizarre,” “[e]xtraordinary,” and “the most impressive work to emerge” from the 
period of what he refers to as a “medieval revival” in British letters in the mid-1980s.29 J.H. Prynne, in a 
letter to Oliver, calls it “immense and audacious.”30 Kelvin Corcoran, reviewing the book in Reality 
Studios, calls it “a remarkable book,” adding that “[t]he work and care of its making is beyond my 
attempt at the reviewer’s voice to say.”31 Another contemporary reviewer, Patrick Wright, writes in the 
London Review of Books that the poem “finds a remarkable political narrative in its skilfully contrived 
collision of autobiography and public symbolism.”32 As this last accolade suggests, The Infant and the 
Pearl is not a poem whose various aims and achievements can be summarised solely by recourse to 
Oliver’s contemporary biographical locale. The scene I have set in section 3.1, above, is just that, the 
background to the poem, and I proceed in this chapter to complicate, extend upon and extrapolate from 
this scene by close readings of the poem in order to understand The Infant and the Pearl’s development of 
the major questions we have been following through Oliver’s work since the early 1970s. Unity, as we 
have seen, is a lasting and important theme for Oliver’s entire oeuvre. Rather, the question of unity is the 
superlative question of Oliver’s career as a poet. The ways in which we have seen this question posed and 
practised in Oliver’s essays from the early 1970s and in the verse of The Diagram--Poems can be 
summarised in the following terms: how it is possible to articulate the idea and the practice of unity in 
poems? In other words, how is it possible to achieve in verse a unity that transcends, and is 
simultaneously prior to, social relations determined by a paucity of recognition and appreciation for our 
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30 Prynne to Oliver, 01.02.1986, DOA, Box 9. 
31 Kelvin Corcoran, review of The Infant and the Pearl, Reality Studios Vol. 8, Nos. 1-4 (1986) pp.74-77 (77). 
32 Wright, ‘A Journey through Ruins,’ p.10. 
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fundamental, natural human commonality and co-dependency, and by political antagonism, especially 
radical left-wing dissent and revolutionary agitation and activism?  
 In the early essays, and in Poetry and Narrative in Performance, unity is something a poet-
author and a reader can achieve together in the realisation of an unfettered intersubjectivity produced in 
the meeting of minds that poetic stress makes possible. In The Diagram--Poems, unity is that which the 
revolutionary Tupamaros’ failure and eventual destruction by the Uruguayan state proves is necessary to 
political struggle, because without peaceful adherence to mutual human commonality such struggle is 
doomed. In The Infant and the Pearl the question of unity is posed with greater ambition, clarity and 
concision than it had ever previously been posed in Oliver’s writing. In the poem, unity, and especially 
sexual unity, is that which defines and expresses a utopian political organisation of human social relations 
based on “ignorance,” “mercy” and “virtue.” What the poem valorises as “the union between / people” is 
not limited to, but certainly includes, heterosexual union, that is, straight sex. This is made explicit by 
such moments as the celebration of the righteous “union of male / and female in fruition” in the poem’s 
fifteenth section, and the relief Oliver’s narrator feels when he claims: “I recognized Rosine the way 
you’d recognise / your lover’s look in union as a unity” in the poem’s thirteenth section.33  
 Such “union” is also reminiscent of the “moments” of “special intersubjectivity” we detailed in 
Chapter 1, and that are a foundational principle of Oliver’s poetics. The Infant and the Pearl is the first of 
Oliver’s works to tackle the question of unity in terms of the social application of a poetical and 
theoretical argument Oliver had been formulating since the early 1970s. As always in Oliver’s work, 
unity in The Infant and the Pearl is a concept of great moral significance, and from it emerges what I 
have previously called a “moral imperative”: it is what we should strive towards, and act in accordance 
with, in our everyday lives. Like The Diagram--Poems, The Infant and the Pearl articulates a moral 
obligation to political transformation. But the break The Infant and the Pearl makes with Oliver’s 
previous writing is that the moral imperative in this poem, instead of being expressed implicitly and 
abstractly through an image of, for example, “spoken kindness,” is instead named explicitly as a specific 
type of political organisation. The poem names the organisation of human beings around the principles of 
moral virtue that emanate from unity, in the sense that we have here defined it, “Socialism.” 
 What does Oliver mean by “Socialism”? The Infant and the Pearl shares with The Diagram--
Poems and Penniless Politics the treatment of political context and political activity which I outlined at 
                                                            
33 SP, p.64, p.61. I explain the significance of Rosine below.  
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the close of the previous chapters, that is, such context is subordinated at crucial moments in all three 
poems to the truth of the inadequacy of its generic type, human politics, as a solution to the problem of 
human violence, antagonism and strife. As Oliver would put it in Penniless Politics, “all solutions [to 
social and political crisis] are false when the spirit is wrong: the biggest mistake / of our age is to think 
politics will cure our lives.”34 Oliver’s poetic is centrally concerned with getting the spirit right. This 
involves the subordination of politics to that which must, for him, be the organising principle for a social 
relation hitherto ignored and actively debased by political affiliation of all stripes. Oliver calls this 
principle by various names; in the introduction to The Diagram--Poems it is an “authentic politics”; in 
The Infant and the Pearl it is “Socialism” and its expression is “the union between / people.” Here is the 
ninety-ninth stanza of the poem. 
 
A memory sea that had lain at low tide 
in my mind slowly mounted making green 
my dense darkness, radiant liquid 
filled my vision; somewhere, half-seen 
a precious pearl was shining in me; a pellucid 
awareness of all that had passed – all that had been 
born in me one morning when the mongoloid 
eyes of my son stared at me, smiling, serene 
in their way – was eerily glowing again, what I mean 
by Socialism, that our soul and our selves are unknown 
yet unconsciously known in the union between 
people. (I lay in my grey dressing gown.)35 
 
The Infant and the Pearl is a dream vision in the tradition of the genre of which its namesake is the most 
formally remarkable and critically divisive example, the fourteenth-century Middle English Pearl. The 
Infant and the Pearl mimics the form of Pearl, as well as its redemptive, pedagogical plot, very closely, 
with important convergences of narrative detail. In a moment, I will explore the significance of these 
convergences in order to illuminate The Infant and the Pearl’s major concerns. For now, let us note some 
important developments of themes we have seen characterising Oliver’s work from the early 1970s 
onwards.  
 The Infant and the Pearl is a poem about disillusionment and discontent with its contemporary 
political context. The poem’s response to the British political malaise of the 1980s stems from a broadly 
left perspective – Oliver did, after all, call it his “anti-Thatcherite poem” – but the poem’s discontent is 
universal: that is, its political sympathies lie not with any party, or even any version of party politics, but 
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with the pre-political, intersubjective “union between / people” that is, in the poem, a necessary condition 
of any authentic human association.36 In The Diagram--Poems, as we have seen, this kind of relation is 
designated as the wellspring of an ideal “authentic politics” based on essential human commonality, one 
inflected by the semantic resonance of the Middle English kynde and by Rousseauian notions of natural 
innocence. The Infant and the Pearl develops this kind of thinking. An important part of this development 
is exemplified by the stanza quoted above, in which Oliver’s speaker refers more explicitly to his hidden 
natural propensity for recognising the truth and moral virtue of essential human connaturality than any 
speaker does, at any point, in The Diagram--Poems. A “sea” of “memory” floods “my mind” with clarity, 
making the dreamer freshly aware of the hitherto untapped reserves of what, as we saw in The Diagram--
Poems, “we know.” The recognition of this “memory,” which had always been there, laying “at low tide,” 
re-asserts that which Oliver’s Down’s syndrome infant son Tom represents in all of Oliver’s poems in 
which he appears: the irrefutable goodness of pacifistic (“serene”) human co-habitation. Furthermore, the 
speaker’s corporal frame itself experiences the scene of re-birth in sympathy with Tom, as both infant and 
mother: the amniotic fluid of some “radiant liquid” “fill[s] my vision,” and the dreamer is figuratively 
impregnated with the “awareness” that was, and is, “born in me.” The stanza expresses a revelation that is 
both physical and intellectual: “radiant liquid / filled my vision,” producing a “pellucid / awareness” that 
is “born in me,” an awareness characterised by an influx of received wisdom and illumination. But 
“vision” is also meta-textual, since the “vision” is in one important sense the dream vision we are reading 
and which is The Infant and the Pearl; it is in this sense that the poem nominates itself as the very 
medium by which “awareness” of our hidden nature can be, and is, revealed.  
 Another aspect of The Infant and the Pearl’s development of Oliver’s recurrent themes is the 
promotion of the figure of Tom Oliver from a pedagogical emblem capable of “spoken kindness” and 
representative of ideally innocent human nature, to a fully-fledged dynamic allegory for the type of self-
knowledge and commitment to a social bond of loving reciprocity that the poem advocates as an 
alternative foundation for political organisation to the UK’s traditional two-party-dominated system of 
parliamentary democracy. In The Infant and the Pearl, Tom Oliver is more than the guiding “voice” he is 
in The Diagram--Poems; the wisdom he imparts is made structurally and allegorically consistent with the 
divine wisdom of the fourteenth-century Pearl’s Pearl-Maiden. Although the figure of a maiden also 
appears throughout The Infant and the Pearl as a character named “Rosine” and is distinct from Tom, the 
                                                            
36 CAAS, p.253. 
130 
two represent and communicate the same imperative to acknowledge the foundational social bond of 
loving reciprocity conducted in the poem by the emphasis on the value of “ignorance.”  
 Rosine and Tom thus partake of the same “dynamic” structure of symbolic development that 
A.C. Spearing and Stephen Russell note in the original Pearl’s development of its imagery. In other 
words, as in Pearl, the meaning, characterisation and allegorical significance of the central symbolic 
characters in The Infant and the Pearl accumulate meaning and shades of interpretation as the poem 
progresses. In Pearl the single image of the “precios perle” [“precious pearl”], like “the concept of 
clannesse [cleanness] in the poem Purity,” is 
 
[set] in a variety of contexts taken from real situations, so that the idea 
develop[s] in meaning as the poem extend[s] itself in time. In Pearl [...] the 
development in meaning is co-ordinated with and expressed through a single 
developing human drama – the encounter between the Dreamer and the 
Pearl-Maiden.37 
 
It is as true for The Infant and the Pearl as for Pearl that, as Spearing goes on to say, “[t]he whole force 
and poignancy of Pearl derives from its basic structure as an encounter involving human relationship,”38 
and it is equally true that the development of this relation, again as much for Oliver’s poem as for his 
source text, involves what Russell describes as 
 
a sense of movement from the personal, local, phenomenal, or sensory to the 
communal, universal, supernal, or spiritual [...] the poem works on both 
levels, moving simultaneously outward and upward, away from the self and 
the world and mutability and the senses and toward “unknowing.”39 
 
In The Infant and the Pearl, the maiden Rosine, Tom and “Socialism” denote different forms or aspects of 
the poem’s journey towards the expression of “what I mean / by Socialism” in the ninety-ninth stanza. 
What this means is the expression in universal terms of a spiritually-infused intersubjectivity that 
promotes self-knowledge and personal fulfilment in the reciprocal recognition of human nature. 
Recognising human nature – “our soul and our selves” – requires “unknowing.” Rosine, Tom and 
“Socialism” are structurally co-dependent upon each other; they are also inexplicable in the context of the 
The Infant and the Pearl’s complex symbolic economy without an understanding of their 
interrelationships. They are linked by the valorisation of Oliver’s own form of “unknowing,” “ignorance.”  
                                                            
37 A.C. Spearing, The Gawain-Poet: A Critical Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p.137. 
38 Ibid., p.137. 
39 Stephen J. Russell, The English Dream Vision: Anatomy of a Form (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 
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 We explored the background to Oliver’s preoccupation with this concept under the name 
“stupidity” in the previous chapter. In the stanza quoted above, “the mongoloid / eyes of my son” gazing 
at the speaker impart the wisdom that he requires to see through the mutually obfuscatory, because 
mutually dogmatic, “rent-a-Marx/Margaret rhetoric” named two stanzas previously, and this wisdom 
consists in the communication of the value of “ignorance.” Remember that, for Oliver, the fact that his 
son was what he called “mongoloid” gave Tom access to the reserves of hidden nature that we should all 
strive to discover within ourselves. Tom is a limit case for the exercise of human care and benevolence: 
his demand on society to care for him in his disability provides by extension the model for the type of 
responsibility and care we should all have for each other. Tom’s “ignorance” is not just unificatory, but 
divine. Note these lines from the poem’s hundredth stanza: 
 
[...] ‘The pearl is ourself in which lies 
a rosy reflection of all whom we care for 
enough, the Other rendered perfect in paradise 
of our self-love [...]40 
 
Oliver’s choice of “enough” in this stanza, prosodically emphasised and provocatively isolated by its 
position immediately following a line-break and followed by a strong caesura, echoes Pearl’s use of 
variations on “innoghe” [“enough”] as a link-word in its eleventh section during the Pearl-Maiden’s 
explication of the Parable of the Vineyard and the salvation, through grace, of the innocents. In other 
words, the “care” Tom teaches us we should have for each other is, like Christ’s, a means of excess 
directly proportionate to its ends; it is a redemptive and salvific sufficiency. In The Infant and the Pearl 
the description of the fictional Tom in The Harmless Building, that he radiates “the true blessedness 
allowed only to the really low in IQ,” achieves its fullest expression in verse. In the poem, his divinity is 
twofold: as well as embodying the Christ-like virtue of serene beatitude, Tom is also a Buddha-like figure 
of enlightenment, and is so because of his “ignorance”: in the poem’s sixth section, he is described as 
“one on whom / innocence and incapability impose an immutable / Buddha face beaming; for Down’s 
Syndrome / [...] had kissed him with mercy.”41  
 In The Infant and the Pearl’s ninety-seventh stanza, Rosine, in the manner of Pearl’s passages of 
homiletic instruction, delivers the following encomium to “ignorance”: 
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[...] ‘First acknowledge 
that the highest human intelligence is a near 
relation of ignorance; let language 
untwist on your tongues. There’s no true idea 
of political system; so say so; don’t languish 
in rent-a-Marx/Margaret rhetoric [...]42 
 
The “rhetoric” admonished here is that of both Thatcherite economic policy and Tory ideology more 
generally, as well as that of the trade union lobby and Labour party “Marxists” who opposed them. What 
exactly Oliver considered such “rhetoric” to sound like we shall explore in greater detail below. But it 
does not matter, finally, for The Infant and the Pearl, precisely in what the politics of either Marxism or 
Thatcherism consist. It is “enough,” and it is bad enough, that they are examples of what the poem calls 
the “whole hollow / conformity of creeds,” that is, that they proceed by dogma and demand (as Oliver’s 
poem represents their “rhetoric”) to tell people exactly what they must do to improve their lives and 
enrich society. Like The Diagram--Poems’ desire for “some beneficial balance” to replace wholesale the 
murderous antagonism between “revolutionary flamboyance and a dictatorship’s response of iron rule,” 
The Infant and the Pearl’s insistence that “[t]here’s no true idea / of political system” is the negative 
correlate to the poem’s positive argument about the possibility of a utopian politics. 
 This argument, developed through the symbolic dynamism Oliver inherited from the original 
Pearl, is as follows: Marxist and Thatcherite ideologies obscure equally the common ground from which 
a politics based on a pacifistic abundance of care (what the poem calls “mercy”) could arise. The key to 
understanding why both these positions fail to account for, or even properly recognise, the question of 
unity that we posed above, is that neither of them acknowledges that “ignorance” is the only point from 
which a truly inclusive universalism can begin to be thought. It might conceivably be argued that Oliver 
contradicts Rosine’s admonition that there is no “true idea / of political system” five years later, in ‘An 
Island That Is All The World,’ by naming “the precious origin of our lives’ form” a “true politics.” But a 
“true politics,” as we explored at length in the previous chapters, is not an “idea,” and it is still less a 
“system”: it is an ethical imperative built on the foundations of formal and intersubjective unity. A “union 
between / people” is not a trade union, because it is more primordial than the cognitive knowledge 
required to form and act upon the organisational and political imperatives of such an association. A 
“union between / people” retains the value of “our soul and our selves” being “unknown,” or at best 
“unconsciously known,” that is, it retains the intrinsic value of what scholars of Pearl concerned to tease 
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out the more mystically inflected meanings of the poem call the “ineffable.”43  
 What Oliver’s dreamer/narrator “mean[s] by Socialism” in The Infant and the Pearl is essentially 
both ineffable and, to use another term deployed by Pearl critics, figural. Here, again, is how Oliver’s 
dreamer defines the term: 
 
[...] what I mean 
by Socialism, that our soul and our selves are unknown 
yet unconsciously known in the union between 
people.44 
 
Ann Chalmers Watts, discussing Pearl, describes “The height of mystical experience” as 
 
the apprehension of the “ineffable,” so-called even in modern parlance 
because being at one with God must by definition leave all human desire and 
language far below. By gradual discipline of contemplation, the mystic 
comes to a momentary experience of God’s light, God’s love, or eternal 
knowing, and the experience passes beyond desire and language even sooner 
than it passes human understanding.45 
 
The protagonist dreamer of Pearl, Watts continues, “desire[s] a union of word to referent, of motion to 
stillness, not possible to humanity and not compatible with true mystical vision.”46 This is to say that the 
Pearl-poet 
 
plays off the difference between his dreamer’s inexpressibilities and the 
inexpressibility that properly belongs to the mystical tradition influencing the 
poem.47 
                                                            
43 It is worth comparing the political value of ignorance as it is deployed in Oliver’s work to Andrew Bennett’s 
description of what he calls the “politics of contemporary ignorance” in his Ignorance. Bennett writes that 
“[i]gnorance is a pervasive trope of authorship in contemporary poetry,” and produces a taxonomy of authorial 
positions which in some manner involve an ignorant relationship to the production of poetic work, such as “I 
don’t know where my poems come from” and “[t]he poem tells me something about myself that I did not know 
before.” He further suggests that acknowledgement of such ignorance inflects the post-Romantic condition of 
authorship with an essential “fallibility” and “uncertainty,” and that ignorance as it pertains to such fallibility “is 
at the heart of the open society, of tolerance, of democracy.” Bennett focuses on the expressions or avowals of 
ignorance that colour contemporary poets’ self-descriptions, rather than their use of ignorance as a political 
function in poems, but his emphasis (via Lorenzo Infantino) on the essential relationship between ignorance and 
“democracy” is pertinent here, as it is to The Diagram--Poems’ “land silvery with democracy.” Oliver in The 
Infant and the Pearl, it should be remembered, is less interested in ignorance’s relationship to “democracy” than 
its relationship to the ecstatic spirit of “Socialism.” See Andrew Bennett, Ignorance: Literature and Agnoiology 
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2009), p.229, p.232, p.239. 
44 SP, p.73. 
45 Ann Chalmers Watts, ‘Pearl, Inexpressibility, and Poems of Human Loss,’ PMLA, Vol. 99, No. 1 (Jan., 1984), 
pp.26-40 (29). See also Theodore Bogdanos, Pearl, Image of the Ineffable: A Study in Medieval Poetic 
Symbolism (University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983). Bogdanos’ entire 
monograph is concerned with the idea of the ineffable in Pearl; he “regard[s] Pearl as a dramatization of man’s 
encounter with divine reality as this particular poet has envisioned this encounter and has rendered it into a poetic 
experience with an order and significance of its own as artistic statement.” (p.1). 
46 Ibid., p.30. 
47 Ibid. 
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The fact of the dreamer’s “inexpressibility” in Pearl is that which proves, for Watts, the existential 
certainty – we might say the apodicticity – of the very mystical union, i.e., “being at one with God,” that 
he seeks: “Language protesting the failure of language apprehends the sure being of what cannot be 
expressed.”48  
 At the end of The Infant and the Pearl, as we saw above, Rosine exhorts Oliver’s dreamer (and 
by extension – note the plural “tongues” – everyone) to “acknowledge” precisely such an inexpressibility: 
“let language / untwist on your tongues.” What is to be allowed to “untwist” on all of our “tongues” into a 
state of unbidden natural commonality is “language,” rather than speech or vocabulary, since it is 
“language” itself that remains twisted by our clinging to political “rhetoric.” The distinction recalls that of 
Saussure’s langue [language] and parole [speech], by the imputation that to let “language / untwist” 
would be to return to a natural system (langue) of communicative truthfulness and not simply a negative 
manifestation of that system’s expression in speech or writing (parole). Language will not “untwist” by 
any deliberate act of intelligent eloquence, argues Rosine, let alone by the assertion of any “true idea / of 
political system,” but because it is language’s natural action to do so if only we “let” it. Language in its 
originally untwisted state does not profess a “true idea / of political system” and therefore confronts 
inauthentic “rhetoric” with the truth of its inexpressible other. Inexpressibility is expressed in the 
following stanzas’ definition of “Socialism” over a line-break: the enjambment “between / people.” 
 In these final, climactic stanzas of Oliver’s poem, Rosine and Tom both promote “ignorance” in 
the name of the question of unity, and they are both subsumed by the question of unity into acting as 
functionaries for its expression in the poem’s narrative trajectory. They are both exemplary figures of the 
achievement of “unity” as a moral virtue, but by their very existence as fictional idealisations whose 
artifice is reflexively couched in the poem’s formal and prosodic fourteenth-century inheritance, they 
condemn the real world’s lack of “unity” and chastise its inability to achieve its articulation in everyday 
social relations. The enjambment “between / people,” the spatial and, in any given reading, temporal gap 
between these two words in the fleeting moment it takes for the reader’s eyes to scan back to the left 
margin, is composed by Oliver to be the icon of our present inability to achieve that which The Infant and 
the Pearl demands that we must achieve: “union between people.” That line cannot yet be written, 
because we do not, as a “nation,” submit to the demand that we recognize unity in our common 
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“ignorance” as a basis for “Socialism.” Oliver’s dreamer, and Oliver himself, have a guide in the form of 
Tom to teach them the truth of this relation, and The Infant and the Pearl is, finally, an extension of this 
didactic relationship. The closest we can therefore come to recognising our potential for utopian politics, 
for the unity that is in us and that we are, is to read the poem itself – the enjambment “between / people” 
admits and performs this fact. In the break between these lines echoes the figure of the Husserlian “abyss” 
between subjects. It is this figure whose prospect of abolition the poem wants to prove by subjecting it to 
the iconic scrutiny of a line-break, the very performance in prosodic method of a distance the poem 
exposes in order to make visible the necessity of its collapse.49 The moment “union between / people” is 
to The Infant and the Pearl what “We know this. Everyone” is to The Diagram--Poems: a deliberate 
performance of the instrumental nature of poetical language to bring us closer together. 
 All of this points towards the existence in Oliver’s poem of a figural (or “typological”) approach 
to reality, and in particular, to “Socialism.” In their readings of Pearl critics such as Elizabeth Salter and 
J. Allan Mitchell refer to Erich Auerbach’s “seminal words on the nature of figural poetics” from 
Auerbach’s 1938 essay ‘“Figura”’: 
 
Figural interpretation establishes a connection between two events or 
persons, the first of which signifies not only itself but also the second, while 
the second encompasses or fulfils the first [...] Only the understanding of the 
two persons or events is a spiritual act, but this spiritual act deals with 
concrete events whether past, present, or future, and not with concepts or 
abstractions; these are quite secondary, since promise and fulfilment are real 
historical events, which have either happened in the incarnation of the Word, 
or will happen in the second coming.50 
 
Salter interprets “the central power” of Pearl in the following terms: 
                                                            
49 A similar moment in the poem occurs in its twelfth section, when Oliver’s dreamer finds himself in the House of 
Commons: “Like a Douglas Oliver look-alike / the Speaker dreamily searched our side / and ‘recognised’ me, 
which although autoscopic / for both of us, deepened the dark divide / in myself.” This moment is comparable in 
its prosodic efficacy to the “union between / people” because both name, or nominate, a moment of absence or 
negation as part of an argument against that absence or negation, and both do so in the name of unity. The puns 
on “recognised” and “Speaker,” and “autoscopic / for both of us,” play with the kind of authorial splitting we saw 
Oliver theorise with reference to Chaucer in Chapter 1, before “deepened the dark divide / in myself” presents a 
specimen of division as inner turmoil and moral insolvency in the shape of the line-break between “dark divide” 
and “in myself.” The parliamentary farce that Rosine will shortly bring to a revelatory halt is hereby played out in 
narcissistic microcosm. As if Oliver’s dreamer was himself simply an incompetent reader, self–other ambiguity 
leading to a sharing of consciousness (recall Chaucer’s “figure of giant-like significance”) is botched; “although” 
the experience is “autoscopic / for both of us,” it nevertheless exacerbates the dreamer’s own self-conflict instead 
of leading to a mutually harmonious encounter with the “Speaker.” Fixated on his own idealistic polemic, the 
dreamer neglects the “middle-ground” of authentic otherness that the spiritualised/sexualised Rosine exemplifies. 
The “dark divide / in myself” is split down the middle to emphasise the intrinsic falsity and wrong-headedness of 
the dreamer’s self-regard, and by extension, of his careerist pretentions to a “true idea / of political system” 
without “ignorance.” See SP, p.59. 
50 Erich Auerbach, Scenes from the Drama of European Life (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), p.53, quoted by J. 
Allan Mitchell, ‘The Middle English Pearl: Figuring the Unfigurable,’ The Chaucer Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 
(2000), pp.86-111 (87). 
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[The poem] draws upon essentially figural concepts: upon an acceptance of 
reality of an earthly relationship between dreamer and Pearl maiden, which is 
not rejected but fulfilled in spiritual terms [...]51 
 
Mitchell goes on to complicate this analysis by noting that the Pearl-Maiden in Pearl “emphasizes that 
anagogic reality – the main inscrutable subject of her discourse and of the poem itself – is precisely not 
immersed in the stream of historical life,” i.e., “not immersed in” the continuum in which Auerbach’s 
definition of figural “forecasting” takes place.52  
 Pearl cannot be figural in Auerbach’s sense for Mitchell because of the manner in which Pearl 
deals with questions of the afterlife and of spiritual salvation rather than “real historical events [that] [...] 
will happen in the second coming.”53 Whilst Mitchell both identifies the coordinates for and qualifies a 
figural reading of Pearl, Cary Nelson is less cautious about applying Auerbach’s scholarship directly to 
the poem, stating that 
 
Pearl may serve as a model for a figural reading of poetic structure, for it 
offers a uniquely formal aesthetic experience. [...] The figural reality of the 
poem’s structure emerges when its story ends; the nature of the narrator’s 
final situation is revealed by the poem’s completed form. A figural reading of 
Pearl satisfies an elegiac interpretation of either the narrator’s of the poet’s 
situation [...] either actual grief or its poetic exploration is an earthly figura 
no less real than what it prefigures: transformed by Christ’s agony, earthly 
suffering foreshadows the perfect understanding achieved after death.54 
 
Focussing on the stanzaic organisation and general narrative trajectory of the poem, Nelson interprets 
Pearl’s “missing” line 472 as a deliberate flaw designed as the formal representation of the figural destiny 
which the poem as a whole “prefigures”: 
 
The poem has the form of a pearl deliberately flawed, a bitten apple, a broken 
circle, a world that sorely needs the grace of God. In the end of time God will 
restore the missing line and complete the poem’s circle.55 
 
Oliver’s poem prefigures something similar. Its definition of “Socialism” is as deliberately and spiritually 
esoteric as it is incorrigibly and archly anti- contemporary trade union politics; the “Socialism” expressed 
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is one defined by a state of “union” the lack of which, as we have already established, is all around us, is 
constitutive of every political “creed” currently on offer, and is the very proof of the necessity of its 
universal recognition as a natural, inalienable and ineffable human property or propensity, both 
individually and socially. 
 Yet despite The Infant and the Pearl’s apathy, or even antipathy, towards the trade unions’ battle 
with Thatcherite economic policy, the very spiritual universalism of the poem’s “Socialism” shares 
common ground with the origins of the British trade union movement. In the pre-Marxist history of 
labour organisation, dissent and agitation in England, a not dissimilar conception of the universality and 
inalienability of natural rights plays a critical role. E.P. Thompson has demonstrated at length the 
complex social and religious elements of radical politics in England in the 1790s. Thompson 
distinguishes between, but notes the coextensive and overlapping influence of, what he refers to as the 
“rational conceit” and the “visionary image” of radical dissent: he discusses the pervasive influence of 
Tom Paine’s Rights of Man as well as citing, as examples of the combination of “‘combustible matter’ of 
poor man’s dissent with [...] a revolutionary era,” tracts such as the 1798 Millenarian pamphlet Unity and 
Equality in the Kingdom of God: 
 
The high and the low, the oppressor and the oppressed, shall be reduced to 
one perfect level. The pampered tyrant, and his indigent vassal; the wealthy 
peer, and the neglected pauper, shall receive an equitable and impartial 
sentence.56 
 
The revolutionary implications of the late eighteenth-century conception of universal brotherhood are 
ably exemplified, for Thompson, as much by Blake’s visionary fervour and Wordsworth’s paeans to the 
French Revolutionary spirit as by the London Corresponding Society’s “rational” collectivist agitation.  
 The “spirit” of radical dissent, writes Thompson, “whether in its visionary or in its superstitious 
form [...] was perhaps as long-lasting in its influence as the arguments of Tom Paine.”57 Oliver’s 
“Socialism” maintains this spirit by jettisoning regard for, or interest in, agitation, the latter associated in 
the 1790s with the most radical of Jacobin associations and by the 1980s with the Marxist, Labour and 
trade union left. The radical inheritance of The Infant and the Pearl is therefore closely akin to some of 
the “prophetic schools” which operated in the mid-1790s such as the “True Baptists” of Norwich, 
Wisbech and Liverpool, who, Thompson argues, made great efforts to recall their congregations “from 
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too literal an encounter with Apollyon and back to the pilgrimage of the spirit.”58 The spirit of 
universalism, of the self and soul in mutual harmony which Oliver’s “Socialism” proclaims, retains a 
kernel of prophetic sermonising as passionate and sincere as Blake’s own vision of universal mutuality in 
his Jerusalem, “Both heart in heart & hand in hand.”59 The achievement of this mutuality in a future state 
of social harmony is the shared preserve of Oliver’s “Socialism” and its precursors, whether in the 
L.C.S.’s correspondence, eighteenth-century Millenarian tracts, or later nineteenth-century utopian 
socialism, including elements of Marxist thought. The esoteric spiritual paradox of the question of unity 
remains in The Infant and the Pearl, as it does with the problem of what “we know” in The Diagram--
Poems, and this is that unity is in us, and we can achieve it: yet we do not. It is there nonetheless, and the 
enjambment “between / people” reminds us of this fact; unity is waiting for us to recognize and accept it 
as the only authentic organisational principle for human life; waiting, in fact, to be fulfilled. 
 For Cary Nelson, Pearl expresses a scene of the completion of human history, and the 
achievement of “perfect understanding [...] after death” congruent with Auerbach’s explication of the 
“divine order” in figural expression: 
 
[T]he individual earthly event is [...] viewed primarily in immediate vertical 
connection with a divine order which encompasses it, which on some future 
day will itself be concrete reality; so that the earthly event is a prophecy or 
figura of a part of a wholly divine reality that will be enacted in the future. 
But this reality is not only future; it is always present in the eye of God and in 
the other world, which is to say that in transcendence the revealed and true 
reality is present at all times, or timelessly.60 
 
Does Oliver’s poem, and especially “what I mean / by Socialism,” look forward to “a wholly divine 
reality that will be enacted in the future”? Oliver’s poem, like Pearl, ends in a failure – the dreamer’s 
failure to cross the “gutter” between himself and Rosine, structurally equivalent to the Pearl dreamer’s 
failure to cross the “strem” [“stream”] which separates him physically, spiritually and allegorically from 
the dream world, the Pearl-Maiden and the vision of the New Jerusalem she has just afforded him – and 
like Pearl that ending sanctions the message of commitment to a code of moral and social human 
behaviour, however broadly defined. In Pearl, this message is that “Hit is ful eþe to þe god Krystyin” 
[“Good Christians can with ease incline”], since “Paradyse” awaits those who recognise that salvation in 
the form of “Krysteȝ dere blessyng and myn, / Þat in þe forme of bred and wyn / Þe preste vus scheweȝ 
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vch a daye” [“Christ’s dear blessing bestowing mine, / As in the form of bread and wine / Is shown us 
daily in sacrament”].61  
 At the end of The Infant and the Pearl, two stanzas after the “union between / people” is 
declared, Oliver’s dreamer begins “crossing the gutter that only grace / can cross,” a figure reminiscent of 
the Husserlian abyss between subjects, but is rudely awakened: 
 
[...] I caught a mere trace 
of grey from [Rosine’s] gowns, her grave frown, 
and awoke in a dawn of our daily disgrace, 
lying down in my father’s grey dressing gown.62 
 
Both poems end in a deficit of grace that must be fulfilled by God’s love, Oliver’s poem even more 
explicitly than Pearl, as “grace” rhymes uncomfortably with its ubiquitous, everyday opposite. Recall that 
The Diagram--Poems’ final invocation is the hope that “grace and courage arrive calmly in us.”63 The 
presentation of Rosine in section XIII of The Infant and the Pearl as “secularized, she was Socialism” is 
inverted at the climax of the poem, at which point “Socialism” is ardently and emphatically spiritualized. 
“Socialism” for Oliver is a state of “union” to be fulfilled in a redemptive future moment, and this futurity 
is what “Socialism” means in Oliver’s poem. But this state is also “always present,” because the “special 
intersubjectivity” provided by poetic language, and emphasised by the iconographic enjambment 
“between / people,” provides a potentially inexhaustible number of just such moments between reader and 
poet-author on a metrical, rhythmical and syllabic level. The “memory sea that had lain at low tide” 
which begins the ninety-ninth stanza is transformed by its end into “a perpetual recollection which 
becomes a radical, Christocentric, and openly future-oriented reorientation of the self.”64 The Infant and 
the Pearl is a redemptive poem, its definition of “Socialism” drawn from a spiritualism expressed in the 
language of Christian eschatology, its solution to political antagonism the wholesale substitution for 
politics of a utopian moralism to which poetic language is the best available guide. 
 Thus The Infant and the Pearl adds to the emphasis on unity and harmonious intersubjectivity 
                                                            
61 E.V. Gordon, ed., Pearl (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp.43-44. All quotations from Pearl refer to 
Gordon’s text, the edition read by Oliver. The current standard edition of Pearl can be found in Malcolm Andrew 
and Ronald Waldron, ed., The Poems of The Pearl Manuscript: Pearl, Cleanness, Patience, Sir Gawain and the 
Green Knight (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014). The English translation used here is that of The 
Gawain Poet, Complete Works: Patience, Cleanness, Pearl, Saint Erkenwald, Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, 
trans. Marie Borroff (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011), p.160. When not otherwise 
noted translations from the Middle English are my own. 
62 SP, p.73. 
63 K, p.126. 
64 David Aers, ‘The Self Mourning: Reflections on Pearl,’ Speculum, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Jan., 1993), pp.54-73 (66). 
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that is the hallmark of his earlier writings the influence of Oliver’s long-standing interest in medieval 
Middle English poetry, and in particular the genre of dream vision, in a manner which refracts the 
question of unity through an ideological, spiritual and political framework inherited from the Pearl-poet, 
Langland, Chaucer and their fourteenth-century Ricardian milieu. This framework – that of the narrative 
structure of didactic, redemptive and eschatological elements of the late medieval dream vision – is 
adapted by Oliver to serve the question of unity. For Oliver, unity is prior to politics because it is 
fundamentally and universally what we are capable of, and we are capable of it before (and despite) 
political factionalism, antagonism and revolutionary struggle. Revolutionary struggle seeks to redefine the 
political according to a more just organisation of social life. Oliver does not deny this, nor does he 
disagree with its most general and abstract designs on human society – justice and social equality. His 
life’s work is a testament to the complexity of his admiration for revolutionaries like the Tupamaros and 
Louise Michel. But Oliver believed that such struggle, epitomised for him by groups like the Tupamaros, 
is doomed to failure, or worse, risks provoking more violence and “harm” than it is capable of preventing, 
unless it acknowledges, and derives its energies and designs from recourse to, the “unity” which is in us 
and which we are, the same “unity” which poetic language and prosodic organisation makes available to 
us in the form of emblematic fleeting glimpses of what “our everyday experience and speech could be 
like” if such moments were not just the literary expression of a universal imperative or truth, but in fact 
the common and manifest content of our daily lives, and within them, of our acts of communication. In 
the previous chapter we saw just such a moment in the line “We know this. Everyone” in the poem ‘U.’65  
 In The Infant and the Pearl large swathes of the poem are taken up with the kind of exhortation 
that only a few lines in The Diagram--Poems could afford to carry or express; the entirety of the late 
sections XIX and XX are overflowing with didactic and exhortative material. It is the inheritance of the 
narrative genre of dream vision that allows The Infant and the Pearl such scope for didacticism, a 
didacticism that is only given fleeting explicit expression in the earlier works. But the paradox at the heart 
of Oliver’s poetic remains firmly in place in The Infant and the Pearl, and is as follows: his poetry 
dreams of abolishing itself in the service of the achievement in social life of that which only poetry can 
teach, show and prove to us. Where The Diagram--Poems bears traces and contains hints of what this 
achievement should consist of and accomplish, The Infant and the Pearl describes its relationship to, and 
its designs upon, contemporary political organisation more fully than ever before. Oliver’s next poem, 
                                                            
65 K, pp.120-122 (122). 
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Penniless Politics, goes so far as to provide, in the name of the achievement in political reality of a 
specifically poetical theory of social relations, a new U.S. Constitution. From here on, this chapter will 
proceed in the following manner. Firstly, I look into Oliver’s reading of Pearl. Secondly, I make some 
major structural and narrative comparisons between Pearl and The Infant and the Pearl. Thirdly, I 
attempt some close readings of the The Infant and the Pearl’s labour politics and gender politics. 
 
3.3 – Oliver and Pearl 
 
The Infant and the Pearl is impossible to understand fully without a proper grounding in the fourteenth-
century dream narrative Pearl. Oliver was deeply interested in, and influenced by, dream narratives and 
the wider tradition of late medieval English and European verse of which they comprise a significant 
subset. Oliver’s interest in medieval English verse, and in dream narrative and dream vision in particular, 
can be discerned from writings which span the breadth of his career as a poet. We have already explored 
the significance of Chaucer’s poetry for Oliver’s early formulation, in the Essex essays of 1973-4, of the 
poetic “moment” and its role in the poet’s “creative dynamic.” The semantic and conceptual inheritance 
of Langland’s use of kynde in perhaps the most famous of all English dream narratives, Piers Plowman, 
we noted in depth in the previous chapter. In 1997 Oliver contributed a translation into modern English of 
the first 180 lines of Pearl and lines 179-231 of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, as well as a short 
commentary describing the two poems’ plots and “brilliant sounds,” to the anthology Poets on Poets.66 
The posthumous collection of Oliver’s late work, Arrondissements (2003), includes the poem ‘The Video 
House of Fame,’ which derives its title, epigraph, thematic material and narrative structure from 
Chaucer’s dream vision The House of Fame. To these English examples we should add the abiding 
influence upon Oliver of Dante. Although not strictly a dream vision, the Divina Commedia shares with 
the classic English poems of the genre “enough [...] motifs” for it to have been considered alongside the 
more self-reflexive dream narratives of the later medieval period; its influence on Chaucer’s dream 
visions is widely acknowledged, and its influence upon the Pearl-poet has been suggested by scholars.67 
                                                            
66 Poets on Poets, pp.138-141. 
67 The English Dream Vision, p.1; for conjecture on the influence of Dante on the Pearl-poet (also called the 
Gawain-poet) from one eminent Medievalist, see Spearing’s The Gawain-Poet, p.17: “Probably a few 
Englishmen before 1400 had read the fourteenth-century Italian poets. Chaucer was one of them, and it seems 
almost certain that the Gawain-poet was another [...] He seems to have known at least the Divine Comedy of 
Dante, and well enough not simply to translate single passages in it, but to take and synthesize hints from a 
number of different places.” A survey of other texts which consider in more detail the varied influence on Pearl 
of Spearing’s “different places” in Dante, especially elements of “the narrative pattern” of the Comedy, can be 
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Unlike the previous examples, whose influence is bound up in Oliver’s thinking about poetry, the 
influence of Dante can be felt most prominently in the manner in which Oliver was wont to present his 
own life as a poet. We have already seen Oliver’s predilection for describing certain moments of import 
in his life by tacitly referring to the famous opening line of the Inferno. 
 Oliver read Pearl at some point in the mid-late 1970s; certainly he read it after 1973. He was 
given a copy of the poem by the poet John Hall, who “remarked once that The Harmless Building 
reminded him of the medieval Pearl poem because of the role a child plays in it.”68 The plot of Pearl is as 
follows. A grief-stricken narrator swoons into a deep sleep in the garden in which he has lost a “precios 
perle” [“precious pearl”].69 It is implied in the poem, though not, as many scholars assert, definitively 
established, that this “perle” is the dreamer’s infant daughter who died before reaching her second 
birthday. Whilst asleep the narrator experiences a vision of an earthly paradise bedecked with precious 
stones and “crystal klyffeȝ” [“crystal cliffs”].70 A virtuous maiden appears who after some confusion the 
dreamer recognises as “my perle,” the same that he had lost, and with whom he debates the nature of 
salvation.71 The dreamer, overcome with relief that “[his] perle” has returned to him, makes a number of 
foolish blunders of spiritual interpretation during their conversation; these include that the dreamer and 
“[his] perle” will now and henceforth be reunited.72 The maiden admonishes the dreamer for his various 
ignominious errors and assumptions and proceeds to instruct him by means of scriptural paraphrase and 
allegorical reflection in certain particulars of God’s grace and mercy (especially those bearing upon the 
salvation of infants before baptism and the paradoxical nature of heavenly hierarchy), before finally 
affording him a glimpse of the New Jerusalem. Awestruck, the dreamer attempts to pass over into the 
heavenly kingdom, but instead awakes from his dream; the poem ends with an exhortation to all good 
Christians to recognize Christ’s “dere blessing” [“dear blessing”] in the Eucharist and to remain God’s 
faithful “precious perleȝ” [“precious pearls”].73 Scholarly interpretation of the poem is as varied and 
multi-faceted as the poem itself. But some recurrent trends in criticism illuminate what must have been 
Oliver’s strong attraction to the poem as a starting point and model for the development of his own poetic 
thinking. These include, but are not limited to, the narrative emphasis on the death of a child, and, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
found cited in Richard Newhauser, ‘Sources II: Scriptural and Devotional Sources,’ Derek Brewer and Jonathan 
Gibson, ed., A Companion to the Gawain-Poet (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1997), pp.257-275 (268).  
68 CAAS, p.254 
69 Pearl, p.3. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., p.9 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., pp.43-44. 
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thematically, the sense of unity posed by the poem’s formal organisation as well as its narrative 
trajectory.  
 The first of these trends is that which Oliver flags up in his reminiscence over John Hall’s gift of 
his copy of Pearl – that Pearl concerns the “role of a child,” specifically, the death of an infant daughter. 
Critics differ in their treatment of the figure of the lost child in Pearl. The poem’s earliest editors read the 
poem as an elegy on the death of the poet’s infant daughter. This view was challenged as early as 1904 by 
W.H. Schofield, who introduced a measure of allegorical interpretation of the lost child and her 
reincarnation as the Pearl-Maiden.74 Since Schofield, criticism has tended to bifurcate along the lines of 
an emphasis either on elegy or on allegory as the guiding force of meaning in the poem. More recent 
twentieth-century criticism has tended to synthesise these two hitherto irreconcilable poles of 
interpretation, and contemporary criticism can be found across the gamut of theoretical exegetical 
practice, including Marxist, feminist, queer theoretical and deconstructive interpretations.  
 Oliver read Pearl in E.V. Gordon’s Oxford University Press edition, first published in 1953.75 In 
the introduction to Gordon’s edition we find a reductive but influential case for what Gordon calls “the 
real experiences that lie at the foundation of the poem,” which include, as he explains, the fact that “the 
pearl [the dreamer] lost was a maid-child who died.”76 Gordon continues: 
 
[T]he maiden of the vision accepts the identification, and herself refers to her 
death in line 761 [“When I wente from yor worlde wete”] (“When I left your 
world of rain and sleet”) [and] the dreamer himself in lines 483-5 tells us that 
she was not yet two years old [when she died] and had not yet learned her 
creed or prayers [“Þou lyfed not two ȝer in oure þede; / Þou cowþeȝ neuer 
God nauþer plese ne pray, / Ne neuer nawþer Pater ne Crede”] (“You lived in 
our country not two years– / You could not please the Lord, or pray, / Or say 
‘Our Father,’ or Creed rehearse”).77 
 
Gordon’s editorial gloss emphasises the dreamer’s (and poet’s) “real” (i.e. biographical) grief as the 
condition for any doctrinal or allegorical significance the poem might also contain, and places the 
“elegiac basis” at the heart of its interpretation, asserting that 
 
                                                            
74 See W.H. Schofield, ‘The Nature and Fabric of The Pearl,’ PMLA 19 (1904), pp.154-215, and ‘Symbolism, 
Allegory, and Autobiography in The Pearl,’ PMLA 24 (1909), pp.585-675. 
75 John Hall to the author, personal communication, 28.07.2014. 
76 Pearl, pp.xii-xiii. 
77 Ibid., p.xiii, p.28, p.18. For ease of sense I use here Marie Borroff’s translation of Pearl in parenthesis following 
the text of the lines referred to in Gordon’s edition in square brackets. The Gawain Poet, Complete Works, p.147, 
pp.138-139. For a recent, convincing and exhaustively researched refutation of Gordon’s thesis, see John M. 
Bowers, The Politics of Pearl: Court Poetry in the Age of Richard II (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2001), pp.151-
186. 
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the doctrinal theme is [...] inseparable from the literary form of the poem and 
its occasion; for it arises directly from the grief, which imparts deep feeling 
and urgency to the whole discussion. Without the elegiac basis and the sense 
of great personal loss which pervades it, Pearl would indeed be the mere 
theological treatise on a special point, which some critics have called it.78 
 
It is clear from what we know of Oliver’s traumatic experience of family loss and separation – in 1969 
with the death of Tom, and during the time of the composition of The Infant and the Pearl that we 
sketched above – that such a gloss would have resonated strongly with his own personal situation. Tom 
Oliver was himself “not yet two years old” when he died in his cot in Cambridge. Oliver’s mother and 
sister both died during the period of composition.  
 In Oliver’s introduction to his translation of the first three sections of Pearl in the anthology 
Poets on Poets, he says:  
 
The general reader may prefer to ignore scholarly controversy and consider 
Pearl as told by a dreamer who has lost a ‘precious pearl,’ an infant 
daughter.79 
 
Given Oliver’s habit of styling himself as a “townie,” (see Chapter 2, section 2.2) it is likely that Oliver 
himself read the poem in this manner. Nevertheless, such a statement proves Oliver was indeed aware of 
the “scholarly controversy” over the elegy/allegory question, and must at least have had a passing 
familiarity with its major theoretical emphases. To summarise Pearl in the literal, lay terms in which 
Oliver recommends it to the “general reader” would be to describe it as a poem in which a dead child is 
transformed into a vehicle of spiritual and moral wisdom. Before he read Pearl, Oliver had already begun 
to experiment on his own terms with the kind of wisdom his dead child could impart: his whole 
development of the concept of “stupidity” that we traced in Chapter 2 is a testament to this thinking. Here 
was a framework in which the moral and transcendental significance of the death of Oliver’s child could 
be given the most expressive poetic licence possible. Already in The Harmless Building Tom has “the 
true blessedness allowed only to the really low in IQ.”80 Oliver’s discovery of Pearl allowed him to 
develop the figure of Tom in even more didactic and spiritual terms; as we saw above, he becomes a 
veritable image of Christ-like virtue, “like a handicapped Jesus,” emanating “slant-eyed saintdom.”81 
 Gordon’s edition relegates to “mere theological treatise[s]” interpretations of Pearl that 
                                                            
78 Pearl, p.xviii. 
79 Poets on Poets, p.138. 
80 THB, p.13. 
81 SP, p.71. 
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subordinate an elegiac reading to the doctrinal, allegorical, symbolical, figural, tropological and other 
various significances and meanings that critics have discovered in the poem before and since. There is not 
the space here to recount the entire latter day twentieth- and twenty-first century history of the reception 
of Pearl, which is various and complex, and what follows will of necessity plumb this criticism for 
interpretations that elucidate my own critical reading of Oliver’s poem. From Gordon’s introduction 
Oliver would certainly have learned the etymological coincidence of “pearl” and “Margaret,” a 
coincidence which may well have been the original impetus for one the poem’s major plot devices and 
structural ironies: early in the poem Margaret Thatcher’s televised visage becomes a “false pearl” that 
distracts the nation from the spirit of unity it requires to “make a Britain to cheer for.”82 This coincidence 
is that the Pearl-poet/dreamer’s “child may have been actually called a pearl by baptismal name, 
Margarita in Latin, Margery in English.”83 Gordon’s editorial gloss lays no special emphasis on the unity 
of the form of the original Pearl, although many scholars have since done just that.84 It was clearly part of 
Oliver’s design for his poem that it mimic as closely as possible the unity that some have felt characterise 
the entire formal and symbolic organisation of Pearl.85 It was also part of Oliver’s design, I argue, that the 
reflexive attention to the question of unity in the poem reflects and emphasises the unity of form which is 
the poem. I go on to critique, later in this chapter, some of the ramifications of this emphasis in terms of 
the poem’s labour and sexual politics. First we must meet the poem and its protagonists. 
 
3.4 – The Infant and the Pearl – form, plot and style 
 
The length and number of stanzas, the rhyme scheme (ababababbcbc), the frequency of internal rhyme, 
stress and alliteration, and the basic narrative trajectory of the dreamer’s vision in Pearl are all 
                                                            
82 SP, p.62, p.73. 
83 On the first page of the poem in SP, Oliver notes that “Margaret [...] means “Pearl” in Greek.” (SP, p.40). As 
John Kerrigan points out, the Pearl-poet “calls pearls ‘margarys’” three times in Pearl, at lines 199, 206 and 
1037. ‘Mrs Thatcher’s Pearl,’ p.184. 
84 Scholarly recognition of Pearl’s formal and/or symbolic unity is widespread. Dorothy Everett articulates one 
common idea when she points to the fact that “The echo between the first and last lines of the poem gives the 
effect of a completed circle, intended perhaps to suggest the idea of the pearl, which in l.738 is called ‘endeleȝ 
rounde’ [‘endless round’].” Hugh White suggests that “[t]he form of Pearl appears to be an image of the thing 
itself. The poem is, or purports to be, an endless round, its parts linked and measured so as to give an effect of the 
circularity and smoothness of surface proper to an actual pearl,” though White also emphasises that “this form is 
at times breached.” See Dorothy Everett, Essays on Middle English Literature, ed. Patricia Kean (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1964), pp.87-88, and Hugh White, ‘Blood in Pearl,’ Review of English Studies, Vol. 38, No. 
149 (Feb., 1987), pp.1-13 (8). John Kerrigan points out that “an especially fine pearl is technically known as a 
‘union.’” ‘Mrs Thatcher’s Pearl,’ p.198. 
85 The editors of the Cambridge Companion to The Gawain-Poet, for example, write that “[a]ll is gathered together, 
or thought to be gathered together, in a unity” in the work of the Pearl-poet, and argue that the “material, moral 
[and] spiritual elements of life are intimately twined together” such that “the circle of truth, hierarchy, social 
merit [and] social reality [...] is complete.” See A Companion to the Gawain-Poet, p.4. 
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reproduced by The Infant and the Pearl in the style of Pearl’s complex prosodic organisation. Like Pearl, 
Oliver’s poem is composed of one hundred and one twelve-line stanzas in twenty sections of five stanzas 
each. Unlike Pearl, the ‘extra’ stanza in Oliver’s poem appears in the twentieth, rather than in the 
fifteenth, section of the poem. Within the (mostly) five-stanza sections, The Infant and the Pearl contains 
its own “refrain-lines,” “refrain-words,” “echo-words” and “link-words” which so fundamentally 
structure the fourteenth-century poem.86 Oliver’s reflection upon the length of The Infant and the Pearl in 
the poem’s original “Author’s Note” is that the ‘extra’ stanza represents “a return to the sign of unity.”87 
He later described the number of stanzas in The Infant and the Pearl in the following terms: “100 
[stanzas] for perfection, 1 for unity.”88 This statement was made in retrospect in the 1997 Contemporary 
Authors Autobiography Series pamphlet, but its relevance given our explorations of the emphases and 
concerns of Oliver’s writing previous to 1985 is clear. Such a statement provides more evidence of the 
attraction of the fourteenth-century poem as a model to be adopted to Oliver’s purposes, since its prosodic 
organisation so powerfully resonates with the “perfect identity between self and Other” and the ideal of a 
“special” intersubjective “unity” we have argued here and in previous chapters are crucial elements of 
Oliver’s poetic.  
 The very form of Pearl, I suggest, struck Oliver as prosodically mimetic of the major thematic 
and narrative content of his previous work, that of the expression in poetry of an ideal social relation that, 
in practice, only poetry can produce and make available to us. We have encountered this paradox before. 
It is central to Oliver’s thinking about the “moment” or “instant” of author-reader intersubjectivity as it is 
conjectured in the essays he wrote as a mature undergraduate in the early 1970s and as it is developed in 
his 1989 book Poetry and Narrative in Performance. We explored the nature and philosophical 
background to this “moment” in Chapter 1 and saw how it remained, for Oliver, an emblematic and 
discrete property of poetic language. The paradox of a uniquely “perfect” self-other interaction whose 
most complete realisation arrives during the experience of reading poetry we saw further developed in 
The Diagram--Poems, wherein the failure to heed the “spoken kindness” that would institute an 
“authentic politics” nevertheless provides us with a glimpse of what is it that “we know”: that political 
conflict should be harmoniously and judiciously resolved into the “land silvery with democracy.”89 
 Let us compare Pearl and Oliver’s poem side by side. Here is the first stanza of Pearl. 
                                                            
86 I here adopt O.D. Macrae-Gibson’s terminology from his ‘Pearl: The Link-Words and the Thematic Structure,’ 
Neophilologus, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Oct., 1968), pp.54-64 (54). 
87 Oliver, The Infant and the Pearl (London: Ferry Press for Silver Hounds, 1985), unpaginated. 
88 CAAS, p.254. 
89 K, p.121. 
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Perle, plesaunte to prynces paye 
To clanly clos in golde so clere, 
Oute of oryent, I hardyly saye, 
Ne proued I neuer her precios pere. 
So rounde, so reken in vche araye, 
So smal, so smoþe her sydeȝ were, 
Quere-so-euer I jugged gemmeȝ gaye, 
I sette hyr sengeley in synglere. 
Allas! I leste hyr in on erbere; 
Þurȝ gresse to grounde hit fro me yot. 
I dewyne, fordolked of luf-daungere 
Of þat pryuy perle wythouten spot.90 
 
[Pearl, pleasant to prince’s pay 
to cleanly close in gold so clear, 
out of Orient, I hardily say, 
ne proved I never her precious peer, 
so round, so reken in each array, 
so small, so smooth her sidës were. 
Wheresoever I judgëd gems so gay 
I set her singly in singular. 
Alas! I lost her in an herbere; 
through grass to ground it from me yode. 
I dwine, fordolked of love-daunger 
of that privy pearl withouten spot.]91 
 
And here is the first stanza of The Infant and the Pearl: 
 
Lying down in my father’s grey dressing gown 
its red cuffs over my eyes, I caught sight 
of Rosine, my pearl, passing out of my room 
one night while a dream passed out of the night 
of my nation. What a robe she was wearing! Brown 
and sinewy, lion colours in the doorlight; 
she turned, Laura-like, on her face a light frown 
to be leaving, not reproving but right- 
lipped, reddish hair loving the dead 
facial centre; virtue could’ve kept her 
had I enough of it, though I dreamt of it. 
In my grey gown I would have gladly slept by her.92 
 
Oliver’s poem begins, like Pearl, with a loss. This loss is twofold: that of the possibility of a Labour 
                                                            
90 Pearl, p.1. 
91 I use here the relatively recent (but not the latest) translation of Pearl by the late Victor Watts. This translation 
has the advantage, useful to our purposes of comparison with Oliver’s verse, of being extremely faithful to the 
Middle English both rhythmically and aurally. In Watts’ translation the following glosses appear for the quoted 
stanza: “pay” - “pleasure,” “close” - “set,” “hardily” - “boldly,” “proved” - “found,” “peer” - “equal,” “reken” - 
“radiant,” “array”- “every setting,” “singly” - “as unique,” “herbere” - “garden,” “dwine” - “went” and “privy” - 
“my own.” “[F]ordolked of love-daunger,” as the glossator notes, is a “special allusion to the Old French 
Romance of the Rose,” and is paraphrased as “I pine for loss of love.” Victor Watts et al., Pearl: A Modernised 
Version of the Middle English Poem by Victor Watts, ed. and glossed by David Fuller and Corinne Saunders 
(London: Enitharmon Press, 2005), p.25. 
92 SP, p.40. 
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government in the UK given the May 1979 election victory of the Conservative Party under Margaret 
Thatcher, and that of the possibility of the realisation of the “dream” associated with “Rosine,” the poet-
author’s “pearl.” This “dream” is the vision of “Socialism” based on common human “unity” that Rosine 
represents and which, later in the poem, she charges the poet-author with forgetting and ignoring. The 
“dream [that] passed out of the night / of my nation” therefore not only refers to the rise to power of a 
Conservative government which promised to radically alter the terms of the so-called post-war consensus 
in favour of business and City interests and against those of the trade unions, but to the “dream” that 
“Rosine” stands for as an emblem of the ideal social relation captured, for Oliver, by the term “unity.” 
The character “Rosine” first appears in Oliver’s writing in the early novel The Harmless Building. Later, 
in the revised version of his pamphlet The Three Lilies, Oliver describes Rosine as a “desired woman” 
who “represents” in his writing “a political ideal in which the one-sidedness of idealism itself may be 
figured, paradoxically, as transcended.”93 Certainly she is “desired” here: she is “Laura-like,” expressing 
all the attributes of gendered idealism reminiscent of Petrarch’s famously impeccable object of adoration. 
The plot of The Infant and the Pearl centres around the efforts of Rosine to encourage the dreamer-cum-
Oliver surrogate to transcend the “one-sidedness” of his Labour-affiliated “idealism” and to “condemn the 
also-ran / horse-tail-wagging-the-head, trade-union / inspired, internecine, leftist sycophancy” of which 
he inadvertently falls foul, as much as (if not more than) he “condemn[s]” the Tories.94 
 In the notes to the Selected Poems printing of the poem, Oliver names Rosine as a 
“representative of a natural, non-doctrinal socialism.”95 As we have seen, Oliver’s rejoinders to British 
Marxists had been prickly and sceptical at best, belligerent and reactionary at worst, since the late 1960s. 
In designating his central character in this fashion he makes a claim for what the poem later calls “what I 
mean / by Socialism,” “the union between / people,” i.e. that such “Socialism” is “natural” and “non-
doctrinal.” Oliver hereby consciously differentiates what he “mean[s] by Socialism” from what most who 
might self-identify as a socialist in the mid-1980s might express by the term. Oliver promotes 
“Socialism” to a utopian claim on our universal pre-political hidden nature and our propensity for the 
expression of loving connaturality, particularly in (specifically and solely heterosexual) sex, which 
Rosine, earlier in the poem, calls “a union of male / and female in fruition.”96 The refrain-line of the first 
stanza of Oliver’s poem, varied and repeated at the end of each of the first five stanzas (a formal 
                                                            
93 ‘Three Lilies,’ Denise Riley, ed., Poets on Writing: Britain, 1970-1991 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire 
and London: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd, 1992), pp.276-281 (281). 
94 SP, p.62. 
95 Ibid., p.40. 
96 Ibid., p.64.  
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technique borrowed from Pearl) expresses with rising intensity the narrator’s assertion that “I would have 
slept by her,” or, as in the third to the fifth stanzas of the first section, “I would have slept with her,” and, 
in the fifth and last stanza, “I should have slept with her.”97  
 From the beginning of the poem then, political disenchantment is intimately connected to sexual 
loss and being sexually unfulfilled, and being sexually unfulfilled is in turn made to express a kind of 
moral deficit connected with (it is inversely proportionate to) “virtue”; “had I enough of it [virtue],” pines 
the dreamer in the stanza quoted above, presumably speaking for all of us, Rosine might have stayed 
put.98 The scene of mourning in Oliver’s first stanza is not just comparable to, but directly concomitant 
with, the gendered nature of the opening scene of mourning in Pearl. In Pearl the dreamer is “fordolked 
of luf-daungere,” and in this “familiar courtly language” of the 14th century, 
 
the lost object fulfils the traditional feminine role of nurturing life source; she 
is the man’s essential physician without whom his life becomes a disease, a 
nightmare of emptiness and tormented dreams [...] the narrator’s mourning is 
inextricably bound up with the courtly dynamics of masculine identity and 
desire.99 
 
 When Margaret Thatcher’s avatar appears at the end of the first section of Oliver’s poem, she appears as  
 
An empty voice in my empty head . . . 
and sexual absence inhabiting my bed . . .100 
 
“[H]ead” and “bed” both partake of the same ‘B’ rhyme by which the second line is also bound, and 
which ends: “then Rosine had fled.”101 Intellectual, (hetero)sexual and political loss – a contemporary 
“nightmare of emptiness” – are connected by the narrative development and by the intricate sound-play of 
the stanza-form inherited from Pearl, all in the opening section of Oliver’s poem. It will be seen as we 
progress through a comparison of the plot of The Infant and the Pearl and Pearl that this connection is 
repeated in various forms throughout Oliver’s poem, whether negatively – as in the scene above – or, 
inversely and positively, as in the scenes of ecstatic recognition of the “union between / people” in the 
final stanzas. 
 After Rosine’s disappearance at the beginning of the poem, Oliver’s dreamer is taken on a tour 
                                                            
97 Ibid., pp.40-41. My emphasis. 
98 Ibid., p.40. 
99 Aers, ‘The Self Mourning,’ p.57. 
100 SP, p.41. 
101 Ibid. 
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of Conservative Britain in which Pearl’s descriptions of the earthly paradise ironically recur as the 
landscape of “Chance ruling commerce” in London’s City, the dazzling “rych rokkeȝ” [“rich rocks”] and 
“crystal klyffeȝ” of Pearl become the equally overwhelming, but now garishly modern, “city of disdain / 
circled with steel walls.”102 Oliver’s dreamer witnesses the disparity of wealth and means amongst the 
populace, in a land “where Margaret / ruled without Rosine, true mercy,” and “charity” has been forsaken 
in favour of the City’s “reign of Chance.”103 The “chivalric hierarchy” of rich and poor has “no golden 
chain of charity joining them.”104 This criticism of society is a conservative one: Oliver’s dreamer favours 
a paternalistic, philanthropic elite instead of “an arrogant [...] mighty” one.105 Oliver’s dreamer is ushered 
into a “blue Bentley” by a chauffeur, and like the dreamer’s “bed” in the first section, the car at first 
seems empty: “There was no-one inside, simply voices / in a light grainy blue-grey like television.”106 
The car is suddenly inhabited – “[t]he leader herself ‘switched on’” – by two “thin televisual figure[s].”107 
These are Thatcher and Keith Joseph, the former later replaced by an aristocratic caricature “stockbroker” 
called “Sir Pretentious Privilege,” who proceed to guide the dreamer through a scene of contemporary 
poverty comprised of “the idle, the dull, the deprived” and “the drunks,” before introducing him to five 
dioramic scenes representing the so-called “Five Giant Evils” identified in William Beveridge’s 1942 
report on Social Insurance and Allied Services.108 This report, colloquially known as the Beveridge 
Report, is a foundational document for the establishment of Britain’s post-war welfare state legislation. It 
identifies the “Five Great Evils” afflicting the wartime poor: want, squalor, idleness, ignorance and 
disease. These appear in Oliver’s dreamer’s “journey through ruins,” with the exception of “Ignorance,” 
as resurgent evils under Thatcher’s Toryism, but they are dismissed, ignored or downplayed by his 
hosts.109 “Ignorance” is represented in the poem by a Down’s syndrome baby “abandoned by adultdom”: 
the image (and teachings) of Tom Oliver ignored by contemporary society.110  
 John Kerrigan is right to point out that these early sections of Oliver’s poem “follow the example 
of Pearl by describing a spectacular landscape,” and right too to point to the influence of “Langland and 
the winter journey in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight” during section VI, in which the five “giants” are 
                                                            
102 Ibid., p.42; Pearl, p.3. 
103 SP, p.42. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid., pp.43-44. 
107 Ibid., pp.45-46. 
108 Ibid., p.47. 
109 Ibid., p.43. 
110 Ibid., p.49. 
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introduced.111 But it is difficult to know exactly what Kerrigan means when he describes as “satiric 
moralism” the opening stanzas of the poem.112 Certainly the presentation of Thatcher and Joseph as 
television wraiths solely consisting of images perpetually interrupted by bad “video / reception” and 
promulgating a vision of the nation’s “adjustable futurity” is a satirical attack on the manner in which 
Thatcher was marketed to the electorate by Saatchi and Saatchi during her 1979 and 1983 campaigns.113 
And the pompous buffoonery of “Sir Pretentious Privilege,” as he comments upon poverty with his 
“merciless morals of monetary art,” is equally identifiably satiric. Even the poem’s topological inversion 
of Pearl’s dazzling paradisiacal landscape into the inhumane wastelands of “Hazard Country,” “Steel 
City” and the City’s “Street of Good Luck” might be designated “satirical,” since the accumulation of 
such description lampoons contemporary London by depicting the city as a morally corrupt dystopia. But 
the stanzas we began with, those which combine “loving the dead” with the idealised “facial centre” of 
the “Laura-like” feminine emblem of unity, “Rosine,” whose “mercy” marks her out as “the pearl’s true 
minister” over and against the falsity of contemporary political life and debate, seem rather to speak to 
and promulgate a moralism entirely devoid of satiric intention, and entirely replete with the sincerity of 
tone that marks so many of the later stanzas of the poem.114 Even the identifiably satirical elements noted 
above rely on a distinct moral absolutism that would seem to confirm the sincerity of the moralising early 
on; on the “Street of Good Luck” the dreamer finds “a hell-sent / inversion of values,” and elsewhere on 
the same “Street” “all good turned to bad.”115 
 Oliver’s dreamer travels through London to the Houses of Parliament. Here he is transformed 
into a Labour MP “of the lunched-at-Locketts, dined- / at-Whites variety,” referring, as Oliver’s 1996 
notes point out, to the “fancy restaurants much used by politicians.”116 He is “set up to spout / for party 
                                                            
111 Kerrigan, ‘Mrs Thatcher’s Pearl,’ p.187. Kerrigan’s essay is essential reading. His technique is summarised by 
his observation that “The Infant and the Pearl is not about medieval wages and conditions, but reading it helps 
one see that the Parable of the Vineyard in Pearl is more engaged with fourteenth-century economics, and the 
literature of complaint and satire, than critics appear to have recognised” (p.192). My method inverts Kerrigan’s: 
I am interested in what a reading of Pearl, and of the literature surrounding it, helps us to understand about the 
politics and spirituality of The Infant and the Pearl.  
112 Ibid. 
113 SP, p.45. The line-break between “video” and “reception” mimics the “tearing” of an analogue television picture 
due to bad reception; Thatcher appears “beside me, though with some ‘tearing’ / of her upper torso towards me” 
at the end of section IV. SP, p.46. 
114 All quotes taken from the first section of five stanzas, Ibid., pp.40-41. 
115 SP, pp.54-55. 
116 Lockett’s (Oliver omits the possessive apostrophe) was the former name for what is now Shepherd’s, on 
Marsham Street in the City of Westminster. By “Whites” Oliver presumably means the oldest and most exclusive 
gentlemen’s club in London, White’s, which contains a private dining room. Although both are famous for the 
patronage of MPs, both, especially White’s, are far better known for being Tory, rather than Labour, haunts. It is 
perhaps not insignificant that on 12th October 1975 Lockett’s was the site of an attempted IRA attack; a bomb 
was planted outside the restaurant but was defused before it could go off. The threat of extreme political violence 
is therefore just beneath the historical surface of this otherwise innocuously sardonic line, an effect Oliver likely 
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and people, proud that Parliament / had seduced me,” and is presented as the epitome of a competent but 
self-deceptive careerist and opportunist.117 The government and opposition benches in the House of 
Commons are divided in the poem by a “stream” whose providence is the “strem þat dryȝly haleȝ” [“river 
that runs a race”] that separates the dreamer’s locus amoenus [pleasant place] from the “Paradyse” 
[“paradise”] on the far bank in Pearl, and from where the Pearl-Maiden stands and delivers her homilies 
to the dreamer.118  
 Oliver’s dreamer lambasts contemporary Tory policy, in particular the reliance on what he 
understands to be the monetarist basis for government economic policy. He references and paraphrases 
(although does not name) Sam Aaronovitch’s 1981 book The Road from Thatcherism, interpolating 
Aaronvitch’s critique of inflation under Thatcher into the fourth stanza of section XII, and he 
ventriloquises an orthodox Marxist position on Tory policy (also sourced, though less explicitly, from 
Aaronovitch) by drawing attention to “the class bias of this blatant / war on workers, those job losses 
which / were a deliberate disciplining” in section XIII.119 Oliver’s dreamer deceives himself through these 
attacks. His wrong-headedness is modelled on that of the Pearl dreamer, who 
 
sees himself not only as a hero but also, more absurdly, as a scholar. He is 
always ready to bandy argument and texts against the Maiden’s explanations 
of her situation and his, forgetting that she is one of those who ‘thurghoutly 
haven cnawyng’ (859) [‘thoroughly have knowing,’ i.e. ‘completely 
understand’]. In consequent, the Dreamer [...] becomes a comic figure, 
struggling in vain to dominate a world which is not his and which he does not 
understand.120 
 
Oliver’s dreamer’s worldly, learned heroism is of a piece with the spiritual density epitomised by the 
typical protagonist of the dream vision genre. As Helen Phillips argues, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
intended to heighten the comparison of political antagonism with the moral failure explored in the following 
stanzas. 
117 SP, p.56. 
118 Pearl, pp.5-6; The Gawain Poet, Complete Works, pp.128-129.  
119 SP, p.60, and see Sam Aaronovitch, The Road from Thatcherism: The Alternative Economic Strategy (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1981). The fourth stanza of section XII, beginning “I glossed over Margaret’s giant, 
Inflation,” is in effect a bowdlerised recapitulation of Aaronvitch’s analysis of the causes of inflation on p.41 of 
his book: “Capitalists trying to improve or maintain profit margins, trade unionists trying to maintain or improve 
real wages, governments trying to carry through their spending plans – all in a situation of low growth and low 
productivity – create the conditions for an inflationary spiral.” Although Oliver need not have further sourced the 
Marxist “rhetoric” in section XIII from Aaronvitch’s book, it is likely that he did so; see “[b]ut of course the 
Tories are acting completely in their class interests when they try to shift the balance of bargaining power towards 
business and away from the working people” (p.25) and “[t]he object [of Conservative economic policy] [...] is to 
‘knock sense’ into the workers, reduce real wages and rationalize capitalist production, with the weaker going to 
the wall” (p.31), and compare Oliver: “I lambasted the class bias of this blatant / war on workers, those job losses 
which / were a deliberate disciplining, with a decadent / fiscal fiddling to facilitate rich / investments abroad and 
to add to arrant / social disparity at home.” 
120 Spearing, The Gawain-Poet, p.106. I translate and gloss using Watts as a reference. 
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All dreamer-narrators have a tendency to seem stupid to some extent, for the 
encounter between dreamer and dream, or dreamer and authority figure, is a 
structure which splits the didactic enterprise in two, into the learning function 
and the teaching function.121 
 
Oliver’s dreamer’s bad stupidity is in supposing (recall the Tupamaros) what he knows to be the best way 
to tackle Tory policy: “I’d / read Aaronvitch on the A.E.S. [Alternative Economic Strategy], / so I started 
magnificently, like a sinner who defied / a heavenly kingdom where the cliffs were of glass.”122 The 
dreamer’s eagerness to announce what he has read marks him out, “absurdly,” to channel Spearing, as a 
“scholar.” And the counterintuitive simile in the lines I have just quoted confirms rather than explains the 
speaker’s ultimate confusion: he starts “magnificently, like a sinner,” and in doing so he also confirms 
both his inadequacy and his need of guidance by his Pearl-Maiden, Rosine, who duly appears to chastise 
and instruct.  
 It is important to point out here that the language of Aaronovitch (and the language of Marxism 
more generally) is invoked at this specific moment in the poem as a specimen of bad language, stripped of 
compassion, (good) ignorance and unity, and revealed as the “leftist sycophancy” by which term it is soon 
to be denounced. Oliver’s dreamer’s “Marxist” speech already expresses the sound of its own inadequacy 
before it is explicitly identified as such. Punning on the birth pangs of “labour,” possibly as a conscious 
reference to the use of that phrase by the advocates of revolutionary terror, the word “pushed” is used in 
all ‘B’ rhyme positions, encouraging a fastidious, deliberately repetitive plosive alliteration to echo 
throughout the entire stanza: 
 
[...] 
wages were hiked when unions pushed 
hardest; this, helped by a hapless nation 
whose purchasing exceeded production, pushed 
up prices; then the pound’s depreciation 
pushed up import prices, and that pushed 
up not just prices by the expectation 
of price rises to come, which pushed 
                                                            
121 Geoffrey Chaucer, Chaucer’s Dream Poetry, ed. Helen Phillips and Nick Havely (London and New York: 
Longman, 1997), pp.13-14. See also Tison Pugh, Sexuality and its Queer Discontents in Middle English 
Literature (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.39. In his chapter on Pearl Pugh quotes 
Phillips, above, and introducing the quotation states: “The Dreamer’s inability to understand even the most basic 
parameters of the heavenly kingdom reinforces his need to turn to the Pearl Maiden for spiritual guidance, and 
this excessive ignorance is typical of the dream vision as a genre.” Marxism in The Infant and the Pearl is 
excessive (bad) ignorance because it is part of the “whole hollow / conformity of creeds” that Rosine and, 
figuratively if not literally or linguistically, Tom, upbraid in section XIX. 
122 SP, p.59. 
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up purchasing demand [...]123 
 
The sound the speech makes thus condemns its sense to absurdity even before Rosine begins to admonish 
the dreamer, an absurdity of which the dreamer is as yet blissfully unaware. His comic bumbling as well 
as his physically standing up to debate in the House of Commons (“I stood up to speak”) is reminiscent 
of, and inherits the attribution to the dreamer of wide-eyed, unreflective stupefaction in, Pearl’s “I stod as 
hende as hawk in halle” [“I stood there as tame as hawk in hall”] (l.184) and “I stod as stylle as dased 
quayle” [“As a quail that couches, dumb and dazed”] (l.1085).124 
 Rosine then appears in the House of Commons. Oliver’s dreamer “recognize[s] Rosine the way 
you’d recognise / your lover’s look in union as a unity.”125 She appears in lines which announce their 
construction of symbolic significance in a manner reminiscent of scholars’ attempts to unpack the multi-
layered significance of the original Pearl-Maiden; she is described, in other words, in self-consciously 
literary-critical terms: 
 
[...] She doubly symbolized 
both lioness and pearl: lioness in agility, 
pearl in the setting of an immobile paradise 
made active by her movements. In medieval guise, 
she’d denote Mercy, the divine donum; 
secularized, she was Socialism, this wise 
woman walking in the unworldly kingdom.126 
 
We might compare this passage to any number of critical descriptions of the Pearl-Maiden, past and 
present, especially to those by authors concerned to emphasise her polyvalent symbolism such as D.W. 
Robertson, Stanton Hoffman, A.C. Spearing, Theodore Bogdanos and, more recently, Sarah Stanbury.127  
 Rosine is “Socialism,” and she is a “wise woman”; she also “denote[s] Mercy.” Although this 
                                                            
123 Ibid. 
124 SP, p.59; Pearl, p.7, p.39; The Gawain Poet, Complete Works, p.130, p.156. The Middle English “hende” has 
more connotations of “stupefied” and “dumb-founded” than Borroff’s “tame” can summon. See also David Aers 
on hawks in halls: “the point of the simile is to highlight [...] [the hawk’s] confused, dazzled, controlled 
impotence - hawks in human halls have been turned from birds of prey into either domesticated upper-class fowl 
[...] or targets.” ‘The Self in Mourning,’ p.60. 
125 SP, p.61. 
126 Ibid., p.61. 
127 Compare, for example, and especially with regard to Oliver’s “doubly symbolized,” Sarah Stanbury’s 
introduction to her edition of Pearl: “The economy of metaphor [in Pearl], or rather its hyper-economy, lies in its 
uncanny ability to express both equivalence and multiplicity; ostensibly an equation of identity, marked by an 
equal sign, metaphor also adds up to the sum of its parts. The pearl is a gem, is a two-year old child, is a beautiful 
young woman, is the immortal soul, is the heavenly city - as well as a collective of the properties that inhere to 
each term singly.” Sarah Stanbury, ed., Pearl (Kalamazoo, MI: Published for TEAMS by Medieval Institute 
Publications, 2001), available online http://d.lib.rochester.edu/teams/text/stanbury-pearl-introduction [accessed 
05.08.2014]. For the other representative emphases on symbolism mentioned here, see the respective essays in 
John Conley, ed., The Middle English Pearl: Critical Essays (Notre Dame, CA and London: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1970), excepting Bogdanos, for whom see Bogdanos, Pearl: Image of the Ineffable. 
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attribution is couched in the conditional it still clearly pertains to the contemporary significance of 
Rosine, that is, her significance for the 1985 poem The Infant and the Pearl. Sections XIV-XV and XIX-
XX of The Infant and the Pearl are stanzas of chiding admonition, and they are structurally equivalent to 
the passages in Pearl, especially IX-XI and XIV-XV, in which the Pearl-Maiden schools the dreamer in 
points of Christian doctrine. Rosine appears as a “Saint walking in this unworldly kingdom / and my 
world,” and upbraids Oliver’s dreamer for his Labourite pontificating, arguing that no Labour leader since 
the second world war has been able to bring economic stability to the country:  
 
Did Labour, with Wilson, show down-the-line 
courage to win on the wage front? Did Jim 
Callaghan grapple with a single, genuine 
solution to the seventies’ gradual slacking 
that the radicals didn’t reject? To undermine 
is so bloody radical that it leaves all the rootless attacking 
the roots.128 
 
She continues with a welter of criticisms of factional and idealistic Leftism, which include: 
 
Until you can condemn the also-ran 
horse-tail-wagging-the-head, trade-union- 
inspired, internecine, leftist sycophancy 
in a style fit for it, the state is stuck 
with a Tory for pearl and a falseness for policy. 
 
The warm heart, when weak, is politically unsound 
and even Conservative Christian courage 
like that of your father is sounder. 
[...] 
 
[...] The policy pushed through by your premier, 
though bad, was believed in. Not yours. 
 
[...] Tory cruelty – fight that – but if a vote 
goes monetarist you must work for it, until mercy 
mists the eyes and the majority doubt 
no longer that the pearl is false.129 
 
Rosine advocates the practice of patient political acquiescence. Her logic is as follows: Thatcher was 
voted into office; her policies therefore have a public mandate; these policies should be carried through 
“until mercy / mists the eyes,” that is, until their truly damaging effects can be felt and the populace 
realise, in their “heart[s]” and of their own accord, that such policies are “bad.”  
 The Infant and the Pearl contains, in the voice of Rosine, explicit criticism of both Conservative 
                                                            
128 SP, p.62. 
129 Ibid., pp.62-63. 
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and Labour economic policy. The poem attacks monetarism, inflation and unemployment, and it berates 
what it calls the “unfunded promises” and “careless schoolboy accountancy” of Labour, Socialist and 
Marxist economics. But it does so in order to subordinate the question of economics itself to the question 
of unity, and it does so by diagnosing the problems of what Rosine calls “a virtueless nation” precisely in 
terms of its lack of “virtue,” “mercy,” “courage” and, finally and catastrophically, “ignorance.” Left 
opposition to Thatcherism, in the poem, is worse than ineffective without these moral virtues: it is a 
sycophantic scam dreamed up by careerist “Kinnock-clever” politicians which obfuscates and denigrates 
the ideal “unity between / people.” When Oliver’s dreamer attempts to argue with Rosine in the House of 
Commons in section XV, in a passage that continues in the vein of bumbling ventriloquism that 
characterises the paraphrase of Aaronvitch in section XII, Rosine’s garments immediately become rent 
and torn: 
 
[...] (The side of her skirt had a tear; it 
was as if my words whipped age on her, a weal 
of grey skin was scored where the cloth parted.)130 
 
These lines allude to the appearance of Lady Philosophy in Boethius’ Consolatio Philosophiae, a 
foundational and highly influential text for later medieval dream visions, including Pearl.131 In the 
opening passages of the Consolation, Lady Philosophy appears in a “robe” that “had been ripped by the 
violent hands of certain individuals, who had torn off such parts as each could seize.”132 Philosophy’s 
clothing “was originally a seamless robe [...] which was later torn by hostile sects.”133 Party-political 
affiliation is descried as sectarianism of this ilk in The Infant and the Pearl. Leftist animosity towards 
government policy is merest “sycophancy”: it cannot produce an effective argument because its 
alternative policies have not been voted into office, and they are therefore chastised as not “believed in.” 
But more decisively, the very fact of political factionalism, of the party-political structure itself, is that 
which section XII’s allusion to Boethius claims will damage and destroy the “non-doctrinal” unity which 
Rosine, invoking the spirit of Lady Philosophy, represents.  
                                                            
130 Ibid., p.64. 
131 Some Pearl critics assert a direct and thematic Boethian influence on the poem. See, for example, John Conley’s 
statement that “The presumed and belabored issue of Pearl – whether the mourned loss is fictitious or real – is, in 
fact, secondary [...] As the educated person of the Middle Ages would surely have been expected to perceive, 
Pearl is, in brief, a Christian consolatio, analogous in theme, situation, roles, and treatment to Boethius’ then-
revered Consolation of Philosophy.” ‘Pearl and a Lost Tradition,’ The Middle English Pearl: Critical Essays, 
pp.50-72 (71). 
132 Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. P.G. Walsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.4. 
133 Ibid., p.116. 
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 The last sections of the poem follow Rosine, now joined by the ghost of Oliver’s dead father (he 
of the “Conservative Christian courage”)134 and the shining Christ-like figure of Tom Oliver, as they 
upbraid the dreamer for believing that political struggle against Thatcherism is possible without accepting 
the virtue of “ignorance.” We have already read these passages in some detail, and noted too the 
redemptive and salvific elements of Oliver’s symbolism in harmony with those used in the original Pearl. 
This section has tracked the basic plot of The Infant and the Pearl in order to prove and provide some 
points of intersection and comparison with the fourteenth-century Pearl. We have so far been at pains to 
point out these convergences of formal, symbolic, philosophic and spiritual significance between The 
Infant and the Pearl and Pearl, and through these comparisons to suggest the meaning and significance of 
Oliver’s poem in the context of his oeuvre. We now move towards some more detailed exegesis and 
critique. What are the practical political ramifications of The Infant and the Pearl’s connections to, and 
inheritance from, Pearl, and thus of the arguments, primarily about “unity,” “ignorance” and “Socialism” 
in Oliver’s poem? What are the politics of The Infant and the Pearl? Is it even possible to describe the 
“politics” of a poem whose avowed aim is, as I have argued, to undermine the entire structure of political 
organisation in the UK in order to sanction and support a utopian agenda that is modelled on a scene of 
poetical encounter between poet-author and reader? 
 
3.5 – The Infant and the Pearl and labour 
 
We have already established that The Infant and the Pearl is not just formally comparable to Pearl, but 
deeply influenced by all aspects of its textuality, from important convergences of narrative detail and plot 
to significant overlaps of spiritual agenda. This fact is not lost on John Kerrigan, who points out that 
Oliver “is sympathetic to the belief-structure of the dream-frame of Pearl,” and at one point refers to the 
The Infant and the Pearl’s “neo-medievalism.”135 In what respects does The Infant and the Pearl exhibit 
“neo-medievalism”? In what ways does the poem inhabit, refer to or otherwise reflect the arguments and 
paradigms of its formal and prosodic fourteenth-century model?  
 Towards the end of The Infant and the Pearl Rosine delivers a speech in which she makes a 
positive political recommendation. This recommendation begins in a practical, rather than a spiritual or 
utopian, vein. The aim of this recommendation is to define a materialist agenda for the spiritualised 
                                                            
134 SP, p.63. 
135 Kerrigan, ‘Mrs. Thatcher’s Pearl,’ pp.185-186. 
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version of “Socialism” Rosine has just recently (in the previous stanza) promulgated, and into which the 
recommendation segues as it echoes the valorisation of a spiritually-infused intersubjective unity. 
 
[...] We should idolize 
the giants of Beveridge, make a Britain to cheer for, 
a workforce that works for all we are here for 
on earth: the self and its soul whether known 
in the one or the many [...]136 
 
These lines are a complicated mix of exhortation, political enthusiasm, spiritual/mystical utopianism and 
patriotism. The lines are not as syntactically complicated as much as they are conceptually onerous. “We 
should idolize the giants of Beveridge” and “make a Britain to cheer for”; we should also “make” “a 
workforce that works for all we are here for / on earth,” and what “we are here for” is “the self and its 
soul whether known / in the one or the many.” By “idolize” Oliver means to love to excess in a manner 
congruent with his adoration of Tom’s “ignorance.” To “idolize” in this sense, then, is to practice a kind 
of Franciscan veneration of the social ills named by Beveridge; what we “should” do is sacralize the 
condition of poverty and redeem those who suffer from social injustice.137 The “self and its soul whether 
known / in the one or the many” presents a vision of unity both singular and plural, but not specifically 
dyadic; it is at once a vision of perfect selfhood and of the “perfect identity of self and Other” on a global 
scale. Thus, in the poem’s penultimate stanza quoted above, The Infant and the Pearl argues that the 
condition for a just universalism (“all we are here for / on earth”) is a patriotism (“make a Britain to cheer 
for”) that takes its cues from Britain’s early attempts to develop a welfare state (“[w]e should idolize / the 
giants of Beveridge”).  
 Such attempts, as Oliver would have read about in Aaronovitch’s The Road from Thatcherism, 
were stalled from the very beginning, since 
 
The [post-war] consensus [...] was for a welfare system that would, as far as 
possible, not threaten capitalist relationships. The basic principle of the 
famous Beveridge Plan – security of want without a means test – was not 
fully carried out [...]138 
                                                            
136 SP, p.73. 
137 J.H. Prynne, in a letter to Oliver of 01.02.1986, reads Oliver’s dreamer’s “grey dressing gown” as a Franciscan 
symbol, noting that it is “a powerful and deeply-moving device to open with the accidental but evidently pre-
rhetorical inheritance of a notionally Franciscan ethic in the overt symbolism of an assumed mantle[.]” See 
Prynne to Oliver, 01.02.1986, DOA, Box 9. I am inclined to follow Prynne in his reading of the gown, since 
Oliver on occasion explicitly refers to his monkish habit; for example, “I was a new-style, a knowing dreamer, / 
though a grey friar [...],” “Though I seemed a friar / in my gown,” and “friar though I was and wearing such 
rough / clothing,” SP, p.42, p.52, p.54. 
138 Aaronovitch, The Road from Thatcherism, p.98. 
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Rosine’s speech seems, then, to confirm Aaronovitch’s sense that  
 
The movement to throw back the Tory onslaught [...] should not be separated 
from the struggle to change the direction and character of the ‘welfare 
state.’139 
 
But the transition from a national (“a Britain to cheer for”) to an international (“all we are here for / on 
earth”) programme for the development of a “workforce” directed towards the unity of the “self and its 
soul” in “the one or the many” seems both to radicalise and to undermine this practical struggle. It 
radicalises it because such a transition is broadly reminiscent of the transformation of labour itself, its 
emancipation from the strictures of bourgeois economy after the transition from capitalist to communist 
society, described by Marx in his 1875 Critique of the Gotha Programme and discussed at length in 
Lenin’s 1917 The State and Revolution. “In a higher phase of communist society,” writes Marx, 
 
after labour has become not only a means of life but life’s prime want; after 
the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of 
the individual, and all the springs of common wealth flow more abundantly – 
only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety 
and society inscribe on its banners: From each according to his abilities, to 
each according to his needs!140 
 
There is something inescapably revolutionary about Rosine’s demand: to “work for all we are here for / 
on earth” is to radically exceed – just as the clause exceeds the rhyme – the prevailing imperative to work 
“for” the accumulation of surplus-value to the infinite advantage of the capitalist, and it exceeds this 
status quo in the interests of the “all-round development of the individual,” self and other, and the perfect 
equality, through “union,” of a “we” whose inclusivity is limited only by the global geographical locale 
“on earth.”141 
 But in whose interests does “a workforce that works for all we are here for / on earth” really 
work? Consider the audacity of such a statement in a poem first published in England shortly after the 
ignominious end of the 1984-5 UK miners’ strike, the conclusion of which left a legacy of government-
sponsored police brutality in the wake of the Battle of Orgreave (18th June 1984) and a “workforce” 
severely cowed by Thatcherite policy, including the Employment Acts of the early 1980s. Striking 
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workers are hardly “the enemy within” in Oliver’s poem that they were for Thatcher.142 But in the lines 
from its hundredth stanza quoted above The Infant and the Pearl promotes a work ethic with a specific 
history of reactionary privilege, and depicts workers themselves as the benign, idealised beneficiaries of a 
spiritual reconciliation touted as true recompense for their heroic labour. The enjambed transition from “a 
Britain to cheer for” to “all we are here for / on earth: the self and its soul whether known / in the one or 
the many” in fact works to separate the practical “struggle to change the direction and character” of the 
welfare state from the achievement of personal and intersubjective unity, and it thereby undermines such 
struggle. And it separates precisely that admixture of visionary fervour and rational agitation that 
characterises the history of English working class dissent that E.P. Thompson describes and which we 
noted above.143  
 Struggle is undermined because these lines confirm, for Oliver, the irresponsibility of leftwing 
“trade-union- / inspired” agitation and extremist “rent-a-Marx” “rhetoric” that serves only to obscure the 
fundamental truth of unity’s claim on our common humanity. Faith in such agitation, in the poem’s 
account, gives energy to bad types of attitudinising that express resistance against the duty to recognise, 
and act in accordance with, our own ignorance – that is, the duty to act more intelligently than the self-
convinced and ego-driven visions of Marxist polemic would allow. Yet the spiritualised character of 
“Socialism” in the ninety-ninth stanza, the redemptive and salvific implications of “the self and its soul,” 
and the devotional and eschatological overtones of “all we are here for / on earth” combine to promote a 
moralistic ethos peculiarly appropriate to the early capitalist societies from which emerged poems such as 
Langland’s Piers Plowman, as well as Pearl. In this sense Oliver’s politics, as expressed in The Infant 
and the Pearl, are reminiscent not of Marx, but of Langland and the Pearl-poet themselves.   
 David Aers and John Bowers argue persuasively that the moralistic language of earthly toil in the 
service of divine ends is precisely that which was deployed by the landed gentry of the fourteenth century 
in order to reconcile the contemporary “workforce” to the pay and working conditions that same 
workforce so often attempted to re-negotiate to their own advantage during the turbulent period of 
economic upheaval following the 1381 outbreak of the Black Death. Aers and Bowers place the 
authorship of Piers Plowman and Pearl amongst the elitist milieu most concerned to disseminate this 
ideology. For Bowers, the extended verse-paraphrase of the Parable of the Vineyard in Pearl (sections 
IX-XI, lines 497-612) emphasises “the lord’s [spiritual or sovereign] absolute right to enforce labor 
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contracts and to determine the wage-level for the laborers hired for the summer harvest.”144 Noting that 
Pearl was written at a time in which “not everyone [...] would have been so quick to compare Heaven to a 
country landlord,” Bowers goes on to demonstrate at length and in great detail that 
 
It goes without saying that an equation between a beneficent landlord and a 
merciful God [as he finds in Pearl] could only have come from a writer 
whose interests lay almost exclusively with the landed gentry.145 
 
A “workforce that works for all we are here for / on earth” in the context of Oliver’s appropriation of 
Pearl’s spiritual incentives thus fits uncomfortably well with the contractual obligations which the Pearl-
poet means, for Bowers, to reinscribe by using the Parable of the Vineyard “to enforce what was for his 
immediate audience an urgent social as well as spiritual truth.”146  
 David Aers, meanwhile, points out that William Langland’s concern in Piers Plowman is to 
caution his readers against the adoption of market principles which threaten “traditional versions of social 
organization.”147 In doing so, writes Aers, and in  
 
opposing what he takes to be the subverters of tradition, the poet attacks 
lower-class reactions to changed circumstances by deploying a work ethos 
and moralizing vocabulary which is the employers’ response to these same 
circumstances [...] The development of a self-righteous, moralistic language 
of attack on working people who resisted employers’ rules and current needs 
was just one element in the development of an ethos that would prove 
appropriate to early capitalist societies.148 
 
Langland’s intention, however, is to show his readers 
 
how this [work] ethos is now [in the late fourteenth-century] inextricably 
bound up with market energies that subvert the traditional models of 
community and morality he wishes to affirm. [...] What Langland evokes is 
the way a culture of work zealously oriented around a dynamic market 
creates new desires, transforms ‘kynde’ [kind], and positively encourages 
behaviour which has traditionally been viewed as sin, as ‘vnkynde’ [unkind], 
as ‘cruwel’ [cruel].149 
 
 Oliver, too, wants to affirm a particular type of community – unity – defined in contradistinction 
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to contemporary forms of political and economic organisation. The natural moral law of kynde that we 
investigated in detail in the previous chapter would seem, in The Infant and the Pearl, and especially 
when it comes to the politics of labour, to transform the present by employing a social imaginary more 
nostalgic and reactionary than potentially revolutionary. Our natural and inherent propensity to know our 
selves and our souls in harmony with each other exerts a (naturally) concomitant pressure on the 
“workforce” to “work for all we are here for” without the slightest challenge to the current organisation of 
labour, let alone any change in the ownership of the means of production. Oliver’s practical politics are 
therefore utopian, precisely in the sense Jameson articulates when he argues that “utopia emerges at the 
moment of the suspension of the political.”150 Utopian, mystical or otherwise otherworldly political 
solutions are deployed in Oliver’s verse with an arduity and a commitment that promotes into a spiritual 
ecstasy the commonplace of human interaction. The result is a political commitment in verse to the task 
of re-defining politics by first suspending it; indeed, by a process highly reminiscent of the Husserlian 
Einklammerung [bracketing] we investigated in our first chapter.  
 Oliver’s poetry hereby presents a radically non-contingent counterexample to already existing 
politics. This counterexample must begin by establishing that no version of currently existing politics is 
good enough, and by extension, that none ever will be, until the transformation of self and soul in each 
individual makes an “authentic politics” possible. It is the objective of Oliver’s mature political poetry, 
and especially of The Infant and the Pearl, to declare and make apparent this truth, from the general tone 
and shape of the poetry’s narrative, argument and allegory, to the minutiae of particular instances of 
rhyme and enjambment. As a poetic, the argument is revolutionary, because it sweeps aside any and all 
political imaginaries that would stem from currently existing inequalities and injustices. But mediated by 
the specific content of Oliver’s poems, and as a case in point, in The Infant and the Pearl, it is most often 
not revolutionary, because the resulting lack of mediation between the world as it is and the world as it 
should be ends up relegating contemporary struggle, such as the miners’ strike, to the same realm of 
political factionalism as the sheer fact of parliamentary democracy itself. 
 It is not my intention here to critically reinscribe the same lack of mediation I have just now 
discerned in Oliver’s poetic; that is, it is not my intention to suggest that poetry is simply either 
revolutionary or counter-revolutionary. That kind of criticism, to which my argument owes a not 
insubstantial debt, would be reminiscent of the more intractably dogmatic criticisms of the pre-First 
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World War and wartime “bourgeois avant-garde” made in the 1930s by Soviet cultural commentators like 
Lukács and Radek. The debt my argument owes to this kind of criticism is in the form of its attention to 
the practical political commitments of a literature written in a time of political crisis, at least when it 
comes to The Diagram--Poems, The Infant and the Pearl and, although it is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to discuss in any great detail, Penniless Politics. The difference between, for example, Lukács 
and Radek’s criticisms of Joyce’s Ulysses, or of “Expressionism” tout court, and the present discussion, is 
that whilst Lukács and Radek condemn (in the case of Lukács) the failure of Joyce’s novel, 
Expressionism and the avant-garde to depict the totality and thus the reality of social relations under 
capitalism,151 or (in the case of Radek) to present any viable opposition to the global catastrophe of the 
First World War,152 my criticism of Oliver’s work begins with the attempt to understand how global 
politics itself is mediated through the claim to formal exceptionalism that Oliver’s early theory of prosody 
explicitly defines. My criticism begins not from the claim that Oliver’s poetry does attempt to depict the 
totality of social relations as they are mediated by political commitment and desire, or that it does respond 
to, and oppose, global catastrophe (it does both of these things), since this would be to capitulate to the 
same logic of reductive binarism that animates Lukács’ and Radek’s critiques. It begins instead from 
discursive attention to the contradictions immanent to Oliver’s poetry and his conceptions of poetical 
language, such as those discernible from the depiction of the “workforce” we have just now read, 
contradictions that constantly compel attention to the theme of the wholesale reorganisation of human 
sociality under the sign of “unity.” 
 To declare, therefore, as I have done above, that Oliver’s poetic remains “revolutionary” whilst 
the expression of its most pressing imperatives in Oliver’s mature political poems – that we must change 
each other and ourselves before we can change the world – certainly becomes “anti-revolutionary,” is to 
follow the consequences of the poetry’s designs on social relations as they make themselves felt and 
known in the contemporary conditions of social life. The desired end of “what I mean / by Socialism, that 
our soul and our selves are unknown / yet unconsciously known in the union between / people” presents a 
vision of transformed human community the achievement of which must not disturb the current 
foundations of social life lest that method leave itself open to the charge of following any given “hollow 
creed” of political factionalism, just as the Tupamaros’ heroism is marred for the Oliver of The Diagram--
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Poems by what constitutes an inherent part of their activity, namely, armed insurrection. Oliver’s poetry 
cannot countenance either of these methods of achieving that which the poetry is constantly telling its 
readers it is possible to achieve, right now, “in the union between / people,” because both of them involve 
the risk (or the necessity) of violence: one snobbish and intellectually exclusive, the other militant and 
bloody. 
 Oliver’s dreamer’s revolution is achieved harmlessly: in the The Infant and the Pearl’s last 
stanza, “rays / of heartening light, rays of no harm / shot from my eyes to my eyes” in a final scene of 
ecstatic reverie, before, as in Pearl, the dream is broken and the dreamer founders on the shores of reality: 
“[I] awoke in a dawn of our daily disgrace, / lying down in my father’s grey dressing gown.”153 That the 
poem ends on such a note is important. It violently curtails a dream of pacifistic social transformation in 
precisely the same way that Oliver would end the sprawling multicultural New York epic Penniless 
Politics eight years later: 
 
[...] We walk, 20th-century-blind, towards burial, 
pretending that all will come right in some personal heavenly kingdom. 
We wouldn’t know Spirit if, Spirit on top, it fucked us up the ass.154 
 
The irony of these dénouements – that they violently end a dream of non-violent social transformation – 
speaks to the poet’s skepticism of anything so benignly utopian as a bloodless revolution. The end of The 
Infant and the Pearl and the end of Penniless Politics both reiterate the “union between / people” that 
only poetical language can make available to us, because poetical language intrinsically reveals the 
formal structure of an “authentic politics,” and because in the very grain of prosody we are at least 
capable of nominating the “moments” in which “special intersubjectivity” and the prospect of “perfect 
identity between self and Other” are most purposefully and efficiently realised. 
 
3.6 – The Infant and the Pearl and gender 
 
We noted above the gendered idealism of the figure of Rosine that Oliver deploys as a key symbolic 
motif in his poetic repertoire. We noted too that in The Infant and the Pearl heterosexual sex becomes one 
of the defining expressions of the theme of unity, and that at the beginning of the poem the male 
dreamer’s perceived sexual abandonment and loss are intimately connected with political disenchantment. 
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The dynamic of heterosexual anxiety central to The Infant and the Pearl has its roots in the sexual 
dynamics of Pearl, and in the wider genre of medieval dream vision. “This genre,” writes Sarah Stanbury, 
 
which is almost exclusively male in voice, frequently has its origins in the 
loss of a woman: the dead Beatrice, reincarnated in Dante’s Comedy; or 
Chaucer’s Blanche [...] [are] mastered through the work of mourning.155 
 
Oliver’s poem is heavily invested in the gendered symbolic economy of the dream vision genre which 
Stanbury describes. The poem consciously drenches itself in this symbolism. The dreamer “loses” the 
ideally feminised Rosine; he makes a series of blunders which Rosine, in a role akin to that of Boethius’ 
Lady Philosophy, must admonish and correct; and he finally comes to an understanding about 
“ignorance” that Rosine, as divine emissary and intermediary, impresses upon him. But there is a deeper 
problematic at work in Oliver’s poem that concerns not just an inherited symbolic economy, but the 
underlying structure of what is most highly prized in the narrative development in which this historically 
gendered symbolism is put to work, and that is the question of unity. The history of the valorisation of 
“the union of male / and female,” of the sexual “union between / people” called, specifically, “Socialism,” 
is one fraught with essentialist definitions of male and female difference designed to liberate women from 
certain social and religious strictures, but which perpetuate their subordination through the vehement 
reassertion of the continued necessity of other, especially economic and political, ties. That is to say, the 
history of the valorisation of heterosexual union as a touchstone for utopian socialism is dominated by 
sexism. 
 One of the most striking historical examples of the simultaneous assertion of “unity” between the 
sexes (often combined with a strong emphasis on the moral basis of future socialist societies), and the 
maintenance of practical inequality, can be found amongst the nineteenth century French utopian 
socialists, especially amongst the teachings of the leading Saint-Simonians and, later in the century, in the 
writings of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Claire Goldberg Moses summarises the feminism of the (mostly 
male) Saint-Simonian movement in early 1830s Paris in the following way, citing important divergences 
from their Revolutionary predecessors: 
 
In the first place, they opposed revolution because of its association with 
violence and terror. Second, they were Romantics rather than Enlightenment 
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rationalists. They were spiritual, mystical, and visionary. Concerned with 
morality, sentiment, and the emotions, they were determinedly nonpolitical or 
even antipolitical. They called themselves socialists to indicate that they 
wished to create new ways for individuals and classes to relate to each other. 
[...] Third, they were internationalists and pacifists, opposed not only to war 
but even to national boundaries [...]156 
 
The Saint-Simonians effectively venerated a divine “union between male / and female.” The metaphysics 
of their “new Christianity [...] denounced the ‘old Christian’ split of matter and spirit and conceptualized 
an androgynous God, ‘Father and Mother,’” and their ideological leader Prosper Enfantin espoused a new 
world order “ruled by a ‘couple-pope,’ the male to represent ‘reflection,’ the female ‘sentiment.’”157 
Whilst Enfantin’s “mystical feminism” eventually “burned itself out” after a couple of years of internal 
squabble and various charges of immorality, Goldberg Moses notes that the legacy of some female Saint-
Simonians had a significant impact on later nineteenth-century feminist ideas, particularly in view of the 
“contemporary ideology of motherhood” which “extolled female virtues,” enabling French feminists to 
build “on the respect accorded women as mothers to demand their better treatment.”158 “In the historically 
specific circumstances of mid-nineteenth-century France,” argues Goldberg Moses, “the cult of 
motherhood actually served feminism’s purpose” of increased collective agitation and demand for social 
reform.159 But the same ideology was taken up by later male socialist theorists in a manner that intensified 
and formalised Enfantin’s essentialism to a degree of positive misogyny, ably articulated in the writings 
of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. 
 Proudhon’s anti-feminism, promulgated in the name of the utopian socialist ideal he spent his 
adult life advancing, is notorious. At its heart is the union, in marriage, of the patriarchal family unit, the 
centrepiece of the naturally ordained law of justice: 
 
Marriage is the union of the two heterogeneous elements, power and grace. 
Man the producer, inventor, scholar, warrior, administrator or magistrate is 
the embodiment of the former. The latter is embodied in woman, of whom all 
one can say is that by nature she is destined to be the living idealization of all 
the qualities that man possesses in a higher degree, in the three spheres of 
labor, knowledge and rights. This is why women want men to be strong, 
brave and clever. [...] And this is why men want women to be beautiful, 
gracious, modest in speech, discreet and chaste [...]160 
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Proudhon’s conception of love, much like the Saint-Simonians’, rests on a vision of mutuality 
promulgated as “the union between man and woman,” a union that “is not a synallagmatic agreement in 
the manner of the usual contract of mutuality,” but instead one in which 
 
Man and woman together, in both the moral and physical sense, form one 
organic whole composed of two persons, one soul endowed with two minds 
and two wills. The aim of this organism is to create Justice by stimulating 
consciousness, and to enable mankind to perfect itself by itself, that is to say 
civilization and all its wonders. How will this progress towards Justice be 
brought about? It will be by encouraging the ideal that theologians call grace 
and poets call love.161 
 
Philosophies of love that favour the rights of men over those of women are hardly original to Proudhon; 
neither does their history end with his writings. But Proudhon’s reliance on a theory of moral perfection 
innate to the species is peculiarly bound up with his utopian socialism in a manner that remains 
instructive for our purposes. “[Man] carries within himself the principles of a moral code that goes 
beyond the individual. He does not receive these principles form elsewhere. They are intimately and 
immanently part of himself,” and they are “refined” through “social relations” that naturally subordinate 
female to male in all aspects of “social and public life.”162 
 “Are men and women made equal as a result of their union?” Proudhon asks in the fourth 
volume of his 1858 De la Justice dans la révolution et dans l’église [Of Justice in the revolution and in 
the Church]. 
 
Yes, from the point of view of dignity and happiness, in the intimacy of the 
bridal chamber and in their hearts, they are equal. Marriage, which is founded 
on mutual and absolute devotion, entails the sharing of fortune and honour. 
But this equality does not and cannot exist in social and public life, in 
anything to do with the business and organization of life, or with the 
administration and defence of the republic. To put it more clearly, woman 
does not count in these spheres. She is considered as part of her husband [...] 
society does no injustice to woman by refusing her equality before the law. It 
treats her according to her aptitudes and privileges. Woman really has no 
place in the world of politics and economics. Her function begins beyond 
these spheres.163 
 
The purpose of these historical reflections is to point out some important antecedent convergences of the 
ideals of morality, heterosexual “union” and “Socialism.”164 Proudhon’s misogyny is of a different, far 
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more pernicious order of sexual stereotyping than the use of classically gendered female symbols to be 
found in Oliver’s poem. Yet the structure of fundamental moral absolutism which underpins both 
Proudhon’s gendered essentialism and his socialism is also part of The Infant and the Pearl’s political 
argument, as is the theory of natural and inviolable moral perfectibility we saw coursing through The 
Diagram--Poems.  
 We noted above The Infant and the Pearl’s moral absolutism;165 in the previous chapter I 
explored in detail what I called the “moral imperative” of The Diagram--Poems. In The Infant and the 
Pearl the male dreamer “carries within himself the principles of a moral code,” and this “moral code” is 
expressed by the allegorical representative of “natural” and “non-doctrinal socialism,” Rosine: 
 
[...] The feminine 
is numinous in my masculine: it isn’t nonsense 
to picture a pearl placed on a shrine 
inside myself; on the swirling surface 
is Rosine’s reflection [...]166 
 
The end rhyme “-ine” tucked inside the second line by the colon that separates it from the assertion of 
common sense, “it isn’t nonsense,” alerts one to the order of sexuality which subtends the otherwise 
putatively egalitarian division of gender. The placement of Rosine “inside” “my masculine” is hereby 
prosodically confirmed, since “feminine” and “masculine” are not afforded an equal position in the 
formal economy of the line-length but must be separated by the strictures of the rhyme scheme inherited 
from Pearl. Rosine is the “pearl’s true minister,” the ideal representative of a “non-doctrinal socialism,” 
as the poem’s notes name her; the dreamer, we are told, “should have slept with her” instead of delegating 
his political responsibilities to the “hollow [...] creed” of political factionalism on offer in the House of 
Commons. Thus the moral righteousness of inner truth is figured as the object of heterosexual male 
attraction, and the female, whether the “true minister” of Rosine or the “false pearl” of Margaret 
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Thatcher, is figured as the passive recipient either of this attraction: “I would have gladly slept with her,” 
or of an equal and opposite revulsion: the “serious, powdered, severed head / of Margaret.”167 
 The problematic nature of this gendered moral economy is most visible at the end of section IX 
and in most of section X of The Infant and the Pearl. Oliver’s dreamer arrives in the City of London. 
Swiftly disorientated and contaminated by the “inversion of values” that characterises the rapacious 
profiteering of City ideology, the “spiritual insolvency” that accompanies the City’s accumulation of 
capital, and the broader influence of Tory government that “meant ruling the City, the Exchange and the 
Mint” through monetarist economic policy, the dreamer, his “self-image swelled” to the monstrously 
phallic proportions of “the proud ‘I’ of Parliament,” sexually assaults a woman. Here is the second half of 
the fourth stanza and the complete fifth stanza of the poem’s ninth section, and the first few lines of the 
tenth: 
 
[...] Her carefully-cut Rasta-thready 
blonde hair, her wily nether half 
filled me with: sex = self-will = speedy 
orgasm = self-aggrandizement = ‘Steady 
on, I am the dreamer and can dream up suc- 
cess that’s worth more than a wallet. Already 
you’ve gathered my gold on the Street of Good Luck.’ 
 
The next bit’s a mystery: mistreating a woman 
— not even the abuse of another’s soul — 
hadn’t any tie-up with the Tories; but the terrain 
of chance, of Steel City, and the whole 
theme of false values now ran 
through my loins like lust; I stole 
up behind the blonde, crowed like a bantam, 
didn’t go for a posterior goal 
but entered her top to toe. A coal- 
blackness blotted out her silk back 
and I reeled in an utter reversal of role: 
all good turned to bad on that Street of Good Luck. 
 
X 
On that street sex was one-sided and sterile, 
an inversion of self-image on its own image 
as Dante was drawn through the dark navel 
of Satan [...]168 
 
In the stanzas of section X that follow, Oliver’s dreamer emerges “at the woman’s front, facing her, faint / 
with despair to have done such self-damage.”169 These lines, as the first four of section X make clear, are 
a pastiche of Dante and Virgil’s traversal of the physical body of Satan in the final canto of the Inferno. 
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Oliver’s dreamer is made to witness Rosine’s disapproving “frowns” at his actions, “her fair eyes sad / at 
the vicious violation of virtue in / my pretended acts of love, my perverted / rape of the rosy pearl.”170 The 
dreamer is then afforded a vision (within the larger vision of the poem) of the “shining idol” of the 
“beaming baby mongol” “Ignorance” as it gestates inside Rosine’s soul: “The pearl / seed of [Rosine’s] 
Socialism was this subnormal infant.”171 The dreamer seeks “to stabilize the ignorance”; however, in a 
moment that prefigures the final lines of the entire poem, “the scene” breaks down, and he instead finds 
himself on his way to the Houses of Parliament, the blonde woman whom he recently assaulted 
transmogrified into his Parliamentary “secretary.”172 
 As Oliver’s nod to Dante proves, this entire section of the poem partakes, quite explicitly, of the 
realm of conscious literary reference and allusion. The scene of the assault, of what is described in the 
following stanza as Oliver’s dreamer’s “inversion of self-image” (we shall see how the two are linked 
shortly) invokes the scene of geophysical and perspectival inversion in which Dante and Virgil climb over 
Satan’s navel and towards the base of Mount Purgatory: 
 
Ed elli a me: “Tu imagini ancora 
d’esser di là dal centro, ov’ io mi presi 
al pel del vermo reo che ’l mondo fóra. 
 
Di là fosti cotanto quant’ io scesi; 
quand’ io mi volsi, tu passasti ’l punto 
al qual si traggon d’ogne parte i pesi. 
 
E se’ or sotto l’emisperio giunto 
ch’è contraposto a quel che la gran secca 
coverchia, e sotto ’l cui colmo consunto 
 
fu l’uom che nacque e visse sanza pecca; 
 
[“You think you’re still on the center’s other side,” 
he [Virgil] said, “where I first grabbed the hairy worm 
of rottenness that pierces the earth’s core; 
 
and you were there as long as I moved downward 
but, when I turned myself, you passed the point 
to which all weight from every part is drawn. 
 
You are standing now beneath the hemisphere 
which is opposite the side covered by land, 
where at the central point was sacrificed 
 
the Man whose birth and life were free of sin.]173 
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The heightened symbolism and gruesomely euphemistic tone of what is, some lines later, referred to as 
“perverted / rape,” takes pains to advertise its own artifice amongst a welter of reflexive and self-indicting 
imagery, most notably the tendentious equivalence of the equals signs uniting “sex,” “self-will,” “speedy / 
orgasm” and “self-aggrandisement.” We are thus prepared for a deplorable act in the ninth section’s 
penultimate stanza, when the dreamer’s pollution by City life and philosophy in the previous section 
announces and prefigures his transformation, his “utter reversal of role,” into a creature capable of the 
barbarity he is about to commit. The act itself is the culmination of the dreamer, in this “utter reversal of 
role,” channeling “the whole / theme of false values” which now run “through my loins like lust.” As the 
stanza approaches the moment of physical violation the diction rises to a pitch of ghoulish flippancy – 
“posterior goal,” i.e., anal sex – before the phrase “entered her top to toe,” i.e., penetrated her entire body 
by a kind of corporal suffusion, describes the rape in the facetiously innocuous tone of abstract Ovidian 
violation. 
 We should compare the rape scene in The Infant and the Pearl to Oliver’s reading, in the first of 
his essays written as a mature undergraduate at the University of Essex, of Chaucer’s ‘The Wife of Bath’s 
Tale.’ 
 
[Chaucer’s] own realism in depicting the wife combines oddly and 
effectively with the medieval chivalric tradition of service to women. Her 
own wish for marital “maistrie” colours a traditional theme of the knight 
(eventually) yielding “maistrie” to weak womankind. All the same, when the 
knight has yielded the “maistrie” that superior physical force would give him, 
and allows the foul, old woman to decide her own future life with him, a 
redemptive, magical event occurs, one which incidentally redeems time itself, 
for the woman grows young as well as true. Earlier, he has raped a young 
maiden: it is this self-centred, sadistic act which has set him into a desperate 
relationship with time, for now he has but a year to find the answer to the 
queen’s question, what do women most desire? A bad relationship with time 
is here properly allied with distorted body-image (“headlessness”) and bad 
feelings.174 
 
Oliver’s reading here develops a binary moralism based on the gendered spectrum of “foul” and “old” in 
contradistinction to “young” and “true” women in order to emphasise and countenance the greater good 
and eventual redemption of the male protagonist. His commentary recalls Carolyn Dinshaw’s reading of 
authorial perception in ‘The Wife of Bath’s Tale’: 
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The Wife is a source of delight for this male author [Chaucer] precisely 
because through her he is able to reform and still to participate in patriarchal 
discourse; he recuperates the feminine within the solid structure of that 
discourse.175 
 
Oliver’s knight, like Dinshaw’s Chaucer, is “able to reform” by sanctioning what Dinshaw refers to, pace 
Sheila Delany, as the “sexual economics” of exchange (metaphorical or literal) of female bodies.176 
 In both Oliver’s early essay and in The Infant and the Pearl the rape is “bad” because it 
represents the male protagonist’s “reversal of role” and his “inversion of values.” In The Infant and the 
Pearl the rape, like the knight’s actions in ‘The Wife of Bath’s Tale,’ is “self-centred” and “sadistic”: 
Oliver’s dreamer is “faint / with despair to have done such self-damage” [my emphasis]. All of these 
terms apply to the moral depredation sexual assault inflicts self-reflexively upon the rapist. They do not 
concern the suffering of the female victim. The female victim in The Infant and the Pearl, we should 
remember, is a fantastical embodiment of “false values” whose appearance and treatment is completely of 
a piece with the inherited allegorical schema and economy of violence that pervades medieval dream 
vision. The dreamer is dreaming; the narrative is the description of this dream; everything he does is 
therefore, to some extent, directed towards himself. At this point in the poem Oliver deliberately makes 
his own authorial avatar complicit in a violent act that cannot be explained away by political corruption: 
“mistreating a woman [...] hasn’t any tie-up with the Tories.” He does this, I suggest, with the full 
knowledge that such a moment risks repeating the historical economy of violence of which it partakes at 
the same time as expressing horror and revulsion at its continued cost. Rape as a literary trope is self-
consciously deployed in order to be literally disgusting. The act is “an utter reversal of role”: it is the 
farthest possible point from the utopian state of social relations that the dreamer desires. 
  John Kerrigan states that the rape scene in The Infant and the Pearl is “allegorical [...] a piece of 
comic-grotesquerie.”177 What we must also consider is how this allegory functions in the development of 
the poem’s plot and political argument in light of the question of unity. Kerrigan usefully addresses the 
historical meaning of the scene. He points to Piers Plowman’s “Lady Meed” as a model for the “wily 
blonde” in Oliver’s poem, noting that Meed “can be viewed as a parodic antitype of the chastely 
bejewelled pearl-maiden.”178 In Piers Plowman Lady Meed is united with False (or “Falseness”), and the 
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two are “enjoigned” [“joined”] in matrimony by Simony and Civil Law.179 Meed “is y-maried more for 
here goodis / Than for ani vertue or fairenesse or any free kynde” [“is married more for her property / 
Than for any goodness or grace or any goodly parentage”], making her particularly relevant as an 
archetypal embodiment of the “false values” of the City of London that Oliver’s poem descries.180 She is 
in fact the gendered receptacle of all that is unkynde and therefore, in Langland’s worldview as described 
by David Aers, morally and spiritually reprehensible. 
 Oliver’s dreamer’s “perverted / rape” of the “wily” City woman updates the setting of this false 
union but does not change its fundamental allegorical function: to provide a “perverted” “inversion” of 
“the union of male / and female in fruition.”181 The structure of fundamental moral absolutism which 
underpins Proudhon’s essentialism in the name of what is called “Socialism” is also in play in The Infant 
and the Pearl. It is this deep-seated, absolutist moralism, the desired end of which in the The Infant and 
the Pearl’s pedagogical narrative is “Socialism,” that allows Oliver to employ the City woman as a 
narrative device whose function is the development of his male dreamer’s journey towards moral and 
spiritual redemption: the assault in section IX affords Oliver’s dreamer with a vision of both Rosine and 
the “baby mongol” (Tom) that prefigures the ecstatic glimpse of “union between / people” in the poem’s 
final lines. The woman on “The Street of Good Luck,” just as the “young maiden” in Oliver’s reading of 
Chaucer’s ‘The Wife of Bath’s Tale,’ is raped so that she (or, in the case of Chaucer, another woman) 
may provide by proxy an exemplum of “false” unity; not the “union of male / and female in fruition” that 
Rosine lauds early on in the poem, but its lewd and deplorable mirror image.  
 Patricia Klindienst Joplin speaks to this use of the female body in Western literature, and 
particularly in Greek myth, in her essay ‘The Voice of the Shuttle Is Ours.’ She asks, citing ‘The Rape of 
Lucrece,’ “why the greatest of our writers, like Shakespeare, represent their own language anxiety in 
terms of sexual violation of the woman’s body.”182 Her account is of further relevance here for its 
discussion of violence: 
 
[...] female chastity is not sacred out of respect for the integrity of the woman 
as person; rather, it is sacred out of respect for violence. Because her sexual 
body is the ground of the culture’s system of differences, the woman’s 
hymen is also the ground of contention. The virgin’s hymen must not be 
ruptured except in some manner that reflects and ensures the health of the 
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existing political hierarchy.183 
 
In Oliver’s poem, “female chastity” would appear to be “sacred” out of respect for non-violence, and the 
rape of the “wily blonde” the signal violation that proves by reflection the pacifistic kyndeness of “union 
between / people.”  
 The scene at the end of section IX in The Infant and the Pearl depicts a terrible crime against 
“another’s soul,” and it does so in the language of self-disgust designed to powerfully condemn such a 
wretched act of violation. The scene further allegorically indicts the “whole / theme of false values” for 
which the Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher in 1985, its economic and social policies, 
and its City allies, in the poem, stand. Rape in this poem is the ultimate wrong – “the abuse of another’s 
soul” – and to bring that point home the poem re-enacts it through horrifying euphemism; all the more 
horrifying since the tone employed forces the reader’s imagination to concretise the moral evil into 
physical assault. But the moment finally suffers from the brute force of its own deliberate toxicity. At this 
point, the entire play with the model of dream narrative seems transparent and precarious. The gendered 
moral economy that The Infant and the Pearl employs as part of its broader political argument about 
“unity” further results in the relegation of female bodies to the status of equivalent vehicles of spiritual 
pedagogy: Oliver’s dreamer’s victim is miraculously transformed first into Rosine, who “frowns” at the 
dreamer, instigating his shameful penance in view of the “shining idol” Tom, and then into the dreamer’s 
“secretary,” whom he accompanies into the scene of the final lesson regarding “ignorance” and “union” 
in the House of Commons. Heterosexual rape is denounced in The Infant and the Pearl in the strongest 
terms of the poem’s moral vocabulary, terms which include the explicit intertextual intimation of an evil 
inversion. But in doing so, rape is also phenomenologically promoted to the status of bad union, as well 
as politically reduced to a crucial stage in the male dreamer’s spiritual instruction.  
 
3.7 – Conclusion 
 
In The Infant and the Pearl’s “union between / people” we find a powerful distillation of the poetic we 
saw developed in Oliver’s essays from the University of Essex in the early 1970s, thinking which also 
informs The Diagram--Poems with the “emotional urgency” of moral obligation. The Infant and the Pearl 
argues that no version of political affiliation, no existing politics, is sufficient to transform the “nation” in 
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a way that would improve the lives of the country’s most disadvantaged; it is, the poem’s hundredth 
stanza asserts, “[u]nthinkable [...] / to pretend that the poor will profit from policies / whose mercy has 
greyed in the pearly mirror / of the nation’s identity.”184 It is “[u]nthinkable” because the “nation’s 
identity” is thereby hi-jacked either by the invasive parasitism of the fluorescent TV-phantoms of Saatchi 
and Saatchi’s Thatcher-avatar, or by the alternative but insolvent strategies of the Marxist left. Both are 
doomed to failure, because both ideologies lack the necessary “mercy” that would enable them to 
acknowledge that “the highest human intelligence is a near / relation of ignorance.”185  
 It is worth pointing out once more, as we did at the beginning of the previous chapter, how 
extraordinary this is as a political argument directed against specific institutional targets. Oliver’s great 
achievement in The Infant and the Pearl is to level in medieval pastiche a rejoinder to contemporary 
politics whose terms are infinitely in excess of the material and social situation to which the poem speaks. 
This enables the poem to exert a purchase on political life in the UK that is at once satiric and utopian, 
both nihilistic and extraordinarily hopeful. By claiming through the inheritance of a medieval paradigm of 
spiritual moralism the sheer insufficiency of the contemporary political landscape, The Infant and the 
Pearl makes political transformation contingent on the attention to the object of poetical discourse itself: 
prosody in Oliver’s poem, as the early essays argue of all poetry, is not simply mimetic or representative 
of “unity,” but as close as we can get to its perfected lived instantiation. The line-break “between / 
people” declares this fact and exacerbates the social efficacy of its design. Moments such as this in 
Oliver’s political poetry figure the composition of politics itself based on the immediate and unmediated 
meeting of poet-author and reader in untrammelled intersubjective union. This kind of politics is only 
available in poems. 
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Coda 
 
The Infant and the Pearl and Penniless Politics both strive to realise a utopian political vision in verse 
and both end with damning evaluations of the entire endeavour. Their last lines are, in the case of The 
Infant and the Pearl, 
 
I began crossing the gutter that only grace 
can cross. I caught a mere trace 
of grey from the gowns, her grave frown, 
and awoke in a dawn of our daily disgrace, 
lying down in my father’s grey dressing gown.1 
 
whilst Penniless Politics sinks 
 
[...] We walk, 20th-century-blind, towards burial, 
pretending that all will come right in some personal heavenly kingdom. 
We wouldn’t know Spirit if, Spirit on top, it fucked us up the ass.2 
 
These endings are not the same. But they offer comparable moments of termination in which the poet-
speaker (or imagined collective body), prostrate in both instances, is violently wrested from each poem’s 
self-consciously poetical dreamworld and firmly placed in a scene, and a position, of submissive 
abjection. This kind of termination exercises an overwhelming retroactive power over the rest of the 
poems, and promises, or threatens, to inflect or undo their every argumentative twist. We have known all 
along that these are poems – neither poem lets us forget it – but the rebarbative reflexivity with which 
they both conclude is nevertheless remarkable. It is in the face of this kind of termination that the poems’ 
desire to instantiate a field of political efficacy within the bounds of poetic form itself must be read: not as 
the unconditional fantasy of the world as it would shine in the messianic light of the infant child’s 
radiance, or by the temporary, heart-warming glow of the ecstatic multicultural and constitutional 
harmony of Spirit, but rather as the kind of fantasy which the humanity universally implicated by its own 
collective wish-fulfilment is not even remotely capable of seriously dreaming. It is an indictment the 
poems level at political consciousness at large. 
 The jarring despondency of The Infant and the Pearl’s ending, at least, is somewhat alleviated by 
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the formal conceit of the waking dreamer that its imitation of Pearl demands. Yet both endings seem to 
suggest the unavoidable futility of the poems’ own central arguments about political transformation and 
its prosodic facilitation via the poet’s creative dynamic, about the possibility of a “true politics.” Why do 
these poems end in this way? One answer to this question might be: in order to prevent the runaway 
notion that this very “creative dynamic” exercises any presumption of worldly design outside of the 
bounds of the intersubjective encounter it so carefully delineates. Politics, these endings might forcefully 
admonish, cannot, finally, be made here; and by asserting this they underline the effort of the imagination 
required to produce a scene of social relations unlimited by the failures of parliamentary democratic 
process, by what Penniless Politics calls “our ordinary political failure.”3 Such a reading would serve as a 
stern reminder of the literary limitations of utopia and of the practical political activity to be maintained in 
the face of these limitations. But this answer is also too comfortably cynical for any seriously utopian 
project, and it is furthermore at odds with the effort of passionate political and anti-political thinking that 
we have consistently discerned in Oliver’s work. These endings do not insure the poems against the 
collapse of their complex dramas of political adventure into agitprop. Instead, I suggest, they play out the 
literalisation of poetical-political desire into brute complicity with an impotent, sanctimonious and all too 
predictable dream of a better world, and this play is productive rather than proprietary, a further, brazenly 
non-contingent apostrophe to the contingency of existing political solutions, rather than a deferential, 
realistic acknowledgement of their ineffectiveness. 
 The challenge to the reader of The Infant and the Pearl and Penniless Politics that their final 
lines present is this: they ask that the question of aesthetic and social identity be suspended in favour of 
attention to the urgency of political fantasy which has enabled that identity to emerge, on the horizon of 
aesthetic contemplation, over the course of the poems’ reading. The poems make this challenge in 
different ways and in different contexts, but the challenge is broadly the same. It is made more violently 
in 1991 than in 1985. The image of phallic, patriarchal violation is stronger – a more masterful and 
dramatic flourish of repellent mastery, in common with the gendered moral hierarchy we discerned in The 
Infant and the Pearl – than the language of disgrace. Grace may be conferred in the future, since that is, 
after all, its function and its purpose for a redeemed humanity; but right now we are fucked, “heaven” a 
merely “personal” pretence. If the poems ended in a spectacle of triumphant, Dantean spiritual harmony, 
or if they concluded with an earnest rejoinder to the reader to make up the literary deficit with socio-
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political commitment, their powers to reflect reality from the privileged standpoint of artistic speculation 
would be betrayed by a garish pretension to wholesale omnipotence. But “if each and every artwork 
involves a probably aporetic nexus of problems” such as we encounter in these poems, especially in their 
final lines, “this is the source of what is perhaps not the worst definition of fantasy.”4 And Adorno 
continues: “As the capacity to discover approaches and solutions in the artwork, fantasy may be defined 
as the differential of freedom in the midst of determination.”5 The endings of The Infant and the Pearl 
and of Penniless Politics refuse the autonomy of free-floating reverie, or the authority of clumsy 
didacticism, by driving the poems into the heart of the world they would transform. By doing so they 
ensure that the element of fantasy, the “union between / people” realised in a “land silvery with 
democracy,” is firmly lodged in the midst of the existing. It is the differential of the poems’ internal 
contradiction between fantasy and reality, powerfully epitomised by their endings, that secures and 
maintains the fantastical in the face of the real, of what The Infant and the Pearl calls “our daily 
disgrace.” The appearance of these endings binds the poems irrevocably to the world which would 
condemn their dream of kindness, of spirit, and of unity, to failure. The poems’ last lines thus demand 
contemplation of another world entirely as the starting point for thinking about the daily practical refusal 
of this one. 
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